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ABSTRACT 
 
Submitted work “Analysis, management and trade-off with risk of technical facilities“ 
deals with the all type of risks associated with the technical facilities, particularly with 
the complex ones, with aim to ensure their safety. It demonstrates the ways of work 
with risks at phase of identification, analysis, assessment, management and putting 
under control aimed to the safety of both, the technical facilities and their surroundings 
(i.e. their mutual coincidence), and simultaneously respecting the current knowledge 
that the risks are locally and time-specific.  
The safety is understood as a property on the level of the whole technical facility, which 
is determined by the quality of the file of anthropogenic measures and activities aimed 
at the safe technical facility, and even at its critical conditions. Therefore, at safety 
make up, the publication proposes to monitor both, the public assets and the technical 
facility´ assets, and together to consider the diversity of their physical natures, vulner-
abilities, and the constituent changes over time; which means continuously to solve 
emerging conflicts.  
Since the risks are the causes of the technical facilities accidents and failures in the 
processes of the sitting, construction, operation and decommissioning with regard to 
public assets, so the considered goal is ensuring the coexistence of technical facility 
with the surroundings, i.e. with public assets, which include the human lives, health 
and security, property, public welfare, the environment, other technical facilities and  
technologies, and infrastructures.  
With regard to the dynamic development of the world, it is necessary to monitor all 
priority risks and to implement their management and bringing under the control with 
regard to improving or at least maintaining each technical facility safety at an accepta-
ble level. This means to make up the safety management system (SMS) of each tech-
nical facility that respect at work with risks the variability of the world in time and space, 
i.e. normal, abnormal, critical, and in some cases of technical facilities (e.g., highly 
dangerous chemical or nuclear facilities) also extreme conditions. The SMS needs to 
contain the procedures for the control and management of critical situations.  
The publication “Analysis, management and trade-off with risks of technical facilities“ 
summarizes problems and shows methods and procedures for their solution based on 
system concept and present findings and experiences from practice obtained by detail 
research. It summarizes the results of specific research performed in project “Řízení 
rizik a bezpečnost složitých technologických objektů (RIRIZIBE)“ CZ.02.2.69/0.0/ 
0.0/16_018/000”; detail data and results are in the Czech publication and in the CVUT 
archives. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The technical facilities belong to human system that is a model of our  world.  The 
security and development of whole human system and its components, i.e. also the 
technical facilities, are disturbed by disasters, i.e. internal and external phenomena 
that lead or can lead to damages, harms and losses of given entities assets. Each 
technical facility safety is affected by both: 
- the processes, actions  and phenomena that are under way in human system, tech-
nical facilities, human society, environment, planet system, galaxy and other higher 
systems, 
- the humans´ behaviour and human  management acts. 
Therefore, we need to negotiate with risks of different origin and kinds.    
The aim of human effort is to ensure the humans lives, health and security. Therefore, 
on the basis of current knowledge summarized in books from ESREL conferences  [1-
11] and in  books [12-16], the humans need to take care on basic public assets (i.e. 
the human lives, health and security; the property and public welfare; the environment; 
infrastructures and technologies). The basic assets of human system (public assets) 
have system nature [12] and are shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. Human system public assets. 
 
Due to world and its entities characters, we use the system (holistic) thinking, the typ-
ical feature of which is the focusing on the whole and its accessors. The accessors are 
8 
 
elements, linkages and couplings among the elements. The characteristics of a system 
thinking [14] are to: 
- see both, the whole and the details at the same time, 
- focus on the dynamics of processes, 
- pay attention to relations, associations and interactions, 
- consider the roles of feedbacks, 
- consider the relativity of possible situations, 
- think in a long-term way. 
According to system concept [16], each whole (entity) includes the elements, links and 
couplings among the elements which have different character, and therefore, accent 
needs to be put on: 
- study of the interactions and associations, 
- non-linear thinking, interactions, 
- inductions, 
- feedbacks, 
- experiments or realistic simulations. 
Findings and experiments show that feedbacks cause non-linearity’s in the system be-
haviour that are not predictable, and therefore, it is not possible to use the common 
prognostic methods for the identification of the possible conditions of a system [13,15]. 
Since, in the world it is not only a human society, but also other systems (and all sys-
tems are open), which are not subordinated to the human society. Therefore, the con-
flicts originate, e.g.: human vs. environment; technique vs. environment; human vs. 
technique; human vs. human; human vs. IT; technique vs. IT; and IT vs. IT. Therefore, 
the co-existence of basic systems that represent environment, human society and 
technology is the main target of anthropogenic management [1-15]. 
Because the human kind grounds on its education, thus in the present case, it needs 
to realize the actions and management based on knowledge, which accumulated the 
science and historical experience of life. This shows that there is a limit for the human 
activities, which cannot be exceeded, in order to prevent the destruction of mankind. 
The starting point is to accept the need for the co-existence of several systems and 
search conditions and ways of controlling it [12-15]. 
The coexistence and sustainable development strategy are comparable with other sys-
tems of values, which do not have the final form (e.g. the system of human rights and 
freedoms). It leads to ensure the highest attainable quality of life for the present gen-
eration and to create conditions for quality of life of future generations, even knowing 
that the ideas of the quality of life of future generations need not to be compared with 
our visions [12].  
The humans knew during their development that they need for live the nature and a 
number of other assets. They understood that: 
- the great values for them are their existence, security and development potential,  
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- and that the safe world has been disturbed by harmful phenomena (disasters).  
From the evaluation of credible data, knowledge and experience, e.g. [1-17], it follows 
that the human knowledge and capabilities are: 
- small to avert disasters, which are the manifestation of the evolution of the planetary 
system of the Earth, 
- adequate to mitigate the impact of disasters, which are the manifestation of the 
evolution of the planetary system of the Earth, 
- sufficient to prevent disasters that are associated with the activities of humans and 
with the development of human society. 
To use the knowledge and skills the humans consciously create a comprehensive sys-
tem tool, which is called the safety management and also specific targeted tools to 
deal with emergency and critical situations, which are emergency management and 
crisis management; in the professional literature they can be found, as well as other 
tools such as disaster management [17]. This tool is based on the targeted work with 
risks, which would be integral part of entity management [15].   
For qualified management of entities, according to the present knowledge and experi-
ence, it is considered a strategic safety management of entities in the dynamically var-
ying world, which means the skilled management of disasters [17], which is based on 
the approach of "All Hazard Approach" that was introduced by FEMA in 1996 [18] and 
it is used by EU and OCHA [12,17]. For the Europe it was delimited by research in the 
FOCUS project, the result of which are in books [13,19-21].  
For human life quality, it is necessary both, the co-existence of mentioned essential 
systems and the provision of humans needs that are in hierarchical Maslow pyramid 
22 (needs are: physiological; security; social; sociable assertiveness, self-realiza-
tion).  
Having regard to the complexity (Figure 2), multidisciplinary and the interdisciplinary 
nature of the solved problems, understanding the situation and finding the solutions for 
the humans´ security and development, the technical facilities safety is based on the 
systems approach, a comprehensive concept of safety and proactive way of safety 
management, because the human space (our Planet and its surrounding) is dynamic, 
i.e. it is variable in the space and time in particulars and as well as in a whole [12,13].  
From the critical analysis of emergency up to critical situations in human system, in 
detail described in [12,17], it follows that the cause of critical situations are natural, 
technological and other disasters. To other disasters, they belong the organisational 
accidents that are connected with a human factor [12-14]; especially with the phenom-
ena as: 
- low respect to knowledge and engineering experiences, 
- low professional level of management, 
- corruption, 
- abuse of power, 
- suppress of the public interest.  
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Figure 2. Scheme of complex systems  - 1, 2,… are the processes being under way in 
mentioned entity. 
 
On the basis of current knowledge, the reasonable humans negotiate with the risks so 
that systematically carry out the preventive, mitigating, reactive, and recovery 
measures and activities in order to they might avert unacceptable impacts that cause 
the losses to both, the humans and the public assets that are inevitable for human 
society existence and development [12-14,19-21]; scheme is in Figure 3. Because of 
their knowledge, capabilities and possibilities are limited in the subject area, so on the 
basis of the experience they constantly prepare to cope with the situations, which are 
caused by an occurrence of a variety of phenomena, with harmful impacts on them 
and on the vital assets.  
 
Figure 3. Time sequence of phases in which the measures and activities for defending 
the risks are performed.  
 
From reason of human development, it is necessary to apply the strategic manage-
ment to each important entity (State, territory, object, organisation) directed to the long-
term sustainability, which on our knowledge means the targeted work with risks of all 
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kinds. Therefore, the risk is now the dominate concept of our society. According 
to findings summarized in [1-16,19-21], the risk is connected with complex phenom-
ena, conditions or factors:  
- uncertain natural hazards, technological accidents and other disasters [12], 
- uncertainties that are in science and technology findings and their action on health 
and quality of human life, human vulnerability and lack of consistent explanation of 
living sorrows and their sense 
- and the human play with fear, chances and opportunities.    
Due to complexity of human system and all public assets including the technical facili-
ties, the humans need to consider at management: 
- system interconnections of living assets, 
- mutual interconnections among many open systems, 
- and development dynamics vs. human ways of problem solutions.  
The human hierarchy of problem solution has the levels shown in Figure 4 [13]. 
  
 
 
Figure 4. Levels of problem solving used in theory and practice. 
 
For general aims reaching, the goals on all levels need to be targeted in same direction 
and to be co-ordinated 12-15.  With regard to different development of structural open 
systems in the world, there is necessary to expect the conflicts, and therefore, the 
human needs to monitor the changes in the world and to be prepared the originated 
conflicts to solve in time 13,14. 
Basic tools of human society for provision of needs [12,14] are correct control of human 
society, which is divided in to:  
technicaltechnical
operative / functional
tactical
strategic
political
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- management of safety and development, 
- emergency management, 
- crisis management, 
(Figure 5) and good asserting the knowledge and exercises at negotiation with risks 
directed to public interest [12,13]. In this respect, the big roles prove to managerial and 
engineering disciplines that have capability to ensure the human existence, human 
security and the potential for human development.   
  
 
 
Figure 5. Three levels of the State (i.e. human system) management. 
 
To ensure the human lives, health and security, therefore, on the basis of current 
knowledge [12], the humans need to: 
- take care on basic public assets (Figure 1). Technical facilities belong to essential 
public assets because they: provide products and services that improve the human 
lives; contribute to employment, technical education, energy self-sufficiency and 
competitiveness; and create a background in response to critical situations (each 
response needs energy, technical resources, finance, transportation, material, 
etc.), 
- adapt their behaviour so it might be preserved the coexistence of essential systems 
(environmental, social, and technological) that are inevitable for the existence and 
life of humans, i.e. for safe human system that has the nature of the SoS (Figure 
2); i.e. an open system of systems, which is a collection of series of mutually pen-
etrating open systems. Interfaces are the source of internal dependencies, called 
the interdependences, namely by those that are required and as well as by those 
that are troublesome; and some of which take effect only under specific conditions. 
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Therefore,  in engineering sciences, the important role is connected with factor 
called “limits and conditions” [13-15]. 
For reaching the given target, the humans use the tool "management". Management 
is a very broad term and it means "to have something under direction, to control, to 
manage, to regulate, to govern". From the time of  Mr. Taylor, the scientific manage-
ment founder 23, and his successor Mr. Fayol 24, the basic management functions 
have not changed. The executors of the management are the humans, who lead the 
given entity to the prosperity and efficiency. The fact in question also applies to the 
semi-automatic and automatic control, because their algorithms are created by hu-
mans. In the real world, the humans may well drive their behaviour and the behaviour 
of the technical products and facilities that they created, when they perceive the limi-
tations of their capabilities and skills, and with regard to it, they propose and implement 
their measures and activities. 
This means that humans at all levels of management need to adhere to certain safety 
culture [13,14]. The effective safety culture is the fundamental element of safety man-
agement. It reflects the safety concept and it goes out from values, attitudes and man-
ners of top management workers and from their communication with all involved per-
sons. It is obvious obligation to participate in solving the problems of safety and it pro-
motes so all involved persons perform safely and so they observe the appropriate legal 
rules, standards and norms. The safety culture rules need to be incorporated into all 
activities in each entity and in each territory. Their ground is not the concentration to 
punishment of malefactors / originators of faults, but the lessons learned from the mis-
takes and the introduction of such corrective measures so mistakes might not repeat, 
or rather their occurrence frequency might be distinctly reduced.  
The safety culture level is the quantity that cannot be directly and exactly measured, 
but for all that it has fundamental influence on workers´ behaviours, the management 
style and the technology level. The definition of weak and strong features in individual 
parts of safety is important for safety culture level. The comparison of time series of 
investigations permits to evaluate the effectiveness of corrective measures.  
This book is the result of project „Řízení rizik a bezpečnost složitých technologických 
objektů (Management of risks and safety of complex technical facilities - RIRIZIBE)“ 
CZ.02.2.69/0.0/0.0/16 _018/000. It summarizes the most important present facts on: 
risk theory;  risk sources in human system; risk sources in technical systems, i.e. facil-
ities, technologies, processes and technical fittings; causes of diagonal (cross-sec-
tional) risks; work with risks in engineering disciplines – methods, procedures and 
tools; hazard determination; methods of risk engineering used in simple and complex 
technical systems; risk management for support reliability, security and safety; princi-
ples for risk management; responsibilities for risk management; risk management in 
time; risk engineering; risk settlement – measures; decision support system for risk 
management of technical facilities; and risk management plan. Detail data and lists of 
all used references are in book [15] and in given cited sources. 
For recommendations and comments authors thank to reviewers Prof. RNDr. Šárka 
Mayerová, Ph.D.  and Assoc. Prof. Alena Oulehlova, Ph.D.  For working condition cre-
ating the authors thank to the Czech Technical University in Prague, the Faculty of 
Mechanical Engineering, namely to Department of Energy. 
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2. TERMS FOR MANAGEMENT AND TRADE-OFF WITH RISKS 
    AND OTHER IMPORTANT MATTERS CONNECTED WITH    
    TECHNICAL FACILITIES 
 
Present terms go out from the UN concept [25] and are systematically used in the most 
world  publications; e.g. [1-16,19-21]. Primary terms connected with technical facilities 
risks and safety are the following:    
1. Technical facility is the result of engineering process, which ensures products 
and services supporting the human lives and development. 
2. Fundamental State function is the State mission in ensuring the protection of 
public interests (assets) and their permanent sustainable development. 
3. Human system is the smallest space for life of humans and human society. It is 
represented by a territory including the human society, the assets of which are in 
security and they have a certain potential for sustainable development. 
4. Basic human system assets (protected interests or fundamental interests of the 
State) are items that are protected with priority (in the CR and in the most of the 
other countries there are human lives and health, property, welfare, environment, 
existence of the State and recently critical infrastructures and technologies) and 
there is pursued the care to their development. 
5. Critical infrastructure is the set of interconnected physical, cybernetic and or-
ganizational (service) systems, that are necessary for ensuring the support and 
protection of human lives and health, property, minimum function of economy and 
administration of the State.  
6. System of systems (systems system – abbreviation SoS) is a system that con-
sists of several open systems of different nature and various locations, which are 
interconnected to ensure certain operations and activities. It should be aware 
that, when monitoring the SoS behaviour for the needs of some tasks,  we need 
to address very detailed division of systems in several levels, and in other it will 
sufficient just division at the top level (the regional, municipal, local, etc.). Inter-
faces of systems, of course cause the interdependences. From this fact,  it does 
not generally hold, that the SoS safety is the aggregation of safeties of partial 
systems (subsystems); it needs to respect as well as the cross-sectional risks 
caused by links and flows across the SoS and with the surroundings. This fact 
means that today used the integrated safety, which is based on integrated risk 
management, is not fully in place for those facilities [14,15]. Therefore, it needs 
to be gradually replaced by the integral safety, which also relies on the manage-
ment of cross-sectional risks.  
7. Safe space is a space in which on one hand the assets are protected against all 
kinds of internal and external devastative phenomena (disasters) including those 
connecting with the human factor, and which on the other hand does not 
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simultaneously threaten its vicinity. It is represented by safe open dynamically 
variable system of systems (SoS), i.e. several overlapping systems. 
8. Security is a condition  of system at which the occurrence of harm or loss on 
system assets (protected interests) has an acceptable probability (it is almost 
sure that harm and loss do not origin). To this there is also belonged a certain 
sure stability of system in time and space, i.e. a sustainable development in time 
and space which means that the system is protected against to internal and ex-
ternal disasters. It is a forming the sense of safety, safe feeling, certainty, ensur-
ing the public welfare, permanent development of sound environment and reliable 
operation of technical (physical and cyber) facilities. In this view, it is necessary 
to understand that human is also system. 
9. Safety is a set of human measures and activities for ensuring the security and 
sustainable development of certain system and its assets. Its measure is effec-
tiveness size of appropriate measures and activities at ensuring the system as-
sets security and sustainable development. By other words it is the capability of 
system to precede critical conditions of the system (active safety uses the ele-
ments of management; passive safety utilizes protective physical elements) and 
at their occurrence not to threaten the existence of neither itself nor its surround-
ings. From the engineering viewpoint [13,15], the system safety means the sys-
tem integrity, reliability and functionality.  
10. Secured system is a system, in which the system and its assets with an accepta-
ble probability are not threatened by disasters, the origins of which are inside and 
outside of system, including the human factor. 
11. Safe system is a system, in which with an acceptable probability the system and 
its assets are not threatened by disasters, the origin of which are inside and out-
side of system, including the human factor, and the system at its critical conditions 
does not threaten itself and its vicinity. 
12. Danger is a condition / situation at which it originates or can originate detriment 
and damage on assets. 
13. Harm / damage is a detriment on human life and health, property, environment 
and human society expressed in money. 
14. Impact is an adverse effect / influence of phenomenon in a given place and time 
on assets. 
15. Inadmissible (unacceptable) impact is an impact that causes or can cause un-
acceptable damage / harm on one or more assets.  
16. Disaster is a phenomenon that leads or can lead to damages and harms on as-
sets of the State or other followed entity (i.e. phenomenon which leads or can 
lead to impacts on protected assets of the State or other followed entity).  From 
the view of cybernetics, the disaster is one of the possible conditions of system 
including the human society and environment, which leads or can lead to dam-
ages / harms on one or more assets of the State. Prominent World and European 
finance houses (World Bank, European Bank, UN authorities etc.) use the term 
„disaster “for phenomena with small number of victims; if number of victims is 
greater (usually more than 25), they use term „catastrophe “. Present knowledge 
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shows that due to human targeted effort, some phenomena have disastrous po-
tential only from some size [15-17,20]. 
17. Domino effect is a cumulative effect produced when one accident or failure sets 
off a chain of similar phenomena which lead either to further accident or failure 
origination or to original impacts escalation. 
18. Hazard is a set of maximum disaster impacts that are expected in a given place 
in specified time interval with a certain probability. According to technical norms 
and standards, the normative hazard is determined by identified size of disaster 
(so called design disaster). Hazard expresses the disaster potential to cause at 
origin losses, damages and harms on assets in a given site; details on its deter-
mination are in Annex 1. 
19. Risk is a probable size of non-demanded and unacceptable impacts (losses, 
harms and detriment) of disasters with size of normative hazard on system assets 
or subsystems in a given time interval (e.g. 1 year) in a given site, i.e. it is always 
site specific. 
Simply, risk R depends partly on disaster size (in risk engineering on hazard  H) 
and partly on assets vulnerabilities V. Simply it holds relation: 
 
 R = H  x  V. 
 
Further relations valid for risk management and engineering are in next chapters. 
20. Threat is a measure of occurrence of attack (terrorist or military) in a given place. 
It is a probability that it originates or it can originate an event or set of events, 
quite different from those demanded (originally supposed) condition or develop-
ment of protected assets of the State or other followed entity from the viewpoint 
of their integrity and function.  It is determined by capability of attacker, vulnera-
bility of protected assets of the State or other followed entity and by attacker in-
tent. 
21. Vulnerability is a sensitivity of asset (system) to impacts of disaster / threat. It is 
a predisposition of asset to harm / damage origination. It is a measure of system 
inability to react to a disaster occurrence. It is inherent attribute of the system and 
it is dynamically variable. Our knowledge and experience show that in the scale 
of time and space, certain aspects dominate at different points in time and at 
different locations.  
In behaviour of technical facility in the dynamic world in which there are phenomena 
of different kind and different sizes, which can damage facility, there  are asserted  
both, the certain system properties and the certain protected assets properties. The 
vulnerability is understood as susceptibility to damage or loss, and it is variable in time 
and space. Its manifestation depends on both, the size of the disaster and the condi-
tion of the system [16]. Vulnerability of system responds to the question "why the sys-
tem reacts to the way?". There are three different vulnerabilities: typological, specific 
and general. Typological vulnerability relates to the local socio-technological condi-
tions in the entity before the disaster occurrence. For its mastery, it is assessed the 
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level of preparedness, i.e. the capability to withstand the impacts of the disaster, etc. 
Specific vulnerability refers to sources of social units (families, groups, companies, 
institutions), i.e. to a social adaptability. It is a rate of  the organizational, economic, 
technological and cultural resources that determine the capability of  followed social 
units to optimize their behaviour under stress (critical) situations. Specific vulnerability 
also affects the typological vulnerability in the phase prior to the disaster occurrence. 
General vulnerability expresses the level of socio-economic, organisational and tech-
nological development of human (social) system. 
22. Scenario (model) of disaster is a set of isolated and interconnected disaster im-
pacts in space and time that causes or can cause the given disaster in definite 
site, i.e.  time sequence of events presented disaster impacts in entity. 
23. Emergency situation is a situation caused by disaster origination. Usually, it is 
classified into 5 categories (0 - 5) that for simplicity are denoted by colours (upper-
most by sequence of colours – green, yellow, orange, red) [16].  
24. Disaster assessment, hazard assessment and risk assessment in a given 
territory, site, time interval are the risk engineering methods.  
25. Human factor is the set of human properties, which determine the human 
behaviour that marks at decision-making in different situation. The human 
reactions have the form of unconditioned reactions, as “automatic”, inherent ways 
of reaction to inputs (e.g. the wince at an unpleasant input), facultative reactions 
(e.g. in the form of habits), or purposeful  action controlled by will. In engineering 
disciplines, the human factor is the  aggregation of human properties, capabilities, 
experiences that have in a given situation influence on the safety, productivity, 
effectivity and reliability of system. At ensuring the complex entity safety with an 
accent to the protection of persons and properties, it is necessary to achive the 
right decision or at least such decision that will not lead sooner or later to 
destruction, namely in case of a decision under the stress. The decision in this 
concept becomes the social process. In this process, there are the human 
intellect and certain inherent (natural, tacit) human knowledge and skills put 
forward. In the forefront, they manifest the human properties as:  
- responsible approach to a problem and the results of its solution regarding the 
public or other assets,  
- moral properties as a discernment, sense for commitment and consistency,  
- the ability: to analyse the problem or situation; to take an attitude for creative 
approach to the problem solution; to know the art of the foreseen of the further 
development,  to use analogy etc., 
- and also the capability to use experiences and social skills that enable to 
regulate the activity and  his / her behaviour or the behaviour of the 
subordinate humans.  
26. Safety culture is the set of rules in entity directed to entity safety that all entity 
persons meet and respect. 
27. Safety management system is a management of system directed to safety, the 
product of which is security and sustainable development of  system and public 
assets. It is the basic part of the Information & Control system of each entity.  
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28. Human system safety management is a management of human system di-
rected to human system safety the product of which is security and sustainable 
development of all public assets. 
The causal relationship „disaster – emergency“ is shown in Figure 6. Manage-
ment phases, as prevention and renovation are directed to causes, and manage-
ment phases preparedness and response are directed to consequences.  
  
Figure 6. Relationship disaster vs. consequence. 
 
The system behaviour at disaster is shown in Figure 7.  Quantities that decide on 
disasters´ impacts on system are resilience, vulnerability and adaptability. 
 
Figure 7. The system behaviour at disaster. 
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29. Risk management is management of followed entity aimed to the risk reduction. 
It is a planning, organization, allocation of work tasks and check-up of sources of 
entity so, that there might be reduced losses, damages, harms, injuries or deaths 
caused by various disasters. Work with risk is based on the process model shown 
in Figure 8. It starts with definition of concept of work with risk (system character-
istics, determination of assets, specification of aims), on the basis of which the 
risks are identified, analysed, assessed, judged, managed, traded-off and moni-
tored. The criterions determine the conditions at which the risk is acceptable, 
conditionally acceptable or unacceptable. The aims in real case are selected from 
further given possibilities: to reduce risk to certain level; to secure the system, i.e. 
to ensure system security; to ensure safe system, i.e. to ensure security for both, 
the system and its vicinity. The feedbacks denoted in Figure 8 are used in case 
if the monitoring shows that the risk level is not on required level; firstly, it is used 
the cheapest feedback 1; in case of its failure the feedback 2 etc.; at huge harms 
it is immediately used the feedback 4 that means the change of concept of work 
with risks.  
 
Figure 8. Process model of work with risks, numbers 1, 2, 3 and 4 denote 
feedbacks. 
 
Risks are reduced by the reduction of vulnerability of: objects; human population; 
environment; State etc. (in these connections there is used the term „impact 
mitigation“ for impacts that cannot be averted at disaster origin). According to 
majority of technical norms and standards, there is performed the reduction of 
vulnerability at planning, designing, construction and operation of protected 
assets for all risks, the probability of which is equal or greater than 0.05 [13]. By 
this way there is formed the inherent safety of system including the human 
society, objects and environment (i.e. so-called design disasters ought to be get 
under control by design, regulations for land-use planning and construction, 
operating instructions, rules for response to emergencies and by instructions for 
response to critical situations, and therefore, their occurrence would not threaten 
entity sustainable development). The risk management quality depends on both, 
the followed risk concept and the quality of decision. The deciding can relate to 
Process model of work with risks
Identification         Assessment             Management      Monitoring
Analysis Judgement Trade-off
CRITERIONS    AIMS
1
2
3
4
FEEDBACKS - 1, 2, 3, 4
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matters that are vitally important  (the change of the way  of life etc.), or to daily 
details (whether to go in an overfull metro / not to go in an overfull metro; cross a 
road when the lights are red / do not cross a road when the lights are red etc.). 
Sometimes the decision takes a lot of time for deciding (e.g.  while solving the 
working or other problems), sometimes it is necessary to decide immediately (in 
the situations with a direct threatening to life, real risk of a delay and that like).  
We adjudicate something either on our behalf (and on ourselves, what I do, what 
I do not do) or on behalf of our subordinate workers / persons (in harmony with 
their interests, but also against their interests). The decision can only be the result 
of the arbitrament of one person, it can, however, be also the output of collective 
intellect. The decisions may be accurate but also false. The consequences of 
decisions can have the different rate of weight for both, the arbitrary subject and 
its vicinity. 
30. Safety management  is management of followed entity targeted to its safety for-
mation. It is  a planning, organization, allocation of work tasks and check-up of 
sources of organization with aim to reach requested safety level. Enhancement 
of safety is reached by use (application, realization or implementation) of tech-
nical, legal, organizational, educational etc. protective measures. It is also con-
sidered risks, the occurrence probabilities of which are smaller than 0.05, but 
impacts are fatal (severe). Safety management belongs to a common practice at 
planning, designing, construction and operation of technical facilities and objects 
such as power plants, dams, nuclear facilities etc., and it is the basement of nu-
clear safety, radiation protection and protection against dangerous chemical sub-
stances that is introduced by the SEVESO II directive. The safety management 
quality depends on both, the followed safety concept and the quality of decision. 
In technical slang, there is stipulated that this type of management considers be-
yond design (severe) accidents. Except of formation of inherent safety of system 
including the human society, objects and environment, this management type 
also promotes so called principle of precaution, because it considers disasters or 
their sizes, the occurrences of which are very low probable, that are unforeseen.   
31. Emergency management is a management, the purpose of which is to ensure 
preparedness for response to possible emergency situations and to ensure the 
getting possible emergency situations under control with use of standard sources, 
forces and means. 
32. Response management is management, the aim of which is the effective coping 
with emergency situation using the standard sources, forces and means. 
33. Crisis management  is a management, the purpose of which  is to precede a 
possible critical situations, to ensure preparedness for response to possible criti-
cal situations, to ensure the getting possible critical situations under control  in 
frame of power of crisis management authority and executing measures  and 
tasks of line higher crisis management authorities (for getting situation under con-
trol, there is used legal measure „declaration of crisis situation“ that temporarily 
enables to limit rights and civil liberties of humans and use standard and beyond 
standard sources), to start  renovation  and next development.  
In some concepts, its fundamental phases are the prevention, preparedness, re-
sponse and renovation. In some conceptions there is the crisis management a 
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part of safety management, in others the crisis management is only used for the 
getting critical situations caused by disasters under control and for the getting 
current emergency situations under control there is used emergency manage-
ment.  
34. Proactive management is a management type, in which there are in advance 
performed measures for averting or at least mitigation of some non-demanded 
phenomena, and ensured preparedness for the effective response to non-de-
manded phenomena. 
35. Management of technical facility  is a system of measures and activities relating to 
materials, technologies, design, construction, operation, staffing, organization, educa-
tion, finance, and law, so as to ensure the demanded processes, which bring profit, 
ensure compliance with the State and competitiveness, and together to suppress the 
processes that bring technical facility  harms and losses. 
36. Reactive management is a management type, in which there are solved prob-
lems when they occur.  
37. Safety performance indicator is a quantity that measures the level of safety in 
a given system / entity. At technical facilities, there are usually used:  outcome 
indicators and activity indicators [13,26]. 
38. Critical infrastructure / facility protection means to perform strategic, systemic 
and proactive measures and activities so that humans can survive all emergency 
and critical situations and infrastructure / facility could be renovated in moderate 
time interval by help of moderate sources, forces and means. 
39. The engineering is a set of disciplines that realise the tasks determined by man-
agement procedure into practice.  With regard to complex nature of technical fa-
cilities, the present engineering types are multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary 
disciplines, and therefore, they use very various methods, tools and techniques 
because the safety management targets cannot be reached only technically. The 
methods, tools and techniques need to respect the logic, technological, financial 
and managerial data at decision-making, because their integral part is the deci-
sion-making over technical problems, human factor, costs and time planning. 
Some details are in Annex 2. 
40. Good engineering practice (good engineering procedure) is then defined as the 
set of engineering methods and standards that are used during the life cycle of 
technical system with the aim of reaching the appropriate and cost-efficient solu-
tion. It is supported by fit documentation (conceptual documentation, diagrams, 
charts, manuals, testing reports etc.). In a given context the engineering expertise 
is the expression of the capability to:  
- apply the knowledge of mathematics, science and engineering, 
- propose and realize experiments, 
- analyse and interpret data, 
- propose components or the whole system according to requirements and un-
der the frame of realistic limitations identify, formulate and solve engineering 
problems, 
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- ensure the effective communication, 
- comprehend the impacts of engineering solutions in a broader context, 
- use the advanced tools and methods in engineering practice, 
- adhere professional and operational responsibilities and ethics, 
- lead the interdisciplinary team.   
Most of the demands gave above is directed to correct the bad  manifestation of 
human factor.  
41. The risk engineering is the systematic use of engineering knowledge and expe-
riences for the optimization of protection of human lives, environment, property 
and economic assets, i.e. for the optimum reach of security and sustainable de-
velopment of human system. It has a main purpose to reduce all types of harms 
and losses by the means of aimed and qualified trade-off with risk.  It was the 20th 
century phenomenon and on its basis in developed countries, there was set up 
the groundwork for human development that is quite resistant against the tradi-
tional disasters, namely natural ones; human, animal and plant diseases; tech-
nology failures; and social disasters. 
42. Security engineering is a discipline that realizes the goals of system security 
management, i.e. at selected concept it determines and realises the problems´ 
solving from their comprehension through project of solution up to implementation 
under given conditions. For technical facilities, its principles and implementation 
rules are in [27]. 
43. Safety engineering is a discipline that realizes the goals of system safety man-
agement, i.e. at selected concept it determines and realises the problems´ solving 
from their comprehension through project of solution up to implementation under 
given conditions. For technical facilities, its principles and implementation rules 
are in [13,14,26,28]. 
44. Resilience is  a potential (capability) of the system / entity to absorb and to use the 
deviations and changes so that it lives through them without there might originate 
quality changes of its structure. It resides in a specific arrangement of the system, 
which keeps the functions and feedbacks of system, which include the capability of 
system to reorganize itself on the basis of changes induced by disorders. At technical 
facilities, it is created by technical and organizational measures. It is the combination 
of asset capability „withstanding” and “recovering” from disaster. From this it fol-
lows that the management of sustainability needs to be based on management of 
resilience, which has two objectives: 
1) To avert the non-demanded system conditions in the consequences of external 
disturbances and external load. 
2) To keep the elements that trigger system reorganization and reconstruction in the 
wake of massive changes. 
Resilience unlike the vulnerability, answers the question "How does the system re-
spond?". Based on the analysis of contemporary knowledge [13], there are the follow-
ing types of entity resilience: 
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1) Engineering resilience focuses on the entity stability of the near steady state (con-
dition), on resistance to disturbances and to speed of the return to its original state. 
2) System resilience focuses on conditions remote from the steady-state equilibrium 
in which the disorders can switch the system from one state to another. System 
resilience is related to adapt (adaptability), duration and volatility. 
3) Social resilience may not always be demanded, because it can promote unwanted 
status quo. 
4) From the theory of control of systems, it follows that resilience of  system is related 
to robustness, redundancy, ingenuity  (inventiveness) and speed of response, the 
correct starting [13], Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Context of resilience of system with robustness, redundancy, inventiveness 
and speed. 
 
Resilience management process takes place in three steps, namely: 
Step 1: Resilience who, what? It proposes a conceptual model of system based on 
specific questions: what are the spatial boundaries of the system?; What are the key 
system services used in the system?; What are the stakeholder groups?; What are 
the key components of the system, how to characterize what is their importance and 
dynamism?; What is the historical profile system?; What environment variables act as 
driving forces key system products and services?; Which factors are controllable and 
manageable? 
Step 2: Resilience in relation to what? (scenarios). They are analysed the external and 
development processes (processes of sustainable development) and described the 
demanded arrangements, which are resilient. The scenarios need to avoid primarily 
uncontrollable and  ambiguous external driving forces. 
Step 3: Analysis of resilience. There are exploring the interactions among the external 
exposure and resilient folders and finding the processes in the system, that control the 
dynamics of the system. A key element of the analysis of resilience is the determina-
tion of the threshold values. Here is the connection with the criticality. 
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45. Adaptability is a capability of system to modify its behaviour under stress (criti-
cal) situations and to ensure the system existence and functionality on expected 
level. It is ensured by technical, economic and organizational measures. 
46. Functionality is a system capability to fulfil  tasks exactly as entered. 
47. Reliability is a capability of the system to provide the required functions under 
given conditions, in the given quality and in the given time interval. In technical 
domain is connected with the probability; functionality is asked to  be equal  or to 
be higher than 95 %  probability. 
48. Criticality denotes a limit (boundary) from which the risk impacts are significant 
up to eliminative for followed system, which means that appurtenant risk needs 
to be always mastered; details are in [21]. The criticality is mostly determined by 
scoring, i.e. by decision making matrix (system vulnerability vs. system im-
portance); its scheme is shown in Figure 10. 
 
  
Figure 10. Criticality matrix.; scoring the vulnerability (measure of system vulner-
ability or system probability of failure) and the importance of system (measure of 
system damages).  
 
At criticality determination, they are considered the following assets: public; tech-
nological system; territory; and the State, and the following questions: 
1) How does the facility or infrastructure react to certain types of disasters?  
2) How is the facility or infrastructure robust, resilient and rubbery? 
3) How the behaviour of facility or infrastructure can be improved? 
4) What management mechanisms in the sense of control are suitable? 
5) What rules can be used for the self-regulatory or tolerable deflections? 
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6) Which parts of facility or infrastructure are critical? 
Determining the criticality, it consistently refers to the size of the impact of the loss of 
functionality of each system of systems on society. When determining the criticality, it 
is considered: 
1) Concentration of people and assets. 
2) Sectors of the economy (sector analysis). 
3) Types of interdependencies among the subsystems of systems: 
i. On what assets of the system depends? 
ii. What is the dependency of the assets among the systems? 
4) The types of services to the public: 
iii. How long will it take to restore the provision of services? 
iv. What are the refunds / substitutes may be available and usable? 
5) Public confidence in the institutions of the public administration: 
v.  Can damage of the assets / public services reduce the morale of the popula-
tion, the loss of national prestige, panic, riot or civil unrest? 
vi. May damage of the assets cause  the impacts / changes on the environment? 
Determination of technical facility criticality is based on the analyses of the hazards 
from the potential disasters in the given territory, from the consideration of the technical 
facility vulnerabilities. In theory, it has the same principle as the analysis and assess-
ment of risks, in which there is respected the more protected assets. Therefore, one 
can assume that in general the process of determining the criticality can be described 
as follows: 
1) Characteristics of the assets (assets physical, cyber, and human). 
2) Determination of criticality (analysis of hazard from disasters and consideration of 
vulnerabilities). 
3) Assessing the impact on assets (the concentration of people and assets, the eco-
nomic impacts, mutual dependences, reliability). 
4) Evaluation of the consequences of the losses, the victims, damages and harms to 
assets. 
5) Prioritizing the assets according to the specified rules. 
Interpretation of results for a given facility is derived from the position of the point the 
coordinates of which are the calculated values of serviceability (actually a degree of 
importance for the territory) and the degree of vulnerability. If the point falls within the 
sector: 
- "the high vulnerability and high serviceability" mean that  the condition of the facility 
is bad, i.e. critical, for a given territory and in terms of ensuring security and sus-
tainable development it is the need to solve the situation by the facility backup and 
facility upgrade, 
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- "lower vulnerability and lower serviceability" mean that  the condition of the facility 
is satisfactory and it is necessary from time to time to check this status in the terri-
tory, 
- "the high vulnerability and low serviceability" mean that the condition  of facility is 
conditionally satisfactory and it is necessary to provide sophisticated response pre-
paredness for case of a facility failure and prevention focus on preventive and mit-
igation measures to reduce the vulnerability of facility to potential disasters that can 
cause failure, 
- "lower vulnerability and high serviceability" mean that the facility condition is con-
ditionally satisfactory and it is necessary to provide sophisticated response prepar-
edness for the case of a facility failure and prevention  focus on the reduction of 
the criticality, i.e. to create facilities in the territory, or to create a backup of the 
existing facilities. 
It is true that the procedure described above shows that the assessment of facility 
according to two criteria, namely of the extent of services and the extent of the vulner-
ability is not the result of an objective calculation or process analysis, but it is rather 
the result of subjective estimates, which can be tolerated in the case of the determi-
nation of the basic framework. It would be more complex in the case of determining 
the criticality of a process. 
When scoring vulnerabilities and serviceability (sometimes in the literature it is used 
directly the importance) of systems [13], it is necessary to consider the following items: 
the duration of the system recovery; the impact of the failure of system on the human 
lives and security; the caused injuries and losses; the impacts on the environment; 
and caused adverse interest. 
Figure 11 shows the relationships among several characteristics of technical fa-
cility. In practice, it is often used normed relation: criticality rate = 1 – safety 
rate [13,14].  
 
                        IMPACTS                RESILIENCE 
 
 
                           CRITICALITY                             ADAPTIVE CAPACITY 
 
                                                             VULNERABILITY 
Figure 11.  Links among system characteristics. 
 
49. Dependability is a system capability to provide the required functions under the 
given conditions in the given quality and in the given time interval. It is measure 
of reliability, availability and maintainability with which the system performance is 
supported. It is the capability of system to provide services that can defensibly be 
trusted within a time-period. It is a designed property that is related not only to 
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normal conditions but also to abnormal and critical conditions at which through 
the adoption capacity of system ensures the required functions also at certain 
types of critical conditions. 
50. Maintainability is a system capability for easy maintenance and repair. It is de-
fined as probability of performance of successful repair within a given time. 
51. Availability is a system capability to provide the required functions at the occur-
rence of process that uses the given function. 
52. Integrity is a system capability to provide in time fair and valid report to the users 
on system failures. In technical facilities process safety the quantity “Safety in-
tegrity level (SIL)” is defined as a relative level of risk-reduction provided by 
a safety function, or to specify a target level of risk reduction. In simple terms, SIL 
is a measure of performance required for a safety instrumented function [15]. 
53. Continuity  is a system capability to provide the required functions without inter-
ruption at the damaging process initiation.  
54. Accuracy  is a system capability to ensure the required system behaviour in the 
required range. 
55. Interoperability  is an interconnected systems capability to carry out the required 
tasks in required quality correctly and in-time in a given place and in a given time.  
56. Durability  is a system capability to remain functional, without requiring the ex-
cessive maintenance or repair, when faced with the challenges of normal opera-
tion over its design lifetime. 
57. Complexity is a system property that denotes that system has many parts or 
elements that have relationships among them differentiated from relationships 
with other elements outside. 
58. Complex system  is a set of systems that have relationships (links and cou-
plings) among them differentiated from relationships with other elements outside 
the relational regime [13]. Some relations are permanent and some only at certain 
conditions. The required ones are designed and those unrequired are conse-
quence of disasters and are mostly unacceptable. 
59. Integral risk is a risk of the complex system that includes both, the risks associ-
ated with individual assets and the cross-sectional risks that are associated with 
links among the assets and with the couplings among the assets realized by flows 
(energy, information, instructions, commands, responses to them from top to bot-
tom and vice versa), i.e. it represents a complex risk for the qualified manage-
ment. 
60. Integral safety is a property of whole system; usually it is more that sum of sys-
tem parts safety. It is ensured by the integral risk management. It is set of human 
measures ensuring the whole system safety. 
61. Process safety  is a property of process (e.g. production line). It is ensured by 
the process risk management. It is set of human measures ensuring the process 
safety. 
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62. Fittings / product safety is a property of fittings / process. It is ensured by the 
fittings / product  risk management. It is set of human measures ensuring the 
fittings / product safety. 
63. Inherent safety is a set of measures inserted into the entity design for reduction 
of hazard. Firstly,  it was defined by Kletz in 1977 [15].  
64. Limits and conditions are margins in which it is ensured the safety of operated 
system. They are tools of technical facility safety management. They are the set 
of positively defined conditions, for which it is proven that the technical facility 
operation is safe  (in reality with probability ≥ 0,95). The appropriated set includes 
data on permissible parameters, requirements on operation capability, setting the 
protection systems, demands on the workers´ activities and on the organizational 
measures leading to the fulfilment of all defined requirements for design operation 
conditions. For ensuring the safety, i.e. also the reliability and the functionality, 
the control system of given technical facility needs to keep the determined phys-
ical quantities (parameters of appropriate subsystems) on values determined in 
advance. During the process of regulation, the control system changes the con-
ditions of individual controlled systems by bearing upon the efficient quantities, 
with aim to reach the required state (condition) of whole system. In terms of inte-
gral safety, the following properties of control system are pursued in the order:  
- level of observance of established operation conditions and prevention of 
damaging (unacceptable) impacts on the system itself and its vicinity, 
- functionality (level of satisfaction of required tasks), 
- operability, i.e. level of fulfilment of required tasks at normal, abnormal and 
critical conditions, 
- operation stability, i.e. level of observance of established conditions during the 
time, 
- inherently included resilience to possible disasters. 
From above mentioned facts it follows that management and control systems de-
termine quality and performance of systems. They have decisive influence on 
safety, and therefore, their following factors are considered: responsible auton-
omy; adaptability; integrity; and meaningfulness of tasks. Because the human 
behaviour is not deterministic, the main characteristics of considered systems 
are: the emerged properties; non-determinist behaviour; and complex relations 
among the organizational targets. Humans, maintenance, renewal and changes 
decide about each followed system. From the engineering viewpoint the followed 
systems are characterized by structure, hardware, procedures, surround, infor-
mation flows, organization (problem of organizational accidents) and interconnec-
tions among the mentioned items. 
It is necessary to consider that all conditions different from conditions stipulated 
in terms of references of technical facility are mostly danger for technical facility. 
65. All-Hazard-Approach is principle denoting the procedure that at ensuring the 
entity safety are considered all sources of risks; i.e. internal, external, human fac-
tor, organizational, diagonal. Firstly, it was defined by FEMA in 1996 [18] and for 
Europe it was refined in the FOCUS project [19]. 
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66. Defence-In-Depth concept  denotes special arrangements of protective barriers 
in entity for ensuring the entity safety [13]. Firstly, it was used in military domain. 
For safety of technical facilities,  it was defined by the IAEA [29]. 
67. Precaution Principle  is a strategy for approaching issues of potential harm 
when extensive scientific knowledge on the matter is lacking. It calls for action in 
the face of scientific uncertainty. 
68. ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable) determines that from potential disas-
ter impact values  is acceptable for society the small value that can be achieved 
by applying sensible mitigation technical measures. 
69. ALARP (as low as reasonably possible) expresses that the risk should be re-
duced to a size, which is practically achievable. This means that the cost of risk 
reduction measures should not be considered. It stresses the precautionary prin-
ciple, which is a fundamental principle of safety  management with regard to pru-
dence. According to experts, the principle should be used at every stage of the 
technical facility, from preparation to the end of operation. 
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3. SUMMARY OF IMPORTANT KNOWLEDGE ON RISKS  
 
From the foregoing chapters, it follows that risk is the potential that a chosen action or 
activity (including the choice of inaction) will lead to a loss (an unfavourable outcome). 
It partly depends on the hazard that is represented by disaster (i.e. phenomena that 
cause damages, i.e. it is the risk source) and partly on the vulnerability of assets in a 
given site (i.e. on the sensitivity of each individual asset in a given place against to 
disaster manifestation in a given site). It expresses a possibility what it might be hap-
pen.  
From this fact it follows that for each management it is important to know the risk, 
namely in comprehensible expression. In practice of public administration, it is certified 
the risk expression in a form that by risk analysis and assessment it finds that on spe-
cific section: 
- there is necessary 5 million EURs a year for remedy of harms caused by existing 
risk, 
- each ten years ten persons die in a consequence of given disaster, 
- each five years the property damages caused by disaster exceed 5 billion EURs 
etc. 
 
3.1. Characteristics of risk and work with risk 
 
The typical risk properties are the random and epistemic uncertainties (epistemic un-
certainties = vagueness). If we want to manage the risk, we need to identify, analyse, 
assess it and after this to decide, what we can do, in dependence on our possibilities 
– knowledge, staff, technical means and finance sources. For this, we need to use a 
lot of different methods, tools and techniques and also principles of good practice (good 
engineering practice) [15]. We divide sources of uncertainties into three groups, 
namely to the variations originating at:  
- usual system process life cycle at normal conditions in the vicinity (uncertainties), 
- real changes of system process life cycle in the time and space that affect occa-
sional extreme values occurrences – we consider normal and abnormal conditions 
- (uncertainties and vagueness), 
- variable system process life cycle that is caused by process changes in time and 
space, induced by outside causes or by critical conditions (vagueness). 
The data uncertainty relates to the dispersion of observations and measurement; i.e. 
a random uncertainty. It may be included into assessment and prediction by mathe-
matic statistics apparatus. The vagueness relates to both, the lack of knowledge and 
information and the natural variability of processes and actions that are caused disas-
ters. For processing the vagueness, the mathematic statistics apparatus is insufficient, 
and therefore, it is necessary to use the recent mathematical apparatus that offers e.g. 
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extreme values theory, fuzzy set theory, fractal theory, dynamic chaos theory, selected 
expert methods and suitable heuristics based on the existence of several variants of 
solution processed by multicriterial methods [15,30].  
In practice we work with three types of risk:  
- the partial one that is only related to disaster impacts on one asset, 
- the integrated one that is related to disaster impacts on several assets – e.g. sum 
or other aggregation of impacts´ rates, 
- and the integral (systemic) one that is related to disaster impacts on the entity that 
is understand as a system. The last concept is necessary for solution of safety and 
security, the structure of which is complex. 
If we want to trade-off with any risk, in the first, we need to identify it and after this to 
analyse it. Both steps need to be carefully performed because each inaccuracy in the 
given steps cannot be rectified in the following. For the steps mentioned, the profes-
sional knowledge of problem solved is the fundamental. The effective methods for work 
with partial and integrated risks are: What, If analysis; Check List analysis; Event Tree 
analysis etc.; the use of each method depends on the level of problem knowledge and 
on the target of risk analysis [30]. The tools for integral risk will be shown in next chap-
ters.  
Risk analysis procedure for the use in disaster prevention [15,16]  contains: 
- risk analysis definition and determination of study depth, 
- description of considered system, object, equipment and the delimitation of its 
boundaries, 
- identification and description of disasters, i.e. sources of risk, 
- relative evaluation of disaster´ criticality (hazard assessment) and selection of rel-
evant disasters for further study, 
- identification of possible disaster impacts on considered system and its vicinity,  
- compilation of possible disasters scenarios, in which unacceptable impacts can oc-
cur and selection of representative disaster scenarios, 
- estimation of risk amount / size / rate, 
- risk presentation. 
Risk amount / size / rate is a numerical value; e.g.: the number of deaths caused by 
disaster (a year); numerical function giving for each N in a certain interval the proba-
bility of that as a consequence of some technological accident in a year to one or more 
deaths in technology vicinity originate. The function describes the relationship between 
the occurrence probability and consequences of given disaster that has certain nature.  
For risk representation, there is used e.g. risk matrix, number as one-dimensional 
amount, mean death measure, risk isolines (individual risk), f-N curve (societal risk) 
[16,30].   
The acceptable risk is the amount of serious harms or jeopardy for human lives and 
health, home animals, environment or damages arising from existence and possible 
realisation of disasters that is acceptable for person / group of persons and for society. 
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The risk acceptability depends on social, economic and political factors, and also on a 
perceived profit arising from the positive activity of risk sources (disasters) from the 
viewpoint of analysis of costs and profits for society [4].   
Because the risk is a measure of unacceptable impacts caused by an expected disas-
ter on public assets (generally considered assets because in practice, we use different 
risk analysis targets) in a given site, so the risk acceptability depends on social, eco-
nomic and political factors, and also on a perceived profit arising from the positive ac-
tivity of risk sources from the viewpoint of analysis of costs and profits for society.  In 
the business domain the protected assets (interests) are also a safe business, profit, 
competitiveness etc. With regard to these assets, the disasters are also the following 
phenomena:  
- market failure, 
- lack of finances / suitable technologies / qualified human sources, 
- incompetent management of business, 
- loss of competitiveness, 
- external natural and other disasters that have impacts on business, 
- intended damage of business outside / inside, 
- and failure of links with vicinity / public administration. 
In practice [15], there are distinguished the methods for:  
- risk reduction in closed system only considering the technical causes of risks, 
- risk reduction in closed system considering the technical and human factor causes 
of risks, 
- risk reduction directed to ensuring the system security without respecting the sys-
tem  vicinity security, 
- risk reduction directed to ensuring the system safety – its result is that system and 
its vicinity are safe, 
- risk reduction directed to ensuring the system of systems (SoS) safety. 
The assessment of  system risk means the judgement of disasters´ impacts by help of 
one or more criteria that reflect the value scale of human society.  Some of the criteria 
may be even qualitative and some of them are incommensurable [14].  Assessment 
process structure depends on facts: 
1. What is assessed? 
2. When it is assessed, to which moment in time it is assessed? 
3. How, i.e. on the basis of which criteria, it is assessed? 
General knowledge sets that when we want to assess something, we need to deter-
mine the assessment targets, the set of criterions and the scale used at assessment. 
The assessment generally represents an exertion of certain criteria, rating functions or 
preferences. It is used in several senses: 
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1. The first sense means to follow the process by help of process monitoring or ob-
servation. 
2. The other sense means the comparison with some appointed limit. 
3. The third sense means the comparison with some appointed limit and thinking out 
all the more or less probable consequences, i.e. the impacts and the profits. 
The last sense supports the negotiation with risks. The system assessment means the 
application of certain suitably selected criteria set or rating functions to the defined 
system. It means that we assume and specify certain behaviour in time and space, 
certain responses on possible reactions etc. The criteria, we divide into: 
- internal, i.e. such, that ensures the assessment of appropriate system (they take 
note of system only), i.e. its quality, viability, fitting the certain targets, needs, de-
mands etc., 
- external, i.e. such, that ensures the assessment of system as a part of a broader 
system (they take note of system and of its vicinity), i.e. viability, material and en-
ergy demands, sources, human aspects, environmental impacts, social impacts 
etc., 
- criteria tied up with a time trend, i.e. with possible changes of assessment in time 
or with changes of a system function in time (i.e. it is considered expected dynamic 
behaviour of system in time). 
From the given facts, it follows that the assessment has several qualitative levels, 
namely: 
- the simplest level is the comparison of real data value, quantitative or qualitative 
(e.g. data on the level of quality), with a certain strictly defined limit or model (that 
the following phenomena aroused or did not arise). The comparison with the limit 
is used when the surveillance is directed to the check-up of certain item quality or 
to the determination whether it is necessary or not to start a specified regulation or 
warning measures. The comparison with parameters of certain model is more typ-
ical for observation nets that have one of aims to identify phenomena in domains, 
which they cover, 
- the impact assessment goes partly from data and partly from collected findings. It 
represents a tool for the complex and systematic investigation of disasters or 
planned actions. For this assessment type, there is important the reference level 
that may be represented by: original (present) conditions; conditions that will origi-
nate without any activity; some marginal or target (covetable) conditions; ideal con-
ditions. There are systematically followed relations described as the chain of 
causes and impacts (disaster scenarios) and they are determined by impacts of the 
first order in cases in which it is possible to directly distinguish the cause. At data 
processing, they are used the predicative methods (Annex 2) that are mostly based 
on: exact calculations; statistical formulas; experimental observation and mathe-
matical modelling; expert approaches based on judgements, analogies and expe-
riences; or quantities scoring, i.e. at incommensurable quantities, they are used 
methods of multi criteria analysis, i.e. e.g. the decision matrixes, 
- the hazard assessment means the determination of disaster size on a certain level 
of credibility in a certain time interval and in a certain site (the time interval size and 
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site dimension depend on the physical nature of followed disaster). For its determi-
nation, there are used the specific methods of mathematical statistics based on the 
theory of great numbers; the example is in Annex1. 
- the risk assessment means to use the methods by which from hazard characteris-
tics (size and occurrence probability) and site characteristics probable size of dam-
ages is determined (Annex 2).  
At work with risks, it is necessary to consider that processes under way are not only 
characterised by one criterion, and therefore, it needs to be used the multi criteria ap-
proach [30].   
The risk assessment is possible to carry out only on the basis of real, true and tried-
and-true data sets on a given phenomenon that are valid for a correctly defined system 
and correctly defined time interval [15]. The target is to ensure the decision-making 
that supports the benefit for the human system. Therefore, it needs to be used the 
tested set of criterions that guarantees the objectivity, the independence and the im-
partiality of assessment.  With regard to these viewpoints we divide the criterions into: 
- objective and subjective; in the objective ones, there are such criteria, the limit 
(comparative value) of which is created by current measurable units that are de-
tectable by lab experiments, calculation or economic prudence, 
- criterions of advantages and beneficial effect (the higher, the better) or the criteri-
ons of costs, losses and content of contaminations (the lower, the better), 
- cumulative criterions that are characterised by the relation of mutual complemen-
tarities, i.e. they are mutually supplemented and supported. The higher perfor-
mance of one is connected with the higher performance of the other and vice versa. 
The extreme cumulative criterions are such criterions, in which the performance of 
one is conditioned by the performance of the other; the criteria of such type warp 
the result, and therefore, they need to be put out of the criterion set, 
- alternative criterions are given by the relation of mutual competition perhaps, they 
are antagonistic. The higher performance of one indicator is connected with the 
reduced performance of the other and vice versa.  The extreme alternative criteri-
ons are absolutely eliminated, and therefore, they need to be put out of criterion 
set, 
- independent criterions are given by indifferent or variable relations. 
The assessment methods from the viewpoint of approach to matter-of-fact problem we 
separate to: deterministic methods; probabilistic (stochastic) methods; engineering 
judgement; analogy; model; and aggregation of several criterions (multi criteria assess-
ment) [15,30]. 
The deterministic approach is based on a precondition that each phenomenon is the 
inevitable consequence of conditions and causes. The approach consists of fact that 
there is determined the vagueness of all input parameters, and that from the safety 
reasons, there are considered marginal (usually most unfavourable) values in a given 
real case. Just the determination of marginal values is the critical activity of this ap-
proach. By use of different data sets and the application of different assumption sets, 
there are mostly obtained results that are substantially different; i.e. the output value 
from one procedure does not lay in the interval of deviations obtained by the other 
35 
 
procedure. Therefore, great attention needs to be devoted to data set credibility [15].  
This approach is in practice used in technical facilities designing.    
The probabilistic approach is based on a precondition that the occurrence of each phe-
nomenon has a certain random uncertainty, i.e. possibility of random phenomena oc-
currence is estimated with a certain value of probability. From the set of variants, the 
creation of which is the critical activity of this approach, there are determined repre-
sentative values as median or median +  ( – the standard deviation). This approach 
is in practice used in technical facilities operation for judgement of technical facility 
safety level [15].    
For the assessment of phenomena and processes that have random uncertainties and 
vagueness (i.e. the epistemic / knowledge uncertainties) they are, at present, used the 
computations based on the fuzzy set theory or the possibility theory [30] that combines 
analytical approach with expert methods.  In the case of experts´ use, it is necessary 
to solve the problem who is an expert. With regard to discussion in world conference 
ESREL2011 in Troyes [2], the expert is a person who:  
- has the knowledge and experiences, 
- is neutral, 
- has the competences, 
- is capable to guess with the support of object matter and to reach the acceptable 
consensus.  
In the EU and in some countries as the USA, there is the legal rule containing the 
requirements that the expert needs to fulfil [16]. 
At multi criteria assessment, it is possible to use the methods, tools and techniques 
supporting the creative thinking, e.g. Delphi method, SWOT analysis, brainstorming, 
panel discussion, decision supporting systems etc. [15,30].  Their use needs to be 
prudent and careful, in order that the results bear confirmation of purpose in a value 
scale selected for criterions chosen for a given problem solution.  For the selection of 
criterion sets (the order of criterions is usually important [15]), for the establishment of 
scale characteristics and for the judgement of correctness or inaccuracy of outputs, it 
is necessary to use the empirical (experience) databases.    
At risk assessment there is necessary to fulfil the following requirements: 
- performance of assessment in the demanded depth and quality and in harmony 
with the accepted methodology, 
- completeness, 
- to include the recent knowledge of science, 
- estimation of uncertainties and vagueness at an extrapolation use, 
- united expression of risk characterization, 
- transparency of the process performance of risk assessment. 
If the risk assessment does not fulfil these requirements, it needs to be returned to re-
processing. The involved situation arises when the risk assessment was done with the 
use of present scientific knowledge, but there is the lack of data for risk characterisation 
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or the output is burdened by too big error. In this case, it is necessary to decide to 
postpone the decision with note that it will be performed again as far as additional data 
will be obtained [15].   
In practice, for risk determination we use two basis approaches, namely: 
1. Determination of hazard from disaster H and return period τ (in years) is performed 
by methods based on the theory of large numbers, theory of extremes, theory of 
fuzzy sets, theory of chaos, theory of fractals etc. [30];  well-tried method is shown 
in Annex 1.  According to a site vulnerability in an investigated land (e.g. around a 
given site: square 10 x 10 km; circle with radius of 5 km) the whole damage on all 
assets is determined for the H denoted by S  (Figure 12), usually expressed in 
money. Risk R connected with the given disaster in a given site is determined by 
the relation 
 
R = S / τ 
 
The result is very clear: e.g. “the risk from a given disaster in a given site is X EURs 
and for bigger entity it is MX EURs”, where M is number of sites. 
 
 
 
Figure. 12. Flowchart for determining the risks which is used in practice for the strategic 
management of safety; A – assets and Z losses, damages and harms to the assets; 
Description: 1-the human lives and health, 2- human security, 3 - property, 4 - the 
public welfare, 5 - the environment, 6 -  infrastructures and technologies, P – private. 
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2. Determination of disaster scenario for the disaster with size corresponding to max-
imum expected disaster (it is possible with regard to demands of norms to use the 
probable size of expected disaster, or the value of standard size of determined dis-
aster or at least unfavourable disaster) is performed; the exact scenario compilation 
methods [30] are used. According to data for a given land it is determined: 
- the value of whole damage on all assets in the area SS (Figure 12) is usually 
expressed in money according to amount of assets and their vulnerability to 
the impacts of a followed disaster in the affected area, usually normalised to 
a certain land unit S, 
- the occurrence frequency of maximum expected disaster, normalised to one 
year, f according to the professional data from databases or expert opinions. 
Risk R is given by relation 
 
              R = S * f. 
 
The result is in the same form as in the foregoing case. This case is often used for 
technological and other disasters for which we have not good long-term catalogue 
(this shortage the EU want to remove by paying the special attention to the compi-
lation of the MARS database [16].   
It should also be noted that the critical item is also a choice of qualitative or quantitative 
approach to the evaluation of risks, because with the quantification of the risks it needs to 
be treated with caution, since the calculations of the risk  creating a false sense of security 
and safety. It is, therefore, always necessary to compare the originators and consequences 
of using quantitative and qualitative analysis. If we are talking about quantification, it is nec-
essary to mention and compare levels of quantification: verbal (large, small), ordinal (for 
example, from 1 to 10), score, interval rating, probability calculation, calculating on the basis 
of evidence (Bayes’ theorem) [30].    
On the basis of previous knowledge and experience, summarised in the work [14-16,20], 
the following applies: 
1. The reasons for supporting the quantitative analysis are: the determination of the 
risk is the result of objective methods and procedures, including the statistical anal-
ysis of the data; results of the analysis of the risks are also in the "managerial lan-
guage" percent, finance, etc.; it is provided a sufficient basis for the analysis of 
costs and benefits; and it is possible to monitor and control the performance of risk 
management. 
2. Reasons against the quantitative analysis are: the calculations can sometimes be 
complex and to the untrained eye may look like a black box; and to the quantitative 
analysis there are needed knowledge and computer programs. 
3. Several recommendations for quantitative analysis: the risk as the number often 
fascinated, but at the same time it is blinding the perception of the context. In terms 
of communication with the public, it should be noted that the very low probability is  
difficultly related to everyday experience. For example, one/one in a million at a 
time is 30 seconds per year. Therefore, there is a demanded degree of analogy; 
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data type 10-5 does not represent the current risk, but are statistical upper bound of 
the possibility that risk could occur. Thanks to the perfect ten there are believed 
that  reduction of  the risk of the procedure or one or the two orders is simply be-
cause it is only a multiple of ten. Reduce the risk of 10-3 to 10-4 means that the risk 
is reduced by 90 percent. The subsequent reduction of 10-4 to 10-5 is ten times 
smaller, and therefore, the nine percent. Therefore, it is recommended to reduce 
the risk to express graphically; and quantitative approach for the risk must, there-
fore, be based on a simple principle: rather, measure what is measurable, than 
what is important. If it is important at the same time measurable, the better. 
4. Reasons to use qualitative analysis are: calculations, if they do, they are simple 
and easy to understand; it is not necessary to quantitatively determine the fre-
quency of the occurrence of disasters; it is not necessary to determine the cost of 
the measures to soften the impact of risk factors; qualitative analysis arranges and 
recommends areas for a deeper and more detailed assessment. 
5. The reasons against the use of qualitative analysis are: results including the deter-
mination of risks are mainly subjective; it does not work with any value, and a value 
indicator; for the design of countermeasures there are provided only hints at the 
problem; it is not possible to monitor the effectiveness and efficiency of the risk 
management procedures, because there is no objective benchmark. 
6. Several recommendations for qualitative analysis: a qualitative approach to risk 
should deal with only potential / opportunities of occurrence; a qualitative approach 
is based on friendly terms with the relative importance, so it cannot omit the follow-
ing issues of the qualitative approach: how high is high risk or what is the compa-
rability of the various risks? What are the differences between high and middle? 
high and low?, middle and  low ?; and scoring the risk can lead to erroneous deci-
sions, which means that the measure is doing there, where they do not, and vice 
versa, where should do, they do not do. 
 
3.2. Risk engineering 
 
Task of management and trade-off with risks is to find the optimal way how to reduce the 
risks evaluated at socially acceptable level, or to keep them at this level. Reducing the risk 
is always associated with increasing costs. Risk management is, therefore, guided by the 
appeal to find a border that is viable, in order to reduce risk costs incurred were socially 
acceptable; there are used the principles of ALARA and ALARP [15]. Therefore, it is neces-
sary to agree on what the requirements will be output from the risk assessment meet. At the 
risk assessment it is necessary to try to comply with the established requirements, and any 
failure to comply with to justify. These are mainly of compliance with requirements [15]:  
- the execution of the evaluation in demanded extent and quality in accordance with the 
accepted methodology of evaluation, 
- the completeness of the evaluation, 
- the inclusion of the latest knowledge of science, 
- an estimate of the uncertainty and ambiguity in the case of the use of extrapolation, 
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- uniform representation of the characteristics of the risks, 
- and transparency in the implementation of the risk assessment process. 
Achievement of the objective means well manage and properly decide, with good manage-
ment and good decision making is possible only when we have good data, and we can take 
advantage of the instruments that we have available [15]. From  above mentioned facts, 
they are resulting basic principles for the work with risks [15,16], namely:  
- to be proactive, 
- to imagine the possible consequences, 
- properly to determine priorities from the perspective of the public interest, 
- to think about mastering the unacceptable impacts, 
- to consider synergies, 
- and to be alert,  
which corresponds to the philosophy promoted at work [31].  
Therefore, when determining the risk for strategic decision-making it needs to be used a 
hierarchical multi-criteria approach. Recent professional work used the concept of hierar-
chical holographic modelling (HHM) [31] and their results are of high quality, because there 
is considered a number of factors, which are the originators of the epistemic uncertainties.  
Reduction of any risk is associated with the increasing costs, lack of knowledge, technical 
resources, etc. Therefore, in practice, lit is looking for the border, which is feasible to reduce 
the risk, so that the costs incurred were reasonable, see principles of ALARA and ALARP 
mentioned above. Acceptable level of risk taken as follows (certain optimization) is mostly 
subject to top management and the result of a political decision, at which it is in terms of 
ensuring the development necessary to make use of current scientific and technical 
knowledge and to take account of the economic, social and other conditions. Bad decisions 
at the top level, mainly political, tend to have large, harmful consequences, as witnessed by 
events from ordinary life (an attack on Iraq or Libya, and the destabilization of countries, a 
lack of control of pilots and the deaths of 150 people after intentional impact the aircraft to 
the mountain massif in the last week of March, 2015, etc. [15]). 
With the perception of risks, it is related the acceptability of the risk, which needs to have a 
social dimension. It is necessary to consider: 
- for whom it should be risk acceptable? - for the originator of the risks, for the politi-
cians or for public administration? 
- who establishes acceptability? -  politicians make decisions about what is legal and, 
therefore, they should not decide about what is acceptable, 
- whether in the determination of the acceptability of risks it was discussed currently  
tolerate risks,  intolerant thresholds and public attitudes to risks. 
When assessing the acceptability of the risk this is a comparison of the value / risk rate 
founded by risk analysis of the followed system with the limit of acceptability or limit of mar-
ginal function acceptability. The position of the individual to the risk depends on the percep-
tion of risk and the risk of stress, which is caused to the individuals (death, injury, loss of 
employment, etc.). The attitude of society to the risk also depends on the overall perception 
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of risk, further on the risk-averse, for example one accident with a greater number of victims 
in one case is less acceptable than a higher number of accidents with victims, and despite 
the fact that the total sum of the victims for a specific period is the same.  
The society accepts, when a group of people is exposed to the risk in order to obtain benefits 
for different groups of people. The role is played by the ratio between the cost of increasing 
the safety and the number of lives saved, media attention, etc. The acceptability of the risk 
depends on the social, economic and political factors and the perceived benefit from the 
activities for which the benefits are substantially higher than the cost of the rescue and clean-
up work in the realisation of the risk.  
Risks were, are and will be, and constantly appear new. Management and trade-off with risk 
requires dimension and measure of risk, considering not only the physical damages, the 
victims and the equivalent of the economic losses, but also social, organisational and insti-
tutional factors. Most of the techniques on the determination of the risk do not represent a 
holistic approach, and not the fact that the risk is divided into local, regional and country 
level.  
It is clear that if we are not able to identify and analyse the risk, we are not able to defend 
effectively against it. The error, which is allowed for the identification, analysis and evalua-
tion of the risk is transferred to the emergency and crisis plans, business continuity plans 
and reduces their value in relation to the planned measures aiming in particular to the pro-
tection of human life and health, but also in the area of operational rescue forces involved 
in the implementation of the rescue operations. It holds the wisdom "to know means to sur-
vive, to ignore the call of the destruction's means", from which it follows that ignoring or 
underestimating the risk management and trade-off with risk is the reason of most problems, 
failures and disasters.  
Due to the fact that, in many cases, it cannot well cope with epistemic uncertainties, so in 
practice there are used the procedures by good engineering practice, which on the basis of 
experience leads to a good result. On the basis of engineering principles and technical 
standards related to project management, it is the greatest attention paid to the risks, which 
may cause the greatest loss, damage and injury to the assets [15]. Therefore, components, 
systems, and infrastructure objects in technological systems, divided into categories; as a 
rule, the three with the fact that in the first category it is the risk settled up best; it performs 
a detailed monitoring and inspection after each realisation of the source of the risk [15].   
Technically it should be primarily to assess:  
- how severe (what kind of loss, damage and injury to protected assets), 
- what can happen, 
- what is the acceptability of impacts of direct and intermediated by a complex network of 
links and flows and their consequences, 
- and whether the security measures and safety management system are adequate to 
existing threats in a given facility, i.e. whether they are such, that will ensure that in the 
implementation of the risk it would be acceptable. 
As mentioned above, for the understanding and research of complex systems in the engi-
neering practice there are using the chaos theory and the complexity theory, and the theory 
of options (possibilities), i.e. the Dempster - Shafer theory. The theory of options allows to 
work with uncertainties of different kinds, i.e., as with random uncertainties and epistemic 
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uncertainties [32]. It is a continuation of the theory of fuzzy sets, and a certain generalization 
of Bayesian theory of subjective probability. It assumes the existence of a number of certain 
conditions (variants) of the system, which have different probabilities of occurrence. It allows 
combining data from different sources and it is used when creating expert systems.  
In the field of control, the theory of options [32] is used; according to it they are  modelled 
variants corresponding to the different processes that are possible in the system and during 
them, they are considered the possible knowledge deficiencies (epistemic uncertainty). Of 
them, then it is selected optimal variant. In the selection of variants there are used and they 
are combined calculations (i.e., analytical procedures) with the practices of good practice. 
Practice has shown that it is not fit one expert, but it is necessary to combine the knowledge 
of a few experts. The combination may be ensured by using analytical methods or heuris-
tics, for example, the Delphi, the AHP (Analytical Hierarchy Process), a panel discussion 
[30].  
Therefore, in practice, it is used by system engineering, the main principles are: 
- defining the objectives and activities of the facility for their attainment, 
- the establishment and application of the criteria for the decision-making process,  
- developing the alternatives, 
- modelling the systems for the analysis,  
- implementation of management and control.  
The given principles are now widely regarded as good engineering practice. If most 
engineering is based on technology and science, the system engineering considers a 
as equivalent significant component of its practice also the management of engineering 
processes. The aim of the system engineering is to optimize the operation of systems 
in accordance with priority criteria given in proposal. The foundation of any approach 
for the achievement of the objectives, it is the initial assumption that system engineer-
ing optimizing the individual components, subsystems or individual partial systems 
does not generally warrant the creation of an optimal system. It is a known fact that 
improving one of the subsystems may in fact worsen the properties of the entire sys-
tem. When we realize that, according to the principle of the hierarchy it is actually each 
system a subsystem of a larger system, so given principle represents an unsolvable 
problem. It is necessary to recall once again that the safety of the system of systems 
is not a summary of the safeties of the individual subsystems.  
System approach provides a logical structure for the solution of the problem. As 
the first it needs to specify the objectives that the system has achieved and the criteria 
according to which they can be evaluated alternatives (variants) of proposals. Then it 
comes the phase of the creation of system that results in a set of alternative proposals. 
Each of these alternatives is then analysed and evaluated in accordance with the ob-
jectives and criteria and, finally, it is the best of them selected for implementation. In 
practice, it is a highly interactive process of mutual modification of the original objec-
tives and criteria on the basis of the later stages of creation and elaboration of the 
proposal.  
System engineers may not be experts in all aspects of the system, but they need to under-
stand the subsystems and various phenomena in them enough, so to be able to describe 
and model their characteristics. This means that the system engineering often requires: 
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- the team of workers for the specification of the requirements of the system,  
- the elaboration of feasibility studies,  
- comparative studies,  
- design,  
- analysis and development of architecture of the system and analysis of interfaces of 
components and systems.  
Due to the complex structure of systems of systems, in most cases it is not possible to 
eliminate all parts of the epistemic uncertainty in the processes of decision-making, because 
it cannot be obtained all the relevant information. Therefore, the consequences of each of 
the directions of procedure cannot be completely determined and for their study it originated 
further discipline, i.e. system analysis, which provides an organized procedure (process) 
for the acquisition and detection of specific information related to a given decision.  
System engineering and system analysis are already de facto merged long years and 
are used in the formation of complex man-machine systems, in which the system anal-
ysis provides information for the decision-making process and it organises the procedures 
for selection of the best alternatives to the proposal. Listed disciplines create together 
theoretical and methodological basis of system safety, i.e. safety of the system. 
Due to the fact that, in many cases, it cannot well cope with epistemic uncertainties, so in 
practice there are used the procedures known as the good practice procedures / good en-
gineering practice. It is a good practice in a certain area, which on the basis of experience 
leads to a good result. They are used in cases in which a single procedure was not ap-
proved. There are frequent when measuring in laboratories dealing with human beings, etc.  
Good engineering practice (a good engineering practice) is then defined as the ensem-
ble of engineering methods and standards that are used during the life cycle of a technical 
system with the aim of achieving appropriate and cost-effective solutions. It is supported by 
the appropriate documentation (conceptual documentation, diagrams, manuals, reports 
from testing, etc.). 
On the basis of engineering principles and technical standards related to project manage-
ment, as it was mentioned above, it is the greatest attention directed to the risks, which may 
cause the greatest loss, damage and injury to the assets. Therefore, facilities, objects and 
infrastructures are divided into categories; usually three with the fact that the first is the risk 
were best conducted, detailed monitoring and inspection after each implementation of the 
source of the risk. Design tasks are the following: 
- prevention of collapse of buildings, 
- to ensure the security of people, 
- damages need to be repairable, 
- interruption of the operation of a technical and a civilian facility needs to be acceptable,  
- for objects of type power plants, water facilities, etc. continuous operation needs to be 
ensured, 
- at the risk of technologies, it is necessary to avert disorder requiring repair, which would 
have unacceptable impacts on the assets. 
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3.3. Risk of complex systems 
 
Because the territory and each technical facility (object / network / organization) are 
the complex systems of systems (set of open and mutually interconnected systems of 
various nature), it is necessary to consider the safety of whole complex, called the 
integral safety. For this purpose, it needs to work with an integral risk. The integral risk 
is influenced by reality that each followed entity has a range of protected assets of 
different nature that are interfaced by internal links of different nature and couplings 
created by flows.  
Because the goals of assets are not always the same, it is necessary to expect the 
conflicts. At several conditions (caused by occurrence of special disaster with size 
greater than design one, which creates the boundary value that assets withstand such 
disaster without greater losses and damages), low assets´ resilience and interfaces 
among the assets are the causes of another conflicts. The entity integral risk depends 
on the hazards from disasters of all kinds (natural, technological, social, financial, eco-
nomic, legal etc.) that can threaten the entity; the disasters affected not only the indi-
vidual assets but also their links and couplings, which lead to the cascade failures.  
For correct assessment of entity risk, it is important to consider all disasters that can 
damage the entity, and properly to determine the sizes of hazards connected with in-
dividual disasters. The risk connected with each disaster is probable size of losses, 
damages and harms on the entity for hazard connected with the design disaster divided 
to area unit and one year. The crucial is the correct determination of hazard connected 
with the design disaster. Both, the performed entity safety reports audits and the 
inspections after the entity accidents or failures, revealed that in evaluated 
cases: some possible disasters with potential to disrupt the entity were not considered 
at risk determination directed to the entity safety; and several faults in determination of 
correct value of hazard connected with design disaster were found (e.g. data from too 
short time interval on disaster, too limited knowledge).  
The data [1-11] and special research results [13-17,20,21] show that risk value depend 
on many factors. They are shown in Figure 13. The analysis and sorting the data set 
revealed seven domains that influence the result of work with risks of technical facility 
[15,33], i.e. its safety, namely: 
1. Context in which the risks, inherently connected with technical facility, are inserted.  
2. List of considered sources of risks. 
3. Type of risk form. 
4. Ways of mastering the risks. 
5. Process model of work with risks, application of the TQM approach  [34]   and 
Coase theorem [35].  
6. Technique of management and coping with risks of technical facility.  
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7. Way of management of risks in time.  
 
 
 
Figure 13. The factors that influence the risk size of a given entity. 
 
On the TQM (Total Quality Management) approach [34], the ISO standards 9000, 
14000 etc. had been set up. It consists in the requirement that all employees, from the 
plain employee up to the top management employee, are participated in the process 
of quality improvement. The process of quality improvement (i.e., in its top level it goes 
on de facto on integral safety increase) comes from the impulses which come from 
customer/citizen needs.   
TQM comes from the assumption that the stable quality of products and services can-
not be ensured by commands, supervision, partial programmes, organizational or eco-
nomic measures, but it can be reached by seeking, measuring and evaluating of 
causes, why the productivity and quality do not improve. De facto it goes on certain 
safety culture (in the other words it is a way of application of measures and human 
activities). Attention is focused on processes ongoing in the entity. At the TQM imple-
mentation, they are considered the entity specifics, because all measures need to re-
flect the structure of entity from the reason of efficiency; it means they shall be site 
specific.  
The correct outputs for needs of proper management according to the TQM are the 
following: 
1. The risk assessment document – it contains information about the appropriate risks. 
2. The list of top risks – it contains the list of selected risks, the solution of which 
demand big claims on resources and time. 
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3. The list of retired risks – it serves as the historic link for decision making in future. 
The technique of only risk management from the reason of economic handling with 
forces, resources and funds formally before work with risks reviews both, the risk 
management and the trade-off with risks in the context of benefits and costs on the 
outputs. 
On the basis of present knowledge, the orientation to the process management leads 
to: 
- better understanding and greater integration of entity, 
- continuous management of linkages among the individual processes, 
- stress on: comprehension of requirements and their fulfilment; needs to consider 
the processes from the viewpoint of added value; run into increase of performance 
and effectivity; and permanent putting forward the processes on the basis of their 
efficiency.  
The Coase theorem in engineering practice is expressed in Figure 14. Human possi-
bilities and sources are limited, and therefore, the acceptable entity security is near the 
whole cost optimum [35],  
 
   
Figure 14. Security understand as economic optimum for human system. 
 
From the practical reasons it is necessary to consider that the entity risk connected 
with the given disaster does not represent only the direct losses on assets but also the 
indirect ones; the indirect losses are caused by:  
- delays or errors in response,  
- cascades of failures caused by synergic and cumulative effects, which are caused 
by linkages and couplings among the assets, 
- and by domino effects.  
Due to the complex entity structure their risk is the integral risk that is expressed by 
following formula 
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where: H is the hazard connected with the considered disaster; Ai  are the values of 
assets, i = 1,2, ..., n that are considered in connection with complex technical facility 
safety, where n is the number of monitored assets; Zi  are the vulnerabilities of assets 
taken under account, i = 1,2, ..., n;  F is the loss function; Pi  is the occurrence proba-
bility of i-th asset damage – conditional probability; O is the vulnerability of safeguard 
measures; S  is the size of followed territory / facility; t is the time that is measured 
from the origin of harmful phenomenon in facility; T  is the time for which losses arise; 
and    is the return period for the given disaster. 
Because the loss function F  form is not known, we use for determination of total risk 
(i.e. the integral risk) the scheme given above in Figure 12. 
In practice, the easiest way used for estimation of losses and harms caused by disaster 
is to draw up the situation plan of followed entity (example in Figure 15) and to estimate 
the expected losses according to the distribution of assets and their vulnerability (Fig-
ure 12); e.g. a proven formula for determining the number of injured persons is   
 
 
Figure 15.  Example of area situation plan – blue, green and red objects – followed  
assets and black object domino effect source. 
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𝑵 = 𝑺 . 𝒉 . 𝒇                                                                                                  
  
in which S is the affected area in ha, h is the population density given by the number 
of persons per ha, f is a correlation factor when only part of the territory is inhabited.   
 
Well-tried form of registration of losses and harms is table, the model of which is in 
Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16. Example of data registration.  
 
Because losses and harms change with time, the impacts of monitored disaster in the 
selected territory is suitable to monitor: 
- in time 0h (disaster origin),  
- in times 3h, 6h … measured from disaster origin distinguish primary and secondary 
impacts; secondary ones are caused by failure of infrastructures and technologies.   
Table 1 shows an example of a scale used by FEMA; description is in [15] for assess-
ment of losses and harms on  assets. In this way, additional losses caused by domino 
effects that mathematical models do not reveal are evaluated. 
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Onward, the problem is complicated by reality that the world is in dynamic develop-
ment, i.e. both, the entity conditions and the risk sources are changing in time. Moreo-
ver, there is necessary to respect that the risk and safety are not complementary quan-
tities – it holds that the risk reduction leads to safety increase but at the same risk value 
the safety can increase if humans perform special measures or at their behaviour use 
special manners following from correct safety culture.     
 
Table 1. Auxiliary scale for assessing the risk acceptability based on the disaster im-
pacts.  
 
Illness - injury Loss on 
property / 
equipment  
Time needed 
to correct im-
pacts 
Economic 
loss on equip-
ment [$] 
Environmental 
impacts 
Deaths or total 
permanent in-
eligibility 
System 
loss, sub-
stantial 
damage to 
real estate 
 
> 4 months > 1 Million 
Long-term envi-
ronmental dam-
age (5 years or 
more) or the 
need for more 
than 1 mil. $ for 
redress (or fine) 
Permanent 
partial inca-
pacity; tempo-
rary complete 
incapacity 
(over 3 
months) 
Substantial 
damage to 
the system; 
significant 
damage to 
real estate 
 
2 weeks to 4 
months 
250 000 – 1 
Million 
Medium-term 
environmental 
damage (1-5 
years), or the 
need for 250 
thousand -1 Mil-
lion $ for re-
dress (or fine) 
Minor injury; 
Job shift loss; 
Compensation 
for injury or ill-
ness 
  
 
Minor sys-
tem dam-
age; minor 
damage to 
real estate 
 
1 day to 2 
weeks 
1000 –250 000 Short-term envi-
ronmental dam-
age (< 1 year) 
or the need for 1 
thousand - 250 
thousand $ for 
redress (or fine) 
First aid or mi-
nor medical 
treatment 
  
Minor  sys-
tem defects 
< 1 day < 1 000 
Minor environ-
mental damage, 
easily remedial, 
requiring <1 
thousand. $ for 
redress (or fine). 
 
Owing to differences in individual disasters nature, the countermeasures for assets´ 
protection being effective to one disaster, are not effective to another and even can 
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increase vulnerability some of them; i.e. the countermeasures effectiveness depends 
on real entity and its disaster.  
Therefore, at solution of practical tasks connected with both, the entity safety and the 
entity risk, it is necessary to consider that risks are normal and for the entity 
safety it is necessary to apply not only the risk prevention measures and activities 
determined on the basis of correct intent and correct data and methods, but also:  
- the safety culture by which the human behaviour in the entity and its vicinity is tar-
geted to safety, 
- and the tools that reduced losses and damages if some important disasters occur.  
Therefore, it is necessary to prepare the qualified response for important risks realiza-
tions [12-15,21], such as:  
- the risk management plans for both, the entity and the entity vicinity for all relevant 
risks, 
- the continuity plans for survive of important complex technical objects and facilities, 
- and the operational crisis plans for both, the complex technical objects and facilities 
and their vicinities (in-site, off-site). 
From the viewpoint of ensuring the human needs, namely including the human survival 
at critical situations, the four phases of each entity investigation are important:  
- in-depth knowledge of entity (protected assets, possible disasters, vulnerabilities), 
- determination of risks, determination of concept of optimising the measures and 
activities in entity for getting over the expected risks, 
- determination of weaknesses in management and trade-off with risks and in deter-
mination of measures of response and responsibilities for case of occurrence of 
great damages, losses and harms on protected assets, e.g. caused by lack of fi-
nances, knowledge, technology etc.; at least it is necessary to process the risk 
management plans for important risks, 
- constitution of capability and preparedness to ensure the survival of humans and 
critical technologies at critical situations (crisis plans, continuity plans). 
Present knowledge shows that it is not enough to manage the risks of individual disas-
ters but it is necessary to understand and to manage the processes that product the 
disasters. Due to dynamic world development, the processes originating the disasters 
also change, and therefore, the attention to them is logical. Safety management con-
cept formed at certain time on the basis of integral risk is not sufficient and it is neces-
sary continually to adapt it to changes that are caused by internal and external pro-
cesses by help of proactive targeted integral risk management. 
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4. RISK ENGINEERING TOOLS  
 
The basic tools for risk management and trade-off with risk directed to entity reliability, 
security and safety, according to knowledge summarized in [12], are: 
- management (strategic, tactical, operational) based on qualified data,          
knowledge, professional assessments, qualified decision-making methods,  
- land-use planning, correct technical facilities sitting, correct technical facilities de-
signing, correct technical facilities building, correct technical facilities operation, 
correct technical facilities decommissioning and  occupied territory cleaning for 
other civil use, 
- maintenance, reparation and renovation of buildings, technologies and infrastruc-
tures, 
- citizen’s education, schooling and training, 
- specific education of technical  and management workers, 
- technical standards and norms including the best practice procedures, i.e.   tools 
for control / regulation of processes that may or might lead to disaster occurrence 
or to its impact increase, 
-  inspections and audits, 
-  executive security forces for qualified response, 
-  systems for critical situations defeating, 
- emergency, continuity, crisis and contingency planning, 
- safety, emergency, continuity and crisis management. 
The key concepts of present risk engineering directed to security and / or safety [13,14]   
are: 
1. The approaches are based on risk – the work intensity and documentation are ad-
equate to a risk level. 
2. The professional approach is based on reality that only the critical attributes of qual-
ity and the critical parameters of process are considered. 
3. The problem solution is oriented to critical items – the critical aspects of technical 
systems ensuring the consistence of system operations are followed and managed. 
4. Verified quality parameters are included in the project proposal. 
5. The accent on quality engineering procedures – it needs to be proved the accuracy 
of selected procedures under given conditions. 
6. The aim of a safety upgrade – permanent improving of the processes with the use 
of analysis of the root causes of malfunctions and failures. 
For respecting these items, there need to be used relevant data sets and only verified 
methods that provide outputs with a designated testified competence. 
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4.1. Risk engineering models  
 
The short description of procedure of risk management is shown in Figure 17 [16].    
You can see basic important steps; their details are in Figure 18 [16].   Very important 
step is the decision if the risk is acceptable or unacceptable. Regarding the reality that 
the determination of the acceptability level is always very problematic and it depends 
on the situation in society, the risk management lean on two additional levels, namely: 
the insignificant one and the unacceptable one. Between these two levels, there is the 
domain of risk, which is acceptable with certain measures.  
 
 
 
Figure 17. Model of risk management in territory. 
 
If risk is lower than the insignificant level, no measures and activities are required, in 
contrary, if risk is higher than the unacceptable level, it is immediately necessary to 
take measures and activities for its reduction. The proposed measures and activities 
need to be further investigated from the viewpoint of their demands on economic, 
political and social domain; in particular, with the use of following analytical procedures:  
- economic analysis  - "cost-benefit analysis", 
- legal analysis investigating the possibilities of the harmonisation of different 
variants with the legislation, 
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Figure 18.  Detail description of processes: disaster risk analysis; risk assessment; risk 
reduction; and response and renovation. 
 
- political analysis investigating the possible political consequences following from 
the decision, 
- and analysis of the public opinion. 
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The analytical component of risk management is a scientific matter and its output is 
the proposal of several variants of a problem solution as groundwork.  The part of all 
variants needs to be the proposal of mechanisms (Control Options) enabling the effec-
tive realisation of proposed measures. This step may be understood as the adminis-
trative one but it needs not to be underestimated or skipped because it is sufficiently 
known that each good mentioned executive measure without effective check-up and 
appropriate sanction has no effect. 
The final step is the decision of the implementation of measures for risk reduction, 
eventually of the further following of the problem. It is necessary to accept the decision 
whenever, namely in case when it is evident that risk assessment will not give further 
results in sufficient time interval. It is necessary to accept the decision also in the case 
when the result of risk assessment is burden by great errors that follow from present 
scientific cognition and they cannot be reduced in a necessary time. 
In practice two risk management models [15,16] are usually used:  
- classical risk management (Figures 17 and 18), 
- safety management, i.e. risk governance for security and sustainable development 
(Figure 19). 
The Figures 17 and 18 are sufficiently expressive that we do not discuss them in de-
tails; particulars are in [15,16].  
 
 
 
Figure 19. a) - Model of safety assessment in territory (RRD(i) – risk from the i-th rele-
vant disaster; b) – Model of safety management in territory.  
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Figure 19 (part a) shows that the result of safety for followed system is a consensus 
for all considered disasters because each disaster type affects, owing to its nature, the 
system and its protected assets differently.  Because the human factor failure, espe-
cially in risk management belongs to disasters, i.e. phenomena that damaged the hu-
man system from a certain size. With regard to the typical risk properties like uncer-
tainties and vagueness, as was shown above, it is necessary at deciding on risk, to 
use more possible variants of real human system behaviour and multi-criteria deciding 
by the help of experts with verified qualification [15,16]. 
From Figure 19 (both parts) it follows that the result safety for followed system is a 
consensus for all considered disasters because each disaster type affects, owing to its 
nature, the system and its protected assets differently.  
 
4.2. Demands on data and methods at risk engineering 
 
For human safety and for human system safety (i.e. territory, organisation, plant) we 
need to manage the integral risk including the human factor, i.e. to find the way of 
cross-section risks management and to concentrate the investigation on interdepend-
ences and on critical spots with a potential to start the system cascade failures, domino 
effects, strange behaviour etc., and on the basis of such site knowledge to prepare 
measures and activities ensuring the continuity of limited infrastructure operation and 
of the human survival.  
Evaluation of present knowledge shows that one of number of causes are interdepend-
ences inducing the cascade failures in the human system or in its part are the human 
errors (intentional or involuntary) in management and in deciding. Therefore, we need 
to do all measures in managerial and engineering activities to avert human failures, 
namely at decision-making. Because consequences of errors originating at decision 
are often huge, the great attention is concentrated to work with risks at present.  
In daily practice, the getting over the risks is the duty of all participants. The qualified 
activities are ensured by engineers, who arrange co-ordinated implementation of 
measures for prevention, preparedness (directed to mitigation of severe impacts at risk 
realisation), response and renovation. Often used characteristic of engineering’s work 
with the risks is:  
- it considers multi-fields and cross-sectional disciplines that use both, the general 
and the specific methods, tools and techniques (specific ones are either simple or 
complex, complex ones represent well-ordered use of several general or simple 
methods, tools and techniques), 
- it uses methods, tools and techniques logic, technological, financial, managerial 
and deciding because their integral part is a decision on technological problems, 
costs and time planning, 
- it deals with tasks that connect the trade-off with risks for human system safety 
ensuring and the requirement of non-trivial solution of problems by use of multi-
criteria methods, tools and techniques.  
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In all procedures it needs to be respected that assets and causes of risks have different 
natures that cause incommensurability of criterions and reasons, which only allows 
application of multi-criteria methods, tools and techniques that are suitable, i.e. correct 
and valid for a given problem target.  
From the methodical viewpoint at selection of methods, tools and techniques they need 
to be respected:  
- data quality, 
- structure of problem that is solved and requirements on quality of results, 
which means specially to test both, the data quality (accuracy, completeness, homo-
geneity, bearing witness to a given problem [15]), and the qualification of experts if 
they are used (IAEA, OECD, World Bank etc. have strict criteria for judgement of expert 
qualification) [16].     
Methods for determination of risk size need to respect both, the nature of phenomena 
that are their sources (i.e. characteristics and physical nature of disasters) and the 
parameters of medium in which phenomena affect. There are used methods based on 
the mathematical statistics, theory of extreme values respecting the random, sporadic 
and irregular great events occurrence, fuzzy sets theory, approaches of operational 
analysis etc., that inherently assume the certain model of phenomena occurrence, and 
methods based on scenarios that are simulated or empirically obtained [15,16,30].  
 
4.3. Organizational questions of risk engineering 
 
For trade-off with risks of technical facilities, we use the safety management system 
(shortly SMS), concepts [13,14,26]. In the SMS we consider two cases, namely either 
the risk realisation is still substantially the same or it is significantly different. In the first 
case, we consider from safety reasons either the worst case (such approach is found 
in the standards based on a deterministic approach to safety provision) or we admit 
random uncertainties resulting from the momentary local and temporal conditions of 
assets and as a representative variable for risk management we use the mean value 
obtained by evaluating the possible alternatives (arithmetic mean; median; median + 
σ, where σ is the standard deviation).  
The other procedure is now commonly considered in the preparation of documents for 
strategic management (the alternative scenarios for the risk realisation and their oc-
currence probabilities are determined; and the mean and its dispersion are derived 
from them by a clear mathematical approach); we can find it in the norms and stand-
ards based on a probabilistic approach. In cases when we consider the existence of 
vagueness in data we need to use the combination of analytical and heuristic ap-
proaches that offers different theories; overview is in [15].     
Strategy of management for negotiation with risks 15,16 is:  
- part of risk is reduced, i.e. the risk realisation is averted by preventive measures,  
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- part of risk is mitigated, i.e. the non-acceptable impacts are reduced or averted by 
prepared measures and activities having the mitigating effects as warning systems 
and another measures of emergency and crisis management, 
- part of risk is re-insured,  
- part of risk for which there are prepared resources for response and renovation,  
- part of risk for which there is prepared contingency plan, i.e. it is used for part of 
risk that is low frequent and too difficult governable. 
At present work with risk, the risk is understood as the potential that a chosen action 
or activity (including the choice of inaction) will lead to a loss (a non-demanded out-
come). Now in practice there are used five types of risk management / engineering of 
systems [15], i.e.:  
- classical risk management and risk engineering, 
- classical risk management and risk engineering including the human factor, 
- security management and security engineering, 
- safety management and safety engineering, i.e. risk governance / trade-off for se-
curity and sustainable development of system, 
- safety management and safety engineering determined for system of systems 
(SoS). 
Figure 20 shows the overview; the detail characterization is in [15] and in Annex 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20. Concepts of management and trade-off with risks and their targets arranged 
chronologically according to introduction in practice. 
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The classical risk engineering is based on principle that: the risk was determined after 
the design of the system; risk determination was directed to the level of system and its 
components, i.e. there was not considered outer vicinity and the protection of public 
assets; there were only required the knowledge of system and processes, i.e. there 
were not required the knowledge of outer vicinity and protection of public assets; and 
if the risk existed then it was determined and solved but with the lack  of the possibility 
to remove the risks connected with  an inappropriate solution for a given site and sys-
tem. The risk engineering leans on risk management and it searches the problem so-
lution by way that it individually considers disaster after disaster and requires coping 
with all the risks the occurrence probability of which is equal or higher than 0.05. Usu-
ally it only includes disasters the sources of which are within the system and hence it 
very often only solves technical aspects of the problem. This risk engineering type was  
a predecessor of advanced risk engineering types, the standards and norms of which 
started to be developed in the middle of the last century [16,27,28].  
The security engineering [27]  ensures the system security (the security of system), i.e. 
it fulfils the targets of security management. It considers the risks from internal and 
external disasters and from human factor. It is a branch applying the methods, tools 
and techniques that can ensure the system security. 
The safety engineering represents the further degree of engineering trading-off with 
risks. It is a high-powered tool that ensures the security of system and security of its 
vicinity. It does not deal only with technical problems but it also respects public assets 
in the system vicinity. It is a branch applying the methods, tools and techniques and it 
is based on engineering and managing approaches by way in order that the system 
might be safe for all public assets during their whole life cycles [28]. The comprehended 
safety management is particularly marked from the risk management viewpoint by 
these characters:  
- sitting – designing – construction – project with risk reduction, 
- operation with the integration of early warning systems and of procedures for the 
management of the acceptable level of risks, 
- and defeating the abnormal, emergency and critical conditions at the operation and 
at putting out of the operation.  
The advanced safety engineering [13] uses at risk determination the following princi-
ples:  
- risk is determined during the given system whole life cycle, i.e. at sitting, designing, 
building, operation and putting out of operation, and eventually at territory bringing 
in original condition,  
- the risk determination is directed to user’s demands and to the level of provided 
services, 
- risk is determined according to the criticality of impacts on  processes, provided 
services and on assets that are determined by public interest, 
58 
 
- unacceptable risks are mitigated by  tool for risk management, i.e. according to 
technical and organisational proposals, by standardisation of operating procedures 
or by automatable check-up.    
Research [36] dealing with the judgement of criticality of the concepts of management 
and trade-off with risks showed in Figure 20 that  criticality of none of these concepts 
is negligible, Figure 21. Because the system safety  is complementary quantity to sys-
tem criticality; i.e.  
 
safety rate + criticality rate = 1,  
 
we obtain for safety rate values: 0,1, … ,5 and for safety rate the statement “the higher, 
the better”. By the use of theory of margin assessment often used in the engineering 
disciplines in determination of optimum solution we obtain median μ = 2 and standard 
deviation σ = 0.63. This means: μ + σ = 2.63; μ + 2σ = 3.26; and μ + 3σ = 4.89. This 
means that optimal concept for technical facility safety (i.e. the co-existence of tech-
nical facility with its surrounding) is connected with using the model “system of sys-
tems”. 
 
   
Figure 21. Criticalities of concepts of management and trade-off with risks that are 
shown in Figure 20. 
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The safety engineering as a very advanced risk engineering type respects the co-ex-
istence of systems with different nature (SoS), and so fulfils the present demands of 
humans [1-16,37,38]. To prepare groundwork, it is necessary to combine analytical 
methods with expert judgement by which we remove vagueness in data as was men-
tioned in chapter 3. The problems that we need to solve in this consequence consist 
of the acquisition of knowledge and in the assignment “who is the expert”; this was 
broadly discussed in world conference ESREL2011 [2]. For the first problem solution 
we need systematically to monitor human system and process obtained data by 
qualified methods [12,15,16].     
It is evident that each more advanced management type in Figure 20 keeps the higher 
demands on knowledge, tools, times, finance, personnel qualification etc. For each 
management and each engineering concept there has been developed a certain set 
of standards and norms for its use in practice. Because the demands of various con-
cepts are different, the standards and norms are different, the results are different and 
requirements on data, knowledge, material, technology, finances etc. are different. 
From this reason their capability to ensure human system safety, i.e. human security, 
existence and sustainable development, is different. 
Owing to provident handle with sources, forces and means, it is necessary in real cases 
to decide which concept is sufficient for a given problem solution. At deciding the role 
plays the risk size and the level of problem solution. The results of research [13,14,36] 
show that at problem solution on: 
- strategic level, it is necessary to use the system of systems safety management 
and system of systems safety engineering that fulfil demands of social engineers, 
technical engineers and environmental engineers, 
- tactical and functional levels, it is necessary to respect the strategic concept rec-
ommendations and at site specific immediate problems´ solution it is   possible to 
use the system safety management and system safety engineering because the 
character of solved problems is not so fundamental from the long-term viewpoint, 
- technical level it is necessary to respect the recommendations of all higher con-
cepts, i.e.  strategic, tactical and functional ones and for site specific immediate 
problems´ solution it is possible to use the system security management and secu-
rity engineering if character of solved problems is not so fundamental from the time 
viewpoint, 
- political level, it might be respected the strategic solutions, because politicians usu-
ally influence the strategic issues so public interests might be respected.  
At solution of emergency situation there is lack of time, information and knowledge, 
and therefore, it is justified the reaction using the concept of management and engi-
neering trade-off with risk directed to secured system and at critical cases only concept 
of management and engineering trade-off with risks directed to technical aspects. 
The assessment of criticality of individual systems (sectors) of critical complex facility 
parts and the whole critical complex facility is not trivial matter because under different 
conditions the sectors and their whole have a different role - active, reactive, critical or 
damping (not additive); e.g. the existence of several variants of electricity supply to one 
site decreases the energy facility criticality but it increases expenses etc. 
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With regard to knowledge summarized in [13,14], the basic principles of safety technical 
complex facilities are: 
- to apply the principles of inherent safety, 
- to create a management system that has the basic control functions, alarms and re-
sponses of operator processed in the way, so that the system was maintained in normal 
(steady) conditions, 
- to create special control systems, which are based on safety and protective barriers that 
keep the system in a safe condition also at changing the operating conditions and pre-
vent origin of non-demanded phenomena, i.e. the system carries out the objectives as 
well as at abnormal conditions, 
- to create special safety-oriented control systems that will keep the operation also at a 
greater change of operating conditions or they have the capability to ensure the opera-
tion after the application of corrective measures (clean-up, repair ...), i.e. there are 
measures for the in-side emergency response, mitigation, and to return to normal oper-
ation, i.e. the system carries out the objectives as well as at critical conditions,  
- to create special safety-oriented control systems which, in the case of loss of control of 
system and harmful impacts on the system and its surroundings, shall ensure the appli-
cation of mitigation measures on the system and its surroundings, i.e. there are   
measures inserted in system to ensure that the system can be restored, and that the 
losses and damages caused in the area have been minimized, i.e. they provide 
measures for the off-side response. System supercritical conditions are the conditions 
for which the system was not designed, which can lead to situations that threaten the 
system itself and vicinity of the system.  
It is necessary to apply the All-Hazard-Approach [12,15,16,18] and Defence-In-Depth 
concept [14,29]. In the professional area the layers mentioned above shall be regarded as 
protective barriers (so-called "protection in depth – defence in depth”) and at the resolution 
of the facilities from the point of view of safety, it is used the security feature that the facility 
has a single stage or to a five-degree protection in depth. Individual safety management 
systems ensure the application of the technical, operational and organizational measures 
and activities that are designed to either prevent the initiation of chains of harmful phenom-
ena, or stopped them. 
 
4.4. Normative risk engineering 
 
Risk engineering deals with management and trade-off with risks. Way of technical 
facility management and trade-off with risks determines the technical facility safety 
level. For high-quality risk management, it is necessary to know the risk sources and 
their possible impacts, and to have the necessary knowledge, available resources, 
forces and means for defeat the impacts so damages, losses and injuries to protected 
assets might be acceptable. 
The fundamental facts on nature, principles, methods and tools of risk management 
and trade-off with risks, i.e. recent knowledge from management domain, entity struc-
ture (role of interfaces among the human system assets and human system sub-
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systems), errors at decision-making and management are given in works 14,15.  As 
it was given above, the principles for risk management are: 
- to be proactive, 
- to think through possible consequences, 
- correctly to determine the priorities of public interest, 
- to think on overcome of problems, 
- to consider the synergies, 
- and to be alert. 
They come out from the stipulated demands that the risk management task is the 
safety increase, i.e. to find the optimum way how the evaluated significant risks may 
be reduced on demanded socially acceptable level, or to preserve the determined 
safety level. From this reason, the following facts need to be respected: 
- reduction of risk is practically always connected with increasing the costs,  
- risk management needs to be led by effort to find the boundary to which it is endur-
able to reduce the risk, so the spent costs might be socially acceptable,   
- on the basis of just given facts, it is necessary in each real case to establish the 
requirements that output from trade-off with risks needs to be fulfilled,  
- at real trade-off with risks, the stipulated requirements need to be kept and in case 
their non-observing, the reasons need to be given.  
According to  ISO [38]  the risk management procedure is shown in Figure 22. For the 
qualified risk management, it holds: 
1. It creates values, because it contributes to the achievement of the objectives over the 
years, such as improving the health, security, environmental quality, the efficiency of the 
processes and activities, etc. 
2. It is an integral part of the processes that take place in the system, because it corre-
sponds to the management structure of the system and it is an integral part of all pro-
cesses, of them consisting of projects in the facility, and change management. 
3. It is part of the decision-making processes in the system, which helps decide according 
to the importance and recognize alternative ways of solving problems. 
4. It is realistic, because it explicitly deals with uncertainty, random and epistemic (ambigu-
ity) in the conditions in which the system is located, as well as in the processes that take 
place in and outside the facility. 
5. It is a systematic, organized and timely, which ensures the effectiveness of the measures 
and activities. 
6. It is based on the best available information, which provides the current knowledge-
based solutions. 
7. It is a customized system, i.e. it is locally specific, which ensures both economy and 
effectiveness. 
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Figure 22. Risk management process; processed according to [38]. 
 
8. It considers the human and cultural factors in the system, which affects its acceptability 
for participating. 
9. It is transparent and comprehensive, which increases its reliability. 
10. It is a dynamic, repeatable, and responds to changes in the system, which guarantees 
its timeliness helps continuous improvement and development of the system. 
The risk management framework includes: 
1. Understanding of the system and its context. In the area outside of the facility it should 
be monitored, especially the cultural, political, legal, financial, technological, economic, 
and competitive aspects of the natural environ. In the area of internal it mainly goes 
about the quality of the resources and knowledge (e.g., capital, time, people, processes, 
systems, and technology), information systems, information flows and decision-making 
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processes (both official and unofficial), internal stakeholders, values, culture and man-
agement structure of the system. 
2. The risk management policy. Risk management policy specifies the links among risk 
management, the objectives of the system and other policies (it is the preferred option, 
or is in last place in the decision-making process; how resolves conflicts; what control 
methods are used, what tools to support risk management, etc.). 
3. The results of the integration of risk management into the management processes. So 
that risk management might be effective and efficient, it needs to be included in all di-
rectives and implementation processes that take place in the facility. It belongs to the 
strategic planning and policy development. 
4. The determination of responsibility for the actions and activities related to risk manage-
ment. 
5. The resources required for the management of risks, including the knowledge, skills, 
experience and competencies. 
6. Determination of mechanisms for internal communication and reporting on risks and 
their management. 
7. Determination of mechanisms for external communication and reporting on risks and 
their management. 
For the implementation of risk management, it is necessary to: 
1. Establish an appropriate strategy and policy and include them into all the processes in 
the facility. 
2. The risk management process to incorporate into all relevant levels and functions of the 
facility, i.e., it needs to be part of all regulations and directives for processes in the sys-
tem. 
The criteria for the risk assessment are based on: 
- the nature and type of consequences that may occur, including their measurements, 
- method of determining the likelihood of the occurrence of risks, 
- time frame the consequences and likelihood of risks, 
- how to determine the level of risk, 
- the level below which the risk is acceptable or tolerable, 
- the level of risk, from which it is necessary to ensure a targeted response, 
- combination of  options more risks. 
In accordance with considerations of the current philosophers the risks in the society  have 
their objective and subjective page, in addition they are not out the cultural and value context 
(even in this direction they are not "purely scientific" problem and they deserve attention 
from the viewpoint of civil participation). Although modern society uses a comfortable strat-
egy for insurance and compensation, it cannot fully rely on it, since some of the risks are 
capable to reach the essence of the social system, which pays for certain security risks. 
Against the "scientism of security policy” it cannot argue, if we can be a reflexive, which 
mainly means to estimate the consequences of individual acts and not to the illusion about 
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the possibility of the "perfect solution". The reliance of the public on the experts (and institu-
tions) can lead to a weakening of the capability to participate actively to the solutions, and 
accomplish so secession of the private and public (which will then be reflected as the inher-
ent risk on that the tests will fail). According to expert concepts when balancing the risks, 
they have according to their possibilities the duties and responsibilities of all participants (i.e. 
all interest groups). 
Humans, therefore, have the possibility to participate in decision-making, reflect their needs 
and opinions, namely without fear of penalties. Usually the aim is to involve the greatest 
possible number of people (even at the cost of increased costs at the beginning of the pro-
cess), achieving the consensus and conformity. It is also respect for different views and 
clarifying positions and intentions of various groups and individuals. If we enlist the public in 
the decision-making process so we enlist all concerned, in accordance with other materials   
shareholders or the person concerned and the group. A stakeholder is the one (individual, 
group, organization), who can affect or who may be affected (positively and negatively) as 
a result of the decision, plan, program, or process that leads to the result. 
The problem arises in professional matters, where the basis for decision-making are based 
on the assessments, which are complex and for a variety of normal citizens of the incom-
prehensible. The situation in these cases, it is therefore often the war of lobbyists of various 
groups seeking to order. Therefore, it is necessary to make the assessment procedures 
based on the legislation and to the selection criteria for the specific solution was focused on 
the public interest objectives, allow transparency of the decision-making process when 
choosing the right solution with regard to the resources, strength and resources of the public 
administration, which has available. 
 
4.5. Challenges for getting the control over risk 
 
Recent FOCUS project outputs [13,19,20] show that the main EU problems, i.e. the 
EU vulnerabilities are the following:  
- All-Hazard-Approach is not systemically applied – risk from some disasters is ne-
glected, 
- some disasters are underestimated – risk is lower than it is in reality, 
- systemic, strategic and proactive management is not implemented into practice – it 
is only determined partial or integrated risk – omission of cross-sectional risks 
caused by linkages and couplings in system, 
- gaps in risk management – list of criterions or targets of management are incorrect, 
- errors in trade-off with risks – incorrect measures are used, 
- research does not determine priority orientations, its targets are influenced by pol-
iticians or lobbies, 
- application procedures and orientation of strategies are not regularly verified, 
- reasonable strategy for disaster management is missing, 
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- the disaster management does not often respect disaster life cycle; accent to prob-
lem solving is missing, still only a lot of discussions on problems, 
- lack of resources, 
- lack of instrument for ensuring the EU finance stability; and lack of management 
supporting the public protection and sustainable development.  
Mentioned gaps influence the level of control of risks in daily practice. The re-
move of these gaps or at least the mitigation of their criticality is the challenge in im-
provement of get over the risks. 
The most serious challenge is connected with world dynamic changes in time. This 
reality very significantly influences the human capability for getting the risks under con-
trol, so acceptable conditions for human lives and existence of public assets might be 
preserved. Since 50s of last century, the data from all prognostic polygons in the world 
have been showing the relevant changes in processes, the products of which are the 
disasters. It means that we need to concentrate to the linkage between the process 
variabilities and the risks.     
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5. TECHNICAL FACILITIES RISKS AND THEIR MANAGEMENT AND  
    SETTLEMENT IN ENGINEERING PRACTICE 
 
As it was said above, the technical facilities belong to public assets because they en-
sure products and services on which the humans are dependent [1-15]. Present 
knowledge shows that each public asset is open system with real time development 
and these developments are during the time sometimes conflicting [15]. The conflicts´ 
management is influenced by complex nature of all public assets which is described 
by system of systems models and time variability.  Now we concentrate to specialities 
of technical facilities. 
 
5.1. Technical facility structure and problems 
 
Each technical facility is created by human activities and it provides products or ser-
vices important to human´s lives; technical facilities only aimed at military objectives 
are not subject to research. Technical facility architecture is object or network. Each 
technical facility type has its specifics; e.g. there is a significant difference between the 
control of stable ones and moving ones.  
Currently, for needs of practice there are not sufficient individual technical systems, 
but there are used the files of systems. According to the type of organization, system 
files according to [13,14] they are divided into the following:  
- simply organized units (e.g. machines), 
- composite systems characterized by the higher orderliness (e.g. compound sets of 
machines, which together carried out the acts in a given order to ensure certain 
products, e.g. linked production lines with the different technologies), 
- complex systems characterized by unorganized complexity and compound so as 
to perform certain functions (e.g. automatic systems for production, categorization 
and distribution of certain commodities), 
- very complex systems, i.e. systems of systems, which are set of  complex systems, 
which can also work independently and together then they perform completely 
unique task that is remote from the tasks of individual complex systems (such as 
the human body, environment, systems for production, distribution and consump-
tion of electricity, gas, etc.).  
On the basis of knowledge and experience [13,14] for the characteristics and  control 
of: 
- simply organized units and set-up units, the results of analytic solutions are used, 
- composite systems that are understood as a representation of elements that are 
organized and connected in a certain way and because of a proper structure they 
fulfil certain functions, there are used results of statistical solutions based on 
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analytic functions, the parameters of which are variable in certain intervals, which 
are reflection of various possible conditions / variants of the system behaviour, 
- complex systems and very complex systems, the results of simulations must be 
used since the given aggregates have many components (often systems too) that 
interact together and are organized in several levels, which causes that we observe:  
• suddenly emerged features of behaviour that cannot be obtained from the 
knowledge about the behaviour of components, it goes on sudden emergence, 
• hierarchy, 
• self-organization, 
• varied management structures, which all together appear like the chaos.  
Therefore, while observing it is necessary to take a multidepartment and interdepart-
mental approach. For their management it is then necessary to use the multi-criteria 
approaches, the model of the system of systems and also consider the cross-sectional 
risks [15].  
For humans´ security and development,  the coexistence of technical facilities with their 
vicinity is necessary to be ensured throughout their life cycles [13,14]. Therefore, in 
line with current knowledge and experience, we need: 
- to know the sources of risk at using the All-Hazard-Approach,  
- to appreciate their harmful potential (i.e. identify the sizes and distribution of their 
impacts on public assets) in individual places, and the size of their potential losses 
and damages depending on the distribution of public assets, i.e. to determine the 
integral risk.  
Depending on the concerned human society possibilities,  the risks are divided into 
acceptable, conditionally acceptable and unacceptable. In the case of risks which are:  
- unacceptable, the application of effective preventive measures against their re-
sources should be ensured,  
- conditionally acceptable, the mitigating, reactive and renewing measures for the 
monitored assets should be prepared,  
- acceptable, the risk monitoring  over time should be installed with aim to reveal an 
increase of their harmful impacts over time.  
In this way, we carry out activity which we call "risk management". The activity effec-
tiveness depends on tools. The next parts deal with compilation of effective tools for 
technical facilities risk management directed to integral safety with aim to ensure their 
co-existences with their vicinity during their operations (life cycles).  
At complex technical facilities risk management directed to safety, the system concept 
needs to be considered. The characteristics of this concept are to: 
- see both, the whole and  the details at the same time, 
- focus on the dynamics of processes, 
- pay attention to relations, associations and interactions, 
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- consider the roles of a feedback, 
- consider the relativity of possible situations, 
- think in a long-term way. 
Management of system of systems addresses questions relating to materials, technologies, 
design, construction, operation, staffing, organization, education, finance, and law, so as to 
ensure the demanded processes, which bring profit, ensure compliance with the State and 
competitiveness, and together to suppress the processes that bring it  harms and losses. 
From the present knowledge and the facts set out above it follows that the safety of complex 
technological systems representing the files of open and mutually interconnected systems 
that are arranged so as to perform certain tasks in the interval of interoperability, mainly 
depends on the management of the integral risk, and especially on partial risks associated 
with links and flows in the system. Selecting the appropriate strategy for risk mitigation is 
very complex and critical task. It does not go on just the reduction of failure occurrence 
probability, but also on the improvement of the conditions of operating assets, the failure of 
which can lead to large operating costs. Incorrect strategy reduces the productivity and prof-
itability of the technological facility. Selection of strategy for risk mitigation is, therefore, the 
typical multicriterial decision making problem. The best strategy needs to be selected from 
the possible alternatives. It needs to be considered the amounts of criterions, some of which 
are conflicting [14,15], e.g. Figure 23.  
 
 
Figure 23. An example of a basic conflict in the management of critical facilities — it is com-
piled with consideration of ideas in [39]. 
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To avoid the initiation of major risks that at realisation induce the great losses and damages 
to both, the humans and the other public and private assets, so the basic aim of control of 
technical facilities is not just to achieve a large number of products, but also the prevention 
of losses, and therefore, it is looking for a consensus between the risk management and the 
facility assets management. It goes on finding a way, which will not induce risks that cause 
losses and damages to public and private assets, which de facto will be greater than the 
benefits from increased production.  
Because at orientation to losses prevention according to [39], it does not only go on reduc-
tion of  facility failure occurrence probability, but also on improving the conditions of the 
operating assets, so the SMS (safety management system) of the technical facilities needs 
to be flexible and needs to be focused on the interoperability of public and private assets. 
Heterogeneity and the tight interfaces of systems in the technical facilities are causing the 
rough description and emergent behaviour of the systems of systems [13-15]. Classic ana-
lytical methods do not have the capability to provide adequate sight due to the complexity 
of the systems of systems. This requires deep understanding and a holistic approach [15]. 
In addition to the inherent complexity of followed systems there are important their 
interfaces, known as the interdependences. Of particular importance, there are emer-
gent interconnections that occur only under specific conditions. Just these unforeseen 
dependencies are the cause of the cascading failures or non-demanded domino ef-
fects and other non-demanded phenomena that are the result of different synergies 
and cumulating, and that are the greatest threat to today's society  
Models of management of safety of complex technical facilities, i.e. particular the sys-
tems of systems are only in the beginning. They need to have inherent characteristics 
as a dynamic non-linear behaviour, complex rules of interactions, which are the result 
of their openness and high connectivity. Then, they need to respect multi-level internal 
dependencies and the lack of range in required: diversity of nature of services ren-
dered; coexistence of multiple time scales; and  level of resolution of the task.  
Interoperability (the capability of the mutual co-operation) of subsystems means that sub-
systems perform specified tasks so that the system of systems fulfils the target in a de-
manded time, the required extent and in the required quality, namely under normal, abnor-
mal and critical conditions. This means that the behaviour of the elements is coordinated 
and focused on a specific goal, i.e. by the mutual sharing of the intrinsic instructions (know-
how of system), and that there are in the space-time domain ensured such  synergies of 
elements,  by which they are reached targets.  
It goes on the implicit capability of process system (technology), to ensure the most efficient, 
high-quality, safe, environmentally sound, economically efficient, automated and integrated 
run of processes through the boundaries of different internal entities and their vicinity. The 
aim is to provide mutual services among the operating objects in accordance with the re-
quirements of its subjects in a standardized medium. The interoperability in the context of 
large-scale application is the capability to collaborate with other systems without any special 
effort of the customer / user. It is the capability to interact and exchange information among 
the technical facilities and their information systems in both, the inside and the outside the 
facility. It needs to be addressed at least in three areas / levels: Data, Applications, 
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Organization. It is not only a problem of software and IT, but also about communication, 
technical and organisational matters.  
The complexity of the systems of systems is based on the required features of the 
system, namely: a large-size; the use of multiple technologies; the complex functional 
dependencies; the great interoperability; big performance; and high safety, i.e. func-
tionality and reliability, and a low threat to the protected assets under normal, abnormal 
and critical conditions. The SoS problems are heavily sub dividable into clear structure, 
and therefore, for support of decision making at their management they are created a 
DSS (Decision Support System) [15,30].  
 
5.2. Technical facilities risk sources 
 
Present knowledge and experiences show that technical facilities are for them benefi-
cial and also dangerous. Humans need safe technical facilities, and therefore, they 
need to solve these conflicts responsibly and reasonably. Their safety and security are 
disturbed by phenomena are the results of five different processes in the human sys-
tem that represents the world [12,17]. These phenomena (disasters) are results of pro-
cesses: 
- running in and out of the Earth are: natural disasters (earthquake, floods, drought, 
strong wind, volcanic activity, land slide, rock slide etc.); epiphyte; epizootic; land 
erosion; desertification; fundament liquefaction; sea floor spreading etc. 
- running in the human body and in human society are:  unintentional: illnesses; ep-
idemic; involuntary human errors etc.; and intentional: robbery; killing; victimization; 
religious and other intolerance; criminal acts; terrorist attacks; local and other 
armed conflicts, bullying; religious and other intolerance; criminal acts such as: van-
dalism and illegal business, robbery and attacking, illegal entry, unauthorized use 
of property or services, theft and fraud, intimidation and blackmail, sabotage and 
destruction, intentional disuse of technologies, such as: improper application of 
CBRNE substances; data mining from social networks and other cyber networks 
used for psychological pressure on a human individual etc. 
- connected with the human activities are: incidents; near misses; accidents; infra-
structure failures; technology failures; loss of utilities; etc. 
- that are reactions of the Planet or environment to the human activities are: man-
made earthquakes; disruption of ozone level / layer; greenhouse effect; fast climate 
variations; contaminations of air, water, soil and rock; desertification caused by hu-
man bad river regulation; drop of the diversity of flora and fauna (animal and vege-
tal) variety; fast human population explosion; migration of great human groups; fast 
drawing off the renewable sources; erosion of soil and rock; land uniformity etc. 
- connected with inside dependences in the human society and its surrounding sep-
arated to: natural: changes in stress and movements of territorial plates; changes 
in water circulation in the nature (environment); changes in substance circulation in 
the nature (environment); changes in the human food chain; changes in the planet 
processes; changes in the interactions of solar and galactic processes; and human 
established: the failure of human society management (organizational accidents 
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caused by: mutual improper behaviour of an individual or groups of individuals as 
illegal migration of great groups of people; incorrect governance of public affairs - 
as: corruption, abuse of authority, the disintegration of human society into intolerant 
communities; and failures in organization of education and upbringing etc.); the fail-
ure of correct flows of raw materials and products; the failure of correct flows of 
energies (harmful is e.g. blackout); the failure of correct flows of information; the 
failure of correct flows of finances etc.;{word “correct“ means the way in benefit of 
human interest, i.e. given by legislation}. 
The disaster list shows that disasters, according to the process, the product of which 
they are, have very mixed physical, chemical, economical, biological, social or cyber-
netic nature / basis. This mentioned fact is a clincher from the view of safety, because 
the preventive measures need to be targeted to the nature of disaster for the sake of 
being effective. Definitions, features and impacts of disasters are listed in the works 
[12,17,20].  
Generally, it stands that the disasters have certain characteristic features, which are 
the origin of impacts causing the damages, losses and harms to the important assets, 
links or flows and that from the human point of view, because this is de facto the only 
thing in which a human is interested (human aim is to make human to survive). Among 
the impacts it belongs e.g.: vibration; directed fast air, water or soil flow; damage to a 
stability and cohesiveness of rocks and soil; displacements of materials; outburst of 
liquids; anomalies in the temperature etc.  
The impacts effect directly or vicariously through links and flows of human system. 
Humans, thanks to their intellect, deliberately create the resilience of areas, buildings, 
infrastructures and technologies against disasters. They do with a help of both, the 
choice of elements, links and flows and their interconnection; and the specific preven-
tive measures and activities until the specific disaster extent (which is given by human 
knowledge, abilities, financial and technical possibilities etc.). It makes why the impacts 
of interconnections in the system (interdependences) appear only with beyond design 
disasters, which by their extent lays above the border size of disaster against which 
the humans systematically provide resilience by preventive measures. Understanda-
bly, there is a big difference - rich technically developed and quality managed countries 
or organizations (generally entities) have the threshold of assets resilience set higher 
that the counties with a lower standard.  
Disasters cause or from certain sizes cause damage, loss and harm on assets, i.e. 
they are the reasons of situations falling on a human and that is why humans have  to 
handle with them. By the reason of big variety of disasters, the arising situations clas-
sified as “the emergency situations” have either the same or highly specified impacts.  
The relation between a disaster and an emergency situation is the relation “cause-
consequence” [12,15]. This relation is not simple because the intensity (destructive-
ness, severity, criticality, cruelty) of emergency situation in a given place is predeter-
mined not only by the size of disaster but also by the local vulnerability (Figure 6 and 
7) of assets, failure of implemented protective systems (e.g. the system of warning in 
the area, security mechanism etc.), which were created for increasing the assets resil-
ience, and by the humans’ mistakes during the response etc.  
 
72 
 
5.3. Technical facilities risk management directed to safety 
 
With regard to present knowledge [13-15], the technical facilities risk sources are ex-
ternal, internal and those connected with humans. Their  risk management directed to 
safety needs to respect knowledge derived above for complex systems. To achieve 
the sufficient level of technical facility safety it is necessary well to manage and properly 
to decide.  
As we said above, good management and good decision making are possible only 
when we have relevant data and when we use relevant tools. The term “relevant data” 
means: to be correct (it is known their size and accuracy); to have explanatory power 
for the problem (i.e. to be validated). The data files need to be representative (i.e.: 
complete; contain the correct particulars; have a sufficient number of particulars; the 
particulars need to be spread homogeneously throughout the reference period and 
need to be validated. In the application of models, random and epistemic uncertainties 
in the data need to be properly considered.  
Ensuring the facility safety requires a systematic approach described in [13,14]. It is neces-
sary to apply to the following model:  
- to determine what and why it is necessary to protect,  
- to provide for a minimum level of protection,  
- to assess the current level of protection, 
- in the case of a finding that the protection is insufficient to propose measures,  
- to provide the means,  
- to apply the measures for the protection,  
- periodically to check the state (condition) of,  
- to maintain protection at the appropriate level,  
- to revise the measures depending on the developments.  
Division of competences and responsibilities is an essential and important in every more 
complex activity of human society.  
In order to ensure the safety of the facilities at siting, design, construction, and operation it 
is necessary to ensure that these comply with the required functions under all conditions 
(normal, abnormal and critical) and prevent them, in order to not carry out activities that are 
likely to cause unacceptable impacts to the human system, especially on human security. 
This means that in practice, there are implemented appropriate technical, legal, organiza-
tional, economic and educational measures aimed at ensuring the reliable operation of spe-
cific objects, infrastructures and technologies under design conditions and under beyond 
design conditions to limit and mitigate impacts on people and the environment, while the 
obligation of their use is required by law. 
To the given purpose there are mapped all the possible problems of the existing facilities 
that can cause adverse effects on the human system. For reliable operation there are cod-
ified rules for the siting, design, construction and operation. From the engineering point of 
view, there are determined the conditions and limits of operation, installed safety and safety 
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related systems (active, passive and hybrid), and it ensures their appropriate backup 13. 
This means that addresses questions such as:  
- what security systems and safety systems are appropriate and what it needs to be their 
backup? 
- where / in which places the safety and safety related systems operate effectively? 
- why they are just used there and not elsewhere? 
- in what limits they reliably work? 
In accordance with the works [13,14,21], it can be used two scales for the evaluation of 
facility safety: 
1. The scale for the assessment of the severity of the losses associated with the failure 
of the facility: 
- degree 0: the losses of the facility do not have impact on the security and de-
velopment of the territory, 
- degree 1: the losses of the facility have a small impact on the security and de-
velopment of the territory, 
- degree 2: the losses of the facility have a middle impact on the security and 
development of the territory, 
- degree 3: the losses of the facility have a significant impact on the security and 
development of the territory, 
- degree 4: the losses of the facility have a very important impact on the security 
and development of the territory, 
- degree 5: the losses of the facility have a very substantial impact on the security 
and development of the territory, causing its collapse. 
2. The scale for the evaluation of the degree of damage of facility according to the 
times, for which the damaged facility can be repaired or replaced: 
- degree 0: damaged facility can be repaired or replaced in the time interval 0 - 5 
days 
- degree 1: damaged facility can be replaced in the time interval 6 - 30 days, 
- degree 2: damaged facility can be replaced in the time interval 31 to 90 days 
- degree 3: damaged facility can be replaced in the time interval 91-180 days 
- degree 4: damaged facility can be replaced in the time interval longer than 180 
days, 
- degree 5: damaged facility cannot be replaced. 
When we consider the complex technical facility and its interconnections physical, cyber, 
logical and territorial, so we may recognize that there are different types of failures, namely: 
cascading and escalating; and disorder of the same cause (e.g. certain disorders from a 
natural disaster). Their operational conditions are normal, abnormal, and critical. A measure 
of the tightness of their relations and the interfaces is: free; tight; and complex. The charac-
teristics of the facility they are: time; territorially spatial; organizational; the ownership; and 
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institutional. As a result of mutual dependences, the disorder or failure of one subsystem 
will cause a malfunction or failure of another subsystem. This fact contributes to the criticality 
of facility in the territory / object / State.  
On the basis of the results of the project [13] for assessing the facility criticality  there are 
used questions: 
1. How the facility reacts to certain types of disasters? 
2. How is the facility of massive, resistant and flexible? 
3. How the behaviour of facility can improve? 
4. What is the appropriate facility mechanism of control? 
5. What are the facility rules for self-regulation or to acceptable variation may be used? 
6. Which parts of the facility are critical? 
The answers to these questions are searched in six steps:  
- modelling of a problem situation, 
- the analysis of the layers: physical, regulation and management, organisation, strategic 
management, 
- compilation of scenarios, 
- analysis of impacts, 
- planning the measures, 
- and implementation of a robust and adaptive solution. 
In practice, there are two types of critical items [13,14,21], namely: 
- items that only cause an escalation of the impacts of disasters, either all, or just some, 
that are possible in a given place, 
- the items, which guarantee the functionality of the facility, i.e., the safety and develop-
ment of the protected assets. Their failure due to some disaster or due to operational 
aspects leads to serious impacts on the protected assets.  
For the first type it is at the restoration carried out by upgrading the item to the disasters, 
which in this case cause or may cause unacceptable impacts. Implementation of their re-
covery has no priority from the viewpoint of the functionality of the territory. For the second 
type it is already in the planning, design, construction and operation carried out measures 
that lead to an increase in their technical reliability. Various measures are used as well as 
backing up the activities of the other items that lead to higher resistance against possible 
disasters. Therefore, at the restoration it is necessary to make measures in both, the backup 
and the upgrading. Because these items are life-giving for complex facility, there are priori-
ties in the reconstruction, and it is necessary that the public interest was preferred before 
private interests. 
From the foregoing it follows that the conditions of technical facilities are not stable, they are 
dependent on the internal and external processes and their dynamics. Changes to the 
terms, of course, give rise to the various processes in the complex technological facility. 
When responses to the aforementioned processes exceeds the limits and conditions for 
existence of elements, components and systems of the facility, so it appears not only local 
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disorders, but also disorders as a result of various synergies, domino effects and cascade 
failures. 
The reality is that there are many approaches, norms and standards, the use of which en-
sures the safety of technical facilities but accidents still occur, and therefore, experts are 
looking for more new and effective approaches for their construction and management dur-
ing operation. 
Safety culture is designed on the basis of risk management at all levels of the administration 
management of  facilities: the technical, operational, tactical, strategic and political (see  Fig-
ure 4). Safety is measured either by using specific indicators [12,26], or by the  criticality rate 
[13,14].  
The development of technical facilities is becoming more and more to a combination of in-
dividual devices and applications to complex facilities in order to achieve an increase of 
production and to high profitability. There are interlinked systems of nature technical, organ-
isational, cyber, and logical, they create systems of systems (SoS) [13,14]. Formed facilities 
are not the result of experts from one discipline, but they are the result of an interdisciplinary 
team. Especially, technical facilities that have a network structure, it holds that the individual 
expert is not capable to completely examine and control the large interconnected systems, 
and it is, therefore, necessary the cooperation of experts from many disciplines, which re-
quires mutual understanding the objectives and capability for searching the consensus. 
From the need to ensure security and sustainable development of human society it is a 
prerequisite for the construction of the complex facilities the control of their safety. The spe-
cial research [13] showed that this is present management weakness. 
It is logical that in complex facilities the safety functions need to be considered in context 
with the other functions of the facility and its subsystems. That is not enough to solve the 
details (i.e. security problems within the individual subsystems), but it needs to be addressed 
at the same time safety of complex facility and safety of individual subsystems [13,14]. In 
accordance with the knowledge in [12-21] it is necessary to count with the following hazards: 
- the external hazard (hazards from phenomena in the vicinity of the facility), 
- internal hazards (hazards from internal phenomena and  equipment of individual sub-
systems), 
- operational  hazards (hazards associated with the failure of the function of the entire 
facility or device or system components, i.e. the failure of subsystems), 
- hazards associated with the installation, 
- human hazards (hazards associated with human activities – physical and organiza-
tional). 
The reality is that the safety of the individual technological sectors depends on security tra-
ditions, which developed in the sector for some time. Therefore, in the whole composite of 
several sectors there are carried out diverse safety measures that  correspond to the 
knowledge and experience of the time in which they were created. Today, the reality is that 
when compiling the technical facilities and in creating their safety, the experts from different 
fields are working separately, which does not guarantee optimum safety, or even an optimal 
cost. It often happens that the individual subsystems are safe, because for them there are 
standards and norms (e.g., individual technical parts of a particular operation), but the safety 
of the whole, which was their interface with the cyber and other infrastructures, has not 
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monitored, because the evaluation and demonstration of safety is not required by the rele-
vant legislation, and in addition to that purpose it has not been yet available the relevant 
professional procedure. The results are the organizational accident 15.  
The management of complex facilities needs to respect the multi-level internal dependen-
cies and the lack in interface in diversity of the nature of the services provided, in the coex-
istence of multiple time scales and in the level of address that are required, in order to fulfil 
the objectives of the analysis. 
In these contexts, it should be aware of what we determine in practice and how it agrees 
with the integral safety. According to the current procedures, the risk from a particular activity 
is expressed in two dimensions – individual risk and group / social risk. The first demon-
strates the likelihood that an individual will lose life as a result of the activity. The second 
shows the same for a group of people. The individual risk is the probability of death of a 
person, who is permanently exposed to certain risk in the area of agent per year. It displays 
using the isolines and it is used in land use planning. 
To ensure the safety of complex technical facilities, it is necessary to concentrate on the 
serious risks (see requirements of modern methods of project management [34]), i.e., from 
the possible sources of risk to select sources of risks that cause serious impacts on pro-
tected assets and against them to focus preventive and mitigation measures. The objectives 
of the risk assessment for large technical facilities as follows: 
1. To identify initiation phenomena and sequences of subsequent phenomena, which can 
significantly contribute to the damage and injury to protected assets. 
2. To provide realistic quantitative extent the likelihood of phenomena, which causes the 
realisation of risk. 
3. To provide a realistic assessment of the potential impacts of harmful phenomena asso-
ciated with the hypothetical sequences of events that lead to the accident or failure of 
technical facilities. 
4. To provide a reasonable basis for deciding on the sitting the design and the operation of 
the facility. 
For the evaluation aimed to determine the priorities for the implementation of preventive and 
mitigation measures it is most commonly used methodology of PSA (Probabilistic Safety 
Assessment) [30], i.e. the analytical method for the promotion of the protection of public 
health and safety. The result of the evaluation is then: 
- list of responses of equipment to initiation phenomena and a description of the sequence 
of phenomena that may follow, 
- evaluation of the significance of the identified contributors to the risk. There are identified 
high risk sequences that lead to the accident and also the activities that lead to their 
mitigation. 
At technical systems failure, it typically occurs a sequence of more external and internal 
impacts, both primary and secondary, that can be just only influenced. These impacts then 
affect in a different intensity and in a different time period. Therefore, in the preparatory 
phase of documents for the safety management of technical facilities (especially those the 
model of which is a system of systems), it is necessary to identify the range of relevant 
impacts and to determine in what context they operate, whether they are directed to political, 
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economic, technical, personnel, and other environ and what appropriate measures can be 
used to remove them, where appropriate, to mitigate them. Evaluation and management of 
possible hazards and risks that follow of them belong to the demanding and crucial pro-
cesses of safety management. Hesitation and procrastination of solution has a very huge 
impact on the entire public governance, and thus on the development of human society [13-
15].  
In order to achieve a reasonable level of safety of technical facilities it is necessary to intro-
duce an obligation to practice so to deterministic and probabilistic safety analysis have been 
carried out for all technologies with a greater risk of damage [15,30]. Because no large da-
tabases of data, so probabilistic analyses have not been sufficiently focused on the target 
yet. Therefore, it is necessary further development of methods for the analysis of disorders, 
which are directed to determination of the risks. 
The good governance (proper management of public affairs) [12] also regulates the safety 
of technical systems, and therefore, it needs to ensure so that the safety certificates may 
need to be required from all technologies with increased risk. This request requires that, in 
practice, it had to perform a reliable risk control through preventive measures, which are 
economically reasonable. From the request, it follows that the technical legislation needs to 
be primarily oriented towards compliance with the objectives of safety, which means the 
only permissible / allowed risks. Only as a secondary objective the legislation may require 
specific technical steps for the achievement of the objectives of the safety. 
Each technical system contains a number of inherent sources of risk. System failure occurs 
when in the system it is realised an unwanted process, which is initiated by either the ex-
pected risk or is trigger by random combinations of a few likely phenomena. In grounds for 
the safety management the second mentioned option has been often neglected. The proof 
there are usually legislative requirements on the safety reports  that have be processed in 
developed countries for technical facilities [13,14], and in many cases, even for important 
civil objects. 
In addition to the failure of the technologies that lead to the leakage of hazardous sub-
stances, fire and explosion, it is necessary for technological facilities to assess local impacts 
caused by technical facilities that cause harm to the environment, social and economic life 
of human society. Both types of mentioned impacts together form the potential of risk, and 
this is the reason for the request, that they need to be discussed in one safety analysis. At 
the present time, the question is how to incorporate into an environmental pollution into in-
tegral risks. In this context, it is important to know the ratio of the actual concentration of the 
contaminants and critical values for their concentrations. Existing support documents are 
not yet sufficient for the evaluation. 
To ensure the safety of large technological facilities the EU issued on the basis of the rec-
ommendations of the OECD for Seveso companies following the instructions [40,41]: 
1. Measures to support the safety need to be based on a clear understanding of the primary 
production processes and from all their associated ones and from all the important sce-
narios of phenomena leading to damages and losses. 
2. Safety management needs to be carried out throughout the life cycle of technical unit, 
i.e. in the design, construction, installation, operation, maintenance, modification, putting 
out of operation. The risk analysis needs to cover all phases by which the facility acts by 
impacts on its surroundings. 
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3. Way of ensuring the safety needs to include the identification, control and monitoring  
the management scenarios on 3 levels: 
- direct risk control by humans under normal, abnormal, and critical conditions, 
- plans, procedures, and regulations for the optimal direct risk control, 
- the structure of the inspection activities of the safety management system and the 
implementation of the improvements. 
4. Loops feedback and monitoring, which are among the activities on the above 3 levels 
trigger revisions and improvements of the control system. 
5. Systems on the hierarchically higher-level control the critical safety tasks at a lower level. 
The request provides: 
- always available human reserves, 
- competence to operate safely in all situations, 
- be focused and motivated to ensure safety, 
- communicate inside and outside the of intertwined tasks, 
- the existence of the procedures, rules and plans for achieving the safety, 
- the selection of appropriate technical project to ensure optimal safety, 
- the use of user-friendly and ergonomic interfaces man-machine, 
- the existence of a system to control conflicts among safety and the other objectives 
of the company in the production and maintenance, design, etc.  
Professional basis for the guidelines developed the OECD [26,41] using the principles that 
already from the end of the 1970s, has used by the IAEA [42]. 
Since the conditions of each open system depends on the vicinity conditions  and both are 
dynamically evolving, so the safety in today's concept is concentrated on both, the security 
of the system, so to ensure security around the system. The set of measures and activities 
shall be determined on the basis of knowledge of the risks associated with possible disas-
ters, so with the specific construction of the facility (expressed by followed assets, links and 
flows in the facility system), and by the specific interfaces among the facility and its sur-
roundings or among several related facility systems and their surroundings.  
For technical complex facility it holds that it performs certain demanded objectives only un-
der certain conditions [13,14]. The aim is to ensure the coexistence of all facility systems 
and safety of both the individual facility systems, so the whole facility and its surroundings. 
For sources of risk there are taking phenomena (disasters) the sources of which are inside, 
including the human factor, and outside the system, and most recently, the phenomena 
associated with the interfaces among facility systems and their vicinities and phenomena 
associated with links across the facility system of systems, at manifestation of which the 
damages and losses occur in the system or in its assets.  
The requirement in the previous paragraph is correct and logical, just its filling is not easy, 
and it is partly due to lack of data about the behaviour of  facility in different conditions, partly 
because of the complexity of the facility, and  because of the variability of conditions in which 
the real facilities are located. The application of probabilistic models allowed considering 
random uncertainty and thus it brought some progress. Because in addition to random 
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uncertainties there are still epistemic uncertainties in the behaviour of facilities  caused by 
lack of knowledge about the facility and its behaviour under all possible  conditions, it is not 
fully relied on the results of probabilistic models. Their major defect it is often not what they 
include, but what do not include. Low values of the occurrence probability of unreliable be-
haviour  of facility simply talks about that facility does not fail by considered way,  but it does 
not say anything about the fact that the facility can fail with far more probability in a way that 
was not considered [13,14]. Differentiation of risk associated with the origination of the ac-
cident from the errors, it is essential to understand the difference between safety and relia-
bility. 
In order to achieve certain optimal safety of technical facilities, it is necessary to control the 
safety by the way, that is the nature of the multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary, which un-
derstands the internal dependencies, the so-called interdependences, and knows how to 
deal with them. A prerequisite it is the use of system thinking. From a theoretical point of 
view, it is to be: 
1. To create a description of the characteristics of the technical facility, which has both, the 
public assets and the assets of the facility itself (which are the good condition of the sub-
elements, reliability, and correct functionality of subsystems and the entire system), 
among which there are internal links. 
2. To identify significant risks (in the facility system there is more protected assets, which 
are interconnected by internal links) for sources of risk both inside and outside the facility. 
3. To establish criteria for the integral safety of the facility. 
4. To establish the terms and fundamentals of communication for multidisciplinary and in-
terdisciplinary cooperation at ensuring the facility safety. 
5. To establish the principles for the management of facility safety. 
6. To establish legislation on support of facility safety management. 
7. To create control mechanisms for monitoring the facility safety. 
Safety is a matter for all concerned. Therefore, in practice, there used the so-called. The 
GOLDEN RULES of ALL PARTICIPATING [12,26], which lay down for everybody the fol-
lowing: 
- according to his / her possibilities by preventive measures to prevent the origination of 
natural or other disasters, or at least the origination of their unacceptable impacts, to 
ensure preparedness to deal with unacceptable impacts on the protected assets and 
the effective response, 
- communicate and collaborate with others interested in all aspects of prevention, prepar-
edness and response, 
- knowing the hazard from natural or other disasters and possible risks in the territory as 
well as in facility, 
- to establish a "safety culture", which is respected and enforced by all stakeholders in all 
circumstances, 
- to establish safety management systems, to monitor and on the basis of the results of 
research and development, and lessons learned from the experience, respectively, to 
correct their activities, 
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- use the principles of inherent safety at design, the building and operation of facilities and 
their equipment, 
- carefully manage change 
- be prepared for all disasters that may occur, 
- help others interested in performing their roles and responsibilities, 
- search forever the improvement of safety, 
- work in conformity with the safety culture, safe practices, and training, 
- to strive constantly for all of the information and to provide information and for manage-
ment staff featuring the feedback 
- to strive for the development, strengthening and constant improvement of the concept 
of safety, regulations and directives, 
- lead and motivate all other stakeholders in order to fulfil their roles and responsibilities, 
- know the risks within their own sphere of responsibility and accordingly to plan measures 
for its good management, 
- the use of appropriate and coherent policy for land-use planning and follow-up activities, 
- be aware of the risks in the village / organisation  /  territory / business and know what to 
do in case of their realization, 
- to participate in emergency planning and response. 
The procedure for creating a program to increase safety in the facility [12,26] consists from: 
1. Define the tasks (targets), and the strategic objectives with respect to safety. 
2. On the basis of data for facility / public administration or administrative office / community 
of other participating to select areas that are important for the safety and for them ap-
propriate target and run trend indicators. 
3. Compile a list of terms used for the management of safety and the other is to reconcile 
with all the other parties of management. 
4. Collect local procedures, standards and norms. 
5. Create a list of target indicators according to the requirements and conditions in facility / 
public administration  / other participating groups of the community. 
6. Create a list of interim (run trend) indicators according to the requirements and condi-
tions in facility / public administration / other participating groups of the community. 
7. Establish the method of evaluation of the target indicators (i.e., the value system) ac-
cording to the requirements and conditions in facility / public administration / other par-
ticipating groups of the community. 
8. Establish the method of evaluation of each intermediate (run trend)  indicators (i.e., the 
value system) according to the requirements and conditions in facility / public admin-
istration  /other participating groups of the community. 
9. Specify the scale for the measurement of file of target / file of interim (run trend) indicators 
(i.e., the system of values) and the boundary limits according to the requirements and 
conditions in facility / public administration / other participating groups of the community. 
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The complexity of modern technical facilities is growing. On the one hand it means the in-
creasing efficiency of facilities, but on the other hand, it creates new sources of risk that are 
wrongly detectable. Some of the ways to ensure their safety (e.g. redundancy, duplication 
of partial components for protection against a failure of the measuring circuits or regulatory 
functions-backup) provides protection from accidents caused by the failure of individual 
parts, however, they are not equally effective against harmful phenomena that generate 
interactions among components in the increasingly complex and mutually interacting tech-
nical facilities today. Redundancies may in fact increase the complexity to the extent that 
they themselves are contributing factors to accidents [14].  
Therefore, many of the new dangers are more insidious, less exposed and given out, than 
in the past. In addition, there is no previous experience, which could be used to overcome 
new dangers. A lot of experience and lessons learned from previous disasters is stored in 
the laws, standards and practices good practice. But the corresponding laws and standards 
for many of the new engineering and technology sectors are not yet developed. Many times, 
the lessons gathered for centuries will lose when the older technology is replaced the newer; 
for example, when mechanical device replaces the digital computer [14,43].  
Other new dangers are only a summary such as: 
- increasing exposure to danger, 
- increasing accumulation of energy and risk implications, 
- increasing automation, 
- the growing centralization and production capacity, 
- the increase in the pace of technological changes. 
 
5.4. Methodological aspects 
 
From reasons given above, it is necessary to continually monitor the effectiveness of the 
measures and activities aimed at safety and when deviations occur to apply corrective 
measures, or to change the concept of working with risks, as shown in Figures 8 and 23.  
For the understanding of the concept of the safety solution of complex technical facilities it 
is given in the first the summary of the important factors, which are:  
- basic knowledge to ensure the safety of complex technical facilities proven in practice, 
- key concepts of safety and risk engineering, 
- and the assessment of the credibility of theoretical models.  
Then we will describe the concept of safety of complex technical facilities, which we de-
signed by help of the logical synthesis of knowledge and experience in the computing and 
control practices, namely including the safety management procedure in time, which we 
verify in practice [13,14,33,36,43].  
On the basis of the objective of ensuring the safe complex  facility we are interested in all of 
the possible scenarios for the behaviour of the particular scenarios that degrade system and 
deplete the system and its surroundings, because there we have from the perspective of 
the protection of people's attention and make measures to target. On the basis of knowledge 
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and experience, the behaviour of each followed facility is the dynamic process, i.e. the pro-
cess evolving in time, which is formally described by ordinary differential equations [44]. 
In practice, however, we cannot often establish analytical functions describing the behaviour 
of a facility, because the facility behaviour is not specified by one variable, but several vari-
ables, the values of which are interrelated, i.e. mutually dependent, and we cannot accu-
rately describe the relationships among the variables, which provide mutual dependencies, 
and therefore, we use models, theoretical and physical. A good model allows describing the 
system, understanding its behaviour and predicting it. In the case of complex systems, we 
use a wide range of models and each of them provides a description and understanding of 
the just from the perspective of certain aspects [44]. Methods based on use of models are 
followed in Annex 2. 
For understanding and research of complex systems it was formulated the theory of com-
plexity, which is based on assumption that complex systems organize themselves into the 
emergent states (conditions), that are not predicable, as the example there are shown the 
genetic algorithms, cellular automata and neural networks. The theory explains the new 
features of systems, such as the organization itself, and its diverse specialties and moves 
forward the importance of properties, such as the emergence of a new feature, which is the 
result of a symbiotic effect of component parts, the phase space and the eligibility of circum-
stances cause a change [30].  
In the technology practice in the given context there are used the chaos theory, complexity 
theory and the theory of options, i.e. the Dempster-Shafer theory [32,36,44]. The latter the-
ory is based on assumption, that the available data and our knowledge of the system they 
have random uncertainty and epistemic uncertainty. In practice we often exclude the epis-
temic uncertainty by assumptions like "the data file for specifying the behaviour of the sys-
tem is a representative"; "some analytical function describes the process of occurrence of 
the given phenomenon perfectly", etc. 
In theory of the possibility we use a combination of analytical procedures and data from the 
experts, and therefore, according to it should be noted that an expert is a person who is 
recognized by the professional community, has an experimental experience in a given area, 
a number of high-quality publications, knows the essence of the uncertainties of the various 
concepts, the diversity of conditions, ways of compensating damages and is interested in 
the solution of the problem. It is necessary in this context to understand knowledge as infor-
mation obtained from experiences in the application of real results in practice. For the expert, 
it is necessary to determine what knowledge and in which process he / she should give the 
data [32,44]. 
Each dynamic process develops over time and it can be described by ordinary differential 
equations for continuous systems or algebraic equations in the case of discrete time peri-
ods. A linear system is a system that can be to describe by a linear function. If they are 
dynamic processes of linear and time-invariant, so for their description it can be used: La-
place transformation for continuous systems; the z-transform for discrete systems, and ac-
cording to the transfer function to determine whether the system is stable, unstable, or at 
the interface [44]. 
Deterministic processes are described by the analytical function of time, and therefore, 
they can be at any point in time to determine their values. Random processes are de-
scribed by the probability function that in each time moment determines the probability of 
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the possible values, which can realisation of random process realization get. Random pro-
cess is the stationary if the probability density function is independent on the choice of the 
beginning of the timeline (i.e. the mean value does not depend on time). At non-stationary 
processes the statistical properties are variable in time. Random process is ergodic, when 
all of its realisations have the same statistical properties (it allows to estimate the parameters 
of the process from one realisation or at the long-term process by the use of data from 
several different starting conditions). Non-linear systems are, for example, systems with 
hysteresis. Under certain circumstances they exhibit a phenomenon which is characterized 
by sensitivity to initial conditions, the so-called deterministic chaos and, therefore, their man-
agement is difficult [30,44]. 
Not only in monitoring the disasters, but also in engineering practice, it holds that the avail-
able data are often only in small quantities and are not of good quality. In some cases, it is 
about the fundamental problems because there is no accurate models and the exact values 
of the parameters; the information is inaccurate, dispersed, incomplete, sketchy, vague, 
non-homogeneous, or just a verbal. Among the basic types of uncertainties in the engineer-
ing practice they belong:  
- randomness as the natural properties of the underlying variables, 
- statistical uncertainty due to limited range of data, 
- the model of uncertainty caused by imperfections of computational models, 
- the uncertainty caused by the inaccuracy of the limit states (conditions) definitions, 
- gross errors caused by shortcomings in the activities of the persons, 
- and ignorance of the actual behaviour of materials and structures.  
Because of the deterministic methods have been gradually replacing by probabilistic ones 
also at designing critical objects and equipment. However, even these have limitations, be-
cause even the exact observance of the norms and standards does not consider all the 
uncertainties that exist in the real world.  
Specifics of engineering methods, tools and techniques lies in the fact that it impossible 
separated the characteristics of the phenomena, against which the facility needs to be pro-
tected, properties of materials, structures and devices that make up the facility, the operating 
conditions and limits, the detection of distortion of facility when the limits are exceeded and 
correction measures to support the safety of the facility and its surroundings. The aim is, 
however, high-quality solution in the given circumstances, and therefore, it needs to fit to-
gether the exact results with results of good engineering practice, and it primarily means to 
use only proven procedures and verified data. 
Proper engineering solutions and the selection of methods, tools and techniques depends 
on:  
- the number and nature of the assets, 
- the choice of the concept of the solution to the problem, 
- and the stage of the proceedings, for which the solution is, i.e., whether it is about the 
measures and actions of prevention, preparedness, response and recovery. 
The specifics of the safety engineering create special demands on the methods, tools and 
techniques, because: 
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1. When troubleshooting, it is considered that: 
- all of the processes are underway in the dynamically varying world, and therefore, it 
is necessary a special apparatus, i.e., a set of procedures that will ensure an optimal 
risk management, 
- disasters are many, and therefore, it needs to use All-Hazard-Approach, 
- disasters act on assets in manifold ways and, therefore, an important role is played 
by the vulnerability of assets and their interconnections. 
2. On the basis of evaluation of available data files, the existing random uncertainties and 
epistemic uncertainties in the available data, it is necessary to divide the tasks of the 
practice, which can be addressed by way of deterministic or stochastic and or heuristi-
cally. 
3. It is necessary to apply a good qualitative and quantitative approaches to risk and safety 
of the system in all the steps, which are:  
- definition of system and its vicinity, 
- identification of sources of risk, i.e. disasters for the system, 
- determination of hazard for extreme events induced by beyond design disasters, 
- evaluation of risks, 
- proposal for a corrective and remedial measures and activities according to the cri-
teria of safety, with the aim to ensure adequate security 
- and verification of the acceptability of the risk.  
The basic strategic approach for the safety of complex technical facilities is based on 
the realization that: nothing is absolutely safe; the elements, links and flows in the facility 
may fail sooner or later; and, therefore, it is necessary to a sophisticated facility safety man-
agement system. Efficient and effective safety management needs to be based on current 
knowledge and their correct interpretation in the context of that applies in a given territory.  
For high-quality collateral listed sections are used by different standards, norms and proce-
dures of good engineering practice, e.g.: 
- EN 608 (2007) Techniques of analysis of reliability of systems-procedure of analysis of 
methods and the consequences of failures (FMEA),  
- IEC 300-3-9 Management of reliability – part 3 – section 9: risk analysis of technological 
systems, January 1997,  
- ISO 13824 (2009): The Bases for design of structures-General principles on risk assess-
ment of systems involving structures. 
Ensuring the complex facility safety requires a systematic approach. It is necessary to apply 
to the following model: determine what and why it is necessary to protect; provide for a 
minimum level of protection; assess the current level of protection; in the case of a finding 
that the protection is insufficient to propose measures; to ensure the resources; apply the 
measures for protection; periodically check the condition; maintain protection at the appro-
priate level; and revise the measures depending on the developments. Division of compe-
tences and responsibilities is an essential and important in every more complex activities of 
human society.  
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Another crucial problem is connected with the fact that at the solutions of their critical 
conditions they often arise conflicts of interests and, therefore, they arose the whole 
theories, how to resolve conflict in the management of technological facilities. Accord-
ing to them, a conflict management process it is seen as planning, how to achieve a 
mutually advantageous solution of serious problems. Tool, i.e. the risk management 
plan requires that both parties of the conflict have agreed in advance how they will deal 
with the expected contentious issues with regard to the established interests and ob-
jectives, which is to ensure the security and the development of people, namely now 
and in the future, and also maintaining the operability of the technology.  
The costs on safe complex technical facility is not just the costs of its project and construc-
tion, but they also include the costs of operation, maintenance, repair and modernization. 
Therefore, the risks associated with each technological facility also need to include the risks 
of just being referred areas and the facility management needs to be able to deal with them. 
This means that it is necessary to evaluate the risks of disasters, such as: the failure of the 
financial market and with it associated failure of finance on the maintenance, operation, re-
pair and modernisation of facility; corruption; misuse of powers; attacks on the integrity of 
the facility, etc. It is, therefore, that the criticality of facility also increases if it is not proper 
maintenance and regular repairs, which caused the increase of vulnerability. 
On the basis of pro-active approach, which is own to project and procedural manage-
ment, it can be effective to prepare for solution of  conflicts in critical situations in ad-
vance; i.e. to prepare a risk management plan, which is agreed by all stakeholders, 
because each time delay leads to further damage.  
Based on  knowledge of the professional literature and experience, it is true that the basic 
principles of safety technological complex facilities are: 
- to apply the principles of inherent safety, 
- to create a management system that has the basic control functions, alarms and re-
sponses of operator processed in the way, so that the system was maintained in normal 
(steady) conditions, 
- to create a special control system based on safety and protective barriers that keep the 
system in a safe state (condition) also at changing the operating conditions and prevent 
origin of undesirable phenomena, i.e. the system carries out the objectives as well as at 
abnormal conditions, 
- to create a special safety-oriented control system that will keep the operation also at  a 
greater change of operating conditions or they have the capability to ensure the opera-
tion after the application of corrective measures (clean-up, repair ...), i.e. there are 
measures for the in-side emergency response, mitigation, and to return to normal oper-
ation, i.e. the system carries out the objectives as well as at critical conditions,  
- to create a special safety-oriented control system which, in the case of loss of control of 
system and harmful impacts on the system and its surroundings, shall ensure the appli-
cation of mitigation measures on the system and its surroundings, i.e. there are   
measures inserted in system to ensure that the system can be restored, and that the 
losses and damages caused in the area have been minimised, i.e. they provide 
measures for the off-side response. System supercritical conditions are the conditions 
for which the system was not designed, which can lead to situations that threaten the 
system itself and vicinity of the system.  
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Sometimes it is talking about it, that each layer is the protective barrier (so-called protection 
in depth) and that the systems have a single stage to five stage protections in depth. Each 
layer contains measures which are capable to avert the occurrence of undesirable chain of 
phenomena or stop it, when it is triggered. The measures are technical, operational and 
organisational, and their goal is to reduce the risk.  
The logical synthesis of data collected by research, described in the works [13,14,17] it was 
designed the process model for the safety management of the territory and all facilities that 
are located in it, targeted on security and development of the people, which  take into ac-
count the survival of people in critical conditions. A generic tool for the SoS safety manage-
ment consists of 4 parts, Figure 24: 
1. Screening the SoS. 
2. Risk assessment of the SoS. 
3. Screening the existing measures and activities for the SoS risk management and 
for increasing the SoS safety and the evaluation of the level of negotiation with the 
risks. 
4. Identification of the critical SoS risk management items and proposal for solution of 
gaps related to human survival or continuity of assets at critical disasters. 
The aim of the first part denoted in Figure 24 as "territory" is to create a credible scheme 
and specify the properties of the territory (in the range of land-use planning documentation, 
as it calls for the territorial planning) - layout of objects important in terms of the protected 
assets (life, health and security of people; property; the public welfare; the environment; 
infrastructure and technology, and sources of domino effects that can increase the severity 
of the situation caused by the disaster; a list of potential disasters, based on the application 
of the principle of the All Hazard-Approach  and the data on the impacts of possible disasters 
in the territory; and including information about the error in the data about the real disaster. 
Therefore, it is done the SoS screening, which consists of the following parts: 
- determination of the characteristics of the SoS (in the case of the territory it goes 
on the characteristics in the extent of land-use planning documentation), 
- classification of SoS (in the case of the territory – industrial area, agricultural area, 
forest, etc.), 
- application of interface of the All-Hazard-Approach, and the documentation of the 
SoS, i.e. it is fixing the file of disasters that may have on the SoS unacceptable or 
conditionally acceptable impacts, i.e.,. they are dangerous for the SoS, 
- identification of vulnerabilities of the  SoS (e.g. using a SWOT analysis for the weak 
and strengths, risks and possibilities of the SoS management mechanism). 
The aim of the second part, denoted in Figure 24 as "risk" is to create for each specific 
disaster by help of methods of What, If and case study [14] the three scenarios of disaster 
impacts for the size less than the design disaster and beyond design disaster. Each of the 
given scenarios contains a separate list of impacts on protected assets in the times meas-
ured since the origin of the disaster in a given territory: 0 h, 3 h, 6 h, 24 h, 3 days, 14 days, 
with the fact that from time 3 h there are separated the primary and secondary impacts and 
collect data on cross-sectional risks –  a general and specific for the area.  
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Figure 24. Process model of safety management of territory. Phases: I-the characteristics 
of the territory, i.e., assets, sources of domino effects and potential disasters; II-determina-
tion of risks for every possible disaster in 3 sizes; III-a cumulative assessment focused on 
the identification of conflicts, not covered by the serious problems and lack of responsibili-
ties; IV-the determination of the critical situations and measures for the survival of the hu-
mans. 
 
The objective is to obtain data for the identification of the places in which they are the nec-
essary protective measures and measures for response - evaluation is carried out for both, 
the territory and the critical facility. Therefore, there are appreciated the SoS risks asso-
ciated with all disasters that were identified as dangerous in the first step. With regard 
to the existence of random and knowledge and uncertainties in data, there are: 
- process  the variant scenarios of realisation of risks in the SoS for each dangerous 
disaster (e.g. by using a modified form of the link method, What If and targeted 
method of case studies [30]); with regard to the knowledge  there are created the 
disaster scenarios for size of disasters: normal, critical, and extreme, in which there 
are separately followed the impacts on the SoS individual assets at defined time 
intervals (e.g., for the territory there are proven the simulation for periods of time 
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measured from the occurrence of the disaster: 0h, 3 h, 6h, 24h, 3 days, 14 days, 1 
month), 
- for each dangerous disaster there are evaluated secondary and higher impacts on 
the SoS assets, observable in the times of 3 h, 6 h, 24 h, 3 days, 14 days, 1 month, 
namely at scenarios of dangerous disasters of critical and extreme, and they are 
revealed the locations of the origin the cascading failures and possible cascades of 
impacts, 
- by the overall evaluation of the data obtained for the disaster that are identified as 
dangerous for the SoS there are determined the SoS vulnerable items, 
- there is determined the occurrence frequency of failures of each vulnerable item of 
the SoS with regard to disaster identified as dangerous for the SoS, 
- it builds the criticality matrix for the SoS (for each SoS vulnerable item it is scored 
the occurrence frequency of failures and the severity of the failures expressed by 
the size of the losses on the SoS assets) and according to the appropriate value 
scale it shall be determined highly critical, medium-critical and critical items of the  
SoS. 
The aim of the third part, denoted in Figure 24 as "what to do" is to evaluate the real im-
pacts in the disaster scenarios for the disaster sizes:  current, design and beyond design, 
compiled in part 2 for each  real disaster, which belong to specific disasters in a given terri-
tory; and it is assessed whether there are adequate quality of safety management scenarios 
and whether there is a readiness on their implementation in practice. On the basis of critical 
evaluation, they are detected deficiencies and searched for better procedures for safety 
management with the fact that each process needs to include a number of specific 
measures and activities, the way of implementation, evidences of their material, technical, 
personnel and knowledge ensuring, and be accompanied by the relevant competencies 
and responsibilities. Whereas that management procedure consists of different, intersecting 
processes that have one objective, and some are mutually conditional, i.e.  are mutually 
dependent, it is necessary to construct matrixes of responsibilities [30] for the management 
of activities that support the basic functions of the territory associated with safety. 
Therefore, there are evaluated the measures and activities to individual disasters, and it is 
considering the fact that some of the measures and activities which are  the best for a par-
ticular disaster are in real territory of conflicting with those for another disaster, and therefore, 
it performs their optimization in consideration of all possible disasters in the sizes, which are 
the design disasters values. It is required the documents to ensure the response, its mate-
rial, technical, personnel and knowledge ensure, and also the pass of the respective com-
petences and responsibilities.  
From the viewpoint of removing the causes of organizational accidents, there are on 
the basis of existing documentation for the SoS safety management, which currently 
means that it will consider the measures and activities for the management of the risks 
used at individual systems and it will be performed evaluation of their effectiveness in 
the area of the SoS risk management,  namely for individual items of management of 
risks (acts of management, technical area, knowledge area, the financial area, person-
nel area, responsibilities), i.e. it:  
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- performs the screening of the existing measures and activities for risk management 
of the SoS subsystems and it assess their appropriateness for increasing the SoS 
safety, 
- performs the evaluation of level of trade-off with risk all disasters that were identified 
as dangerous for the SoS, particularly for highly critical and moderate critical items 
of the SoS, and for the needs of the SoS safety management this level is classified 
according to the appropriate level of the scale, 
- builds matrixes of responsibilities and their level it shall be assessed from the per-
spective of the relevant competences at the level of  the SoS individual systems 
and the whole SoS; logically, the responsibility for the SoS safety management  
need to be the primary, 
- examines the practices and modes of the SoS control, that result from aggregation 
of procedures and modes of management subsystems,  and the attention will focus 
on the detection of conflicts and gaps in implementation in practice, and how they 
are ensured by knowledge, materially, technically, financially and by  personnel, 
- assesses the adequacy and accessibility of resources, forces and means with re-
gard to cope with failures of the moderate and highly critical of the SoS items with 
acceptable losses and damages, 
- assesses the effectiveness of specific procedures such as a warning, the capability 
to respond, warning instructions, etc. 
Finally, they are identified the areas in which the SoS risks are managed insufficiently 
or not managed.  
The aim of the fourth part, denoted in Figure 24 as "critical interfaces" is to create  matrixes 
of criticalities as a basis for the administrative management of the territory, on the basis of 
the individual impacts scenarios for each real beyond design disaster, or also for such de-
sign disaster when it was revealed that it is not in the territory considered at all; and to gain 
the capability to determine the severity of potential situations in the territory and in the critical 
facilities and to identify the key interfaces for the origin of a social crisis in the territory, which 
is a necessary basis for choosing the right management methods; to collect realistic ideas 
of experts to ensure the survival of the population and to find a way to implement it in practice 
that will be respected by the fact that the measures and activities cannot be chosen with 
regard to just one disaster, or just property, but it is necessary to strive for optimal measures 
for all the assets and all the potential real critical disasters in a given territory. Therefore, 
there are considered beyond design disasters and criticalities of their impacts, and there are 
identified interfaces for origin of social crises and they are searched ideas for ensuring the 
inhabitants survival 
It means that main target is identifying the critical items of the SoS risk management 
and proposal of solution of  gaps related to survival or continuity of assets at critical 
assets, there are determined interfaces, which lead to the collapse of any of the assets 
to the demise or the whole SoS. The procedure is the following: 
- it is assessed the severity of the areas in which the SoS risks are managed insuffi-
ciently or not managed at all, and for very serious areas from the perspective of 
public interest, they are proposed real measures and activities against the breakup 
to the demise of any of the assets or the whole SoS, it is processed the plan of their 
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implementation (usually long-term), and it is ensured its implementation in all re-
spects, 
- on the basis of a critical perspective on the extreme and critical scenarios of possi-
ble dangerous disasters with regard to essential public assets (the lives and health 
of people, the quality of living conditions and the possibility of developing), there 
are again examined possible measures and activities for human survival or conti-
nuity of public assets, in order to avoid the interference threshold of the criticality of 
their conditions of existence.  
Together with the Defence-In-Depth concept, it represents a comprehensive approach, 
which ensures that people and the environment will be protected, even at critical con-
ditions in the facility with nuclear technology. It is a comprehensive philosophy of safety 
that has begun to apply in the 1980 of the last centuries. It includes all activities aimed 
at the safety of the facility and the territory in which the facility is located, namely start-
ing from siting, through design and construction, commissioning, operation and de-
commissioning. To ensure the safe complex technical facility it uses the systems bar-
riers and management modes. Its aim is to: 
- to compensate the human and technological failures, 
- to maintain effective barriers that avert damages to the equipment and the barriers 
themselves, 
- to protect people and the environment, when the barrier fails to fulfil their tasks.  
Present advanced management of socio-cyber- technical facilities is based on the pro-
cess management; details are in Annex 4.  Model for entity safety management in time 
13,14 is shown in Figure 25. It is necessary to coordinate six processes: 1 - concepts 
and management; 2 - administrative procedures; 3 - technical matters; 4 - external cooper-
ation; 5 - emergency preparedness; and 6 - documentation and the investigation of acci-
dents. The main processes are further divided into sub processes:  
1. The first process consists of sub processes for: the overall concept; achieving the inter-
mediate objectives of safety; leadership / management of safety; the safety manage-
ment system; personnel staff including the sections for: human resources management, 
training and education, internal communication / awareness and working environment; 
review and evaluation of the implementation of fulfilment of objectives in the safety.  
2. The second process consists of sub processes for: identify of hazards from potential 
disasters and risk assessment; documentation of procedures (including work permits); 
management of change; safety in conjunction with contractors; and supervision of prod-
uct safety.  
3. The third process includes the sub processes for: research and development; design 
and mountings; inherently safer processes; technical standards; storage of hazardous 
substances; and maintenance of integrity and maintenance of equipment and buildings.  
4. The fourth process includes the sub processes for: cooperation with the administrative 
authorities; cooperation with the public and other stakeholders (including the academic 
institutions); and cooperation with other facilities.  
5. The fifth process includes the sub processes for: planning of internal (on-site) prepared-
ness; facilitate the planning of external (off-site) preparedness (for which it corresponds 
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the public administration); and the coordination of the activities of the departmental (re-
sort) facilities at ensuring the departmental emergency preparedness and at response.  
6. The sixth process has sub processes for: processing of reports on disasters, accidents, 
near misses and other learned experience; investigation of damages, losses and harms 
and their causes; and the response and follow-up activities after disasters (including les-
sons learned and information sharing).  
 
 
Figure 25. Model of the  technical facility (CTF) safety management in time. Processes: 
1 - concept and management; 2 - administrative procedures; 3 - technical matters; 4 - 
external cooperation; 5 - emergency preparedness; and 6 - documentation and the 
investigation of accidents. Feedbacks that are used to control when the risk is unac-
ceptable - the numbers in the yellow circle. 
 
Coordination of processes is targeted at ensuring the safe complex facilities under the con-
ditions of normal, abnormal and critical (Figure 26). 
Only at known and frequent disasters the risk level perceived by humans is near to real 
risk level. At infrequent and low known disasters, the humans perceive the risk level 
as shadowy and remote. Perception of risk is also influenced by further factors – e.g. 
at activities that we perform voluntarily (mountaineering, ski jumping etc.) we consider 
the insignificant level of risk. The risk acceptability is the result of comparison of several 
types of acceptability – technical acceptability (reliability and complexness of technol-
ogies, machines and devices), economic acceptability (costs) and socio-political   ac-
ceptability (general risk perception).  
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Figure 26. Concept of entity safety and its main parts. 
 
Generally, it is possible to say that acceptable risk is determined on social and 
knowledge base, and that the social, economic and political factors are considered 
during the risk level determination. It also means that level of acceptable risk is not 
same for all countries.  
Because the required level of safety is possible also to reach by special education, 
installation of warning systems, it holds that acceptable risk level is not safe risk level 
at which the probable losses and damages are negligible.  
According to the theorization of present philosophers the risks have in society the ob-
jective and subjective features, and moreover there are not out of culture and value 
connections (in this direction they are not pure scientific problem and they need to be 
considered also from viewpoint of civic involvement). Even, if the modern society en-
forces the indolent strategy of insurance and reimbursement, it is not possible to rely 
on it fully because some risks can affect the core of social system, which it is truth for 
some security risks.  
Against scientism of security politics nothing can be say to the extent that we prove to 
be reflexive, which means to reveal consequences of individual activities and we do 
not yield to illusion on opportunity of perfect solution.  Reliance on experts (and insti-
tutions) can induce the reduction of capability to participate actively on solution and to 
finish the separation of private and public (which manifests as inherent risk on which 
the expert opinion fails).  According to professional concept all participants (i.e. all in-
terest groups) have duties and responsibilities at trade-off with risks. 
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From this reason the humans need to have possibility to participate in decision-making, 
to manifest their needs and opinions, namely without fear from punishment. It is nec-
essary to involve many humans (in spite of great costs in the process beginning) and 
to try accomplishment of consensus.    
Problem comes in professional matters in which the ground documents are based on 
evaluations that are complicated and for current humans non-understandable. The de-
cision-making in these cases is often influenced by the lobbies of various groups that 
strive on commission.  
From this reason it is necessary so that: all evaluation procedures need to be lean on 
legislative; the selection criteria need to be directed to publicly aims and need to be 
transparent at decision with regard to dispositional sources, forces and means of public 
administration. In practice we use risks of several types: partial if we consider one 
asset; integrated if we consider several assets and the total risk is the aggregation of 
individual assets risks; and integral (systemic) if we consider more assets and total risk 
includes also indirect impacts on assets that are caused by linkages and couplings in 
system.  
The assignation of real work with risks in good governance is given to person or or-
ganisational part that is well prepared for such work. This approach is possible only in 
organization with qualified process management in which activities and measures are 
applied on knowledge base, namely matter-of-fact and from management domain (i.e. 
the activities are mutually interconnected, no errors in communication, each participant 
knows what to do and how to do).  
Because, it does not exist the general consensus on formulation of problems of sus-
tainability of welfare of human society in context with system utilities, each problem 
solution is provisional, because it continually balances among the rival interests and 
society goals (if they are stipulated). It is difficult to give explicit decision on problem 
owing to the alternating decision process character. During the decision, the following 
dilemmas are solved:  
- relation between risks and profits (often greater benefit for human means greater 
risk for ecosystem), 
- time conflict between needs of present and future generations, 
- and social conflict (relation of needs of individuals and the society).  
It is difficult to solve inverse problems owing to the systems´ complexness. If some 
symptoms connected with risks are stipulated and sorted out, the new symptoms will 
emerge. From this it follows that the real approach to sustainability management by 
help of risk management needs to be iterative, interactive and adaptive.  
The aim of complex management is to ensure at each situation the protection of human 
lives and security, property, environment, infrastructures and technologies that are 
necessary for human survival. It means always to ensure: 
- the mobilisation and co-ordination of all national sources (energy, labour force, pro-
duction capacity, food and agriculture, resources, telecommunications etc.),  
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- the co-ordination of such activities as notification system, warning system, rescue 
system and first responders´ system, which reduce the disasters’ impacts and sup-
porting the public administration activities and adherence of legal rules.  
The planning types that form fundamental methodical tools of individual mutually inter-
connected management types need to create the base in which all given aims are 
embedded. 
For reaching the human society aims, i.e. security and sustainable development, the 
mutual combination of measures and activities is necessary at vulnerabilities´ reduc-
tion, resiliencies upgrade and adaptation capability; all public assets in detail and in 
complex need to be respected. The present tool based on knowledge and experiences 
means to apply on all management levels to implement the proactive safety manage-
ment system based on work with risk respecting above mentioned knowledge; espe-
cially: All-Hazard-Approach, Defence-In-Depth strategy, interdependences, time and 
space variability.  
From the critical analysis of emergency up to critical situations [17], it follows that: 
- the cause of critical situations are the organisational accidents that are connected 
with a human factor; especially with the phenomena as corruption; abuse of power; 
suppress of the public interest; low respect to knowledge and engineering experi-
ences; and low professional level of management, 
- the organisational accident consequences are: government default; technologies 
failures; infrastructure failures; research failure; social system failure; decay of hu-
man society into intolerant groups; increasing number of impoverished people – 
seniors, dossiers, jobless – problem young people who are out of work and without 
education; disturbances of daily civil protection human needs; disturbance of daily 
civil protection, human security and public welfare; disuse of technology, space mil-
itarization.  
From this reason we pay the attention to these phenomena that cause the disturbance 
of social relations, public welfare and human security – Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Phenomena that cause the disturbance of social relations, public welfare and 
human security. 
 
Domain Defects leading to critical situations 
Top governance The domain management: is predetermined to political and 
military aspects; is short of human dimension and gives low 
support to the EU inhabitants;  does not governed on the ba-
sis of qualified data processed by qualified methods; is often 
determined by fixed ideas without real assessment of their 
realisation; is based on image that all is stationary and it 
does not respect dynamic development of world that means 
to prepare possible extreme scenarios and measures for hu-
man’s survival; and is not realised on the principle “Safety 
management system for system of systems”. 
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Technical domain In domain: no standards and norms for underground and 
high-rise buildings with regard to human security and public 
welfare; missing essential services provided to the citizens; 
scenarios for decision-making are prepared only by simula-
tion without verification with use of real data – sometimes 
scenarios used were derived for different conditions, i.e. con-
ditions of technology transfer were not fulfilled; no norms and 
standards for interoperability; no standards and norms for 
co-operation of diverse systems; no co-ordinated emergency 
plans on all levels (EU-wide to regional) – all need to be on 
professional level respecting knowledge and experiences, 
continuity and contingency plans. 
Organisational 
domain  
In domain:  missing the effort directed to reduction of weak-
ness (low number of resources, contamination of environ-
ment, work price, unemployment) and to use of strength 
(qualified technician population); no effective tool against to 
corruption, power disuse, lobbying etc.;  missing the support 
of co-operation on mutual partner principle;  missing base for 
mutual understanding and mutual co-existence; no effective 
international teams of first responders; no base for close co-
operation of first responders; no norms and standards for in-
teroperability.  
Knowledge  do-
main 
In knowledge base used for decision-making: missing sys-
tematic respect to present world nature – dynamic open sys-
tem of systems; low effort directed to collection of qualified 
data on disasters and on lesson learned from responses to 
extreme disasters; underestimation of disasters at disasters´ 
management; neglecting the creeping disasters as ground 
water stores, contamination of human food chain etc.; no 
qualified disasters´ scenarios for decision making. 
 
The outputs of our task are created by application of methods as: the critical analysis 
and critical evaluation of knowledge that is gathered in professional publications and 
summarized in foregoing section; consideration of experiences from everyday life; log-
ical interconnection  of knowledge; classification of obtained facts; synthesis of ob-
tained facts; application of methods of creative thinking and expert judgement (panel 
discussion, brainstorming, Delphi method, criticality assessment etc.) on data as:   
- risk nature and features, 
- risk scenarios change in time and space, 
- risk management change in time and space; special attention is paid to manage-
ment failures, 
- trade-off with risks change in time and space; special attention is paid to failures 
caused by incorrect or insufficient measures. 
At individual investigations the analytical and heuristic methods [15,30] are used.  
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The results from own direct research are based on: systematic investigation and eval-
uation of disasters and accidents in technological objects and facilities; judgement of 
impacts of real accidents on technological objects and facilities; simulations performed 
by the risk engineering methods (What, If and Fishbone [30]); and performed profes-
sional inspections in real technological objects and facilities.  
The aim of inspections was the determination of main deficiencies in complex technological 
facilities. For this aim it was used the special checklist, which was compiled according to the 
technique described in [13]. Its form for i-th disaster is shown in Table 3.  
 
Table 3. Identification of deficiencies for i-th specific disaster, i.e. disaster that can have 
important impacts on entity and its vicinity, i = 1, 2, ..., n, i.e. assessment of criticality 
rate of viewpoint of application of All-Hazard-Approach and Defence-In-Depth. Safety 
rate = 1 – criticality rate. For assessment of criticality it was used the value scale 0-5 
[5] was used (0-negligible, 1-low, 2-middle,3-high,4-very high,5-extremely high) and 
the median of values determined by inspection members (usually 5-7). 
 
 Question Assessment 
of criticality 
Reasons  
of criti-
cality 
i 1. Has the technical object or facility to incorporate the 
principles of inherent safety, i.e. safe design? 
  
 2. Has the control system of a technical facility (SMS) 
set the basic control functions, alarms and the re-
sponse of the operator set up so that the technical 
facility in normal (steady) condition? 
  
3. Has management system (SMS) instrumentation 
(built-in safety instructions) and relevant physical 
barriers, which at derogate from the normal condi-
tion to keep technical system in a good condition, 
i.e. they prevent the occurrence of unwanted phe-
nomenon?  
The operation is successful, when, after the occur-
rence of the abnormal condition the technical facility 
will return to normal as a result of resilience or after 
the application of corrective measures (clean-up, 
repair, replacement of parts). 
  
4. Has management system (SMS) for the case of 
loss of control, i.e. critical conditions´ measures for 
emergency response that mitigate impacts on tech-
nological facility system and ensure the capability to 
return to a normal condition?  
Operation of a technological object is successful, if 
it is a good continuity plan  ensuring that the 
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technological facility shall ensure all the necessary 
tasks. 
5. Does management system (SMS) for the case of 
loss of control, i.e. supercritical (beyond design, ex-
treme) conditions the measures for: 
- maintaining the operability of the technological 
system following its repair and maintenance, 
- and measures to ensure the protection of public 
assets (people, the environment and other as-
sets) in the surroundings of technological facil-
ity? 
  
 
The special attention of advanced risk management and risk engineering targeted to 
the integral safety is targeted to the technological objects and networks that are in 
principle the socio-cyber-technical systems. According to  knowledge concentrated in 
13-15  it is necessary to   use the following principles:  
- the risk is followed and considered during the given system whole life cycle, i.e. at 
sitting, designing, building, operation and putting out of operation, and eventually 
at territory bringing in original condition,  
- the risk determination is directed to user’s demands and to the level of provided 
services, 
- the risk is determined according to the criticality of impacts on facility processes, 
provided services and on assets that are determined by public interest, 
- the unacceptable risks are mitigated by tools according to technical and organisa-
tional proposals, by standardisation of operating procedures or by automatable 
check-up.    
The advanced risk engineering directed to human system safety respects the co-exist-
ence of systems with different nature (SoS), and so fulfils present demands of humans. 
To prepare groundwork it is necessary to combine analytical methods with expert 
judgement by which we remove vagueness in data. The problems that we need to 
solve in this consequence consist in acquisition of knowledge and in assignment “who 
is expert”; this problem was broadly discussed in world conference ESREL2011 2. 
For the first problem solution we need systematically to monitor human system and 
obtained data process by qualified methods.     
It needs to be noted that in the real world we work at ensuring the safety of critical 
facilities with the non-trivial problems, i.e.:  
- they have several protected assets, the objectives of which are sometimes conflict-
ing, 
- these assets vary in time and space, 
- and the human system, in which the assets are and assets alone are in dynamic 
development. 
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For ensuring the safe territory and safe public assets it is necessary to apply the super 
process that consists from five processes (Figure 27): 
 
Fig. 27.  Structure of super process for risk management and trade-off with risk for 
profit of safe territory and safe public assets. The numbers denote the feedbacks that 
need to be realised if problems occur. From the economy reasons the firstly the feed-
back 1 is applied, and only if it fails the feedback 2 etc. 
 
1. The process for obtaining the sufficient knowledge on territory includes: determina-
tion of assets in territory; determination of territory parameters and assets charac-
teristics in the extent of land-use planning documentation; and determination of list 
of disasters that affected the territory (the input list of disasters being under the term 
All-Hazard-Approach). 
2. The process of risks assessments and risk controls  includes: the determination of 
hazards for all disasters that can have impacts on the given territory and their return 
periods; determination of vulnerable sites in territory and vulnerability of public as-
sets with regard to determined sizes of hazards (ways of hazard determination are 
e.g. in [13]); determination of design disasters (normative determined disaster size);  
determination of impacts of disasters on territory and assets (it is suitable to deter-
mine the normative impact scenarios for design disasters); determination of integral 
risks for all important disasters (i.e. to consider the both, the direct disaster impact 
on assets and the indirect disaster impacts on assets through the linkages and 
couplings among the assets); put the work with risks. 
3. Process of evaluation of quality of risk management and trade-off with risks in-
cludes: judgement of levels of effectiveness of prevention, preparedness, response 
and renovation with regard to integral risks connected with important disasters; de-
termination of critical points in risk management and in trade-off with risks and de-
termination of these points criticalities with regard to integrity and effectiveness of 
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applied measures and activities and their control (i.e. it goes on the reveal of 
sources of possible organizational accidents); proposal of corrections for high criti-
cal points. 
4. Process of determination of safety management includes: determination of 
measures and activities for points with high criticalities and their implementation in 
the frame of short-term, middle-term and long-term realization plans, namely in-
cluding the responsibilities for realization and sources for realizations; introduction 
of safety culture on the level of assets, assets´ management and on the territory 
safety management (from top management to individual citizens) [3, 5,14]; and de-
termination of response procedures to emergency situations with demand that at 
each response to critical up to extreme situation there are  solved the human sur-
vival and the continuity of critical objects, facilities and infrastructures. 
5. Process of preservation and upgrade the safety includes: systematic formation of 
capability to perform early and effective response to critical situation, to ensure the 
renovation and continuity of services in territory; determination and implementation 
of strategic programme for safety increase in time including the monitoring the ef-
fectiveness of processes for risk management and trade-off with risks; regular detail 
assessment of territory safety every 10 years; and immediate territory safety judge-
ment after critical situation occurrence.   
Because the dynamic development of world it is necessary to monitor the territory and 
to have prepared the procedures for correction of unfavourable situations. From econ-
omy reasons it is necessary firstly to use the cheapest procedure that feedback 1 in 
Figure 27 shows; in case of its failure the feedback 2 etc.; at huge harms, it is immedi-
ately used the feedback 4, which means the change of territory safety concept. In each 
case denoted by feedback some of adjusted processes change:  
- in case denoted by feedback 1, it is pursued the change of process of territory 
safety management (e.g. they are change the rules for territory safety management, 
the allocation of roles of participated persons, management priorities etc.), 
- in case denoted by feedback 2, it is pursued the change of process of evaluation of 
quality of risk management and trade-off with risks (e.g. they are changed the ways 
of risk control in territory, separation of tasks of trade-off with risks among the par-
ticipated persons, priorities for risk management and trade-off with risks, allocation 
of means for measures leading to risk reduction – it does not only rely on response 
but more on prevention etc.), 
- in case denoted by feedback 3, it is pursued the change of process of evaluation of 
risk assessment (e.g. they are introduced the further criteria for risk assessment, 
the value scale is transformed, they are considered the contributions to integral 
risks from further linkages and couplings among the assets that were revealed as 
originators of huge damages, losses and harms on public assets etc.), 
- in case denoted by feedback 4, it is pursued the change of process of knowledge 
on territory (they are added and introduced into practice new findings, e.g. into the 
set of risk sources are added the further harmful phenomena that were revealed as 
the sources of huge damages, losses and harms on public assets, the size of dis-
asters criticalities changes, the size of assets´ vulnerabilities changes etc.).        
100 
 
For ensuring the safe technological objects or facilities (or more precisely socio-tech-
nological entity because each such entity was invented and set up by humans) that 
are located in real territory it is necessary to apply the super process that consists from 
four processes (Figure 28):   
 
Fig. 28. The structure of super process for risk management and trade-off with risks 
for profit of safe technological entity during its life cycle and its safe vicinity. The num-
bers denote the feedbacks that need to be realised if problems occur. From the econ-
omy reasons the firstly the feedback 1 is applied, and only if it fails the feedback 2 etc. 
 
1. Process of siting, designing, building and construction of technological entity (build-
ing, facility, network) includes: assemble of data on territory and its assets in which 
technological entity might be located in the extent of land-use planning documen-
tation; assemble of data on disasters affecting the territory, their hazard sizes and 
their impacts character (the input list of disasters being under the term All-Hazard-
Approach); determination and judgement of integral risk, and determination of vul-
nerability of the technological entity against to disasters affecting the territory and 
the estimation of integral risk increase after technological entity realization; entity 
siting, designing, building and constructions with regard to site risks, technology 
risks and human factor risks with the respecting the Defence-In-Depth principle (in 
detail described in [13]) and the trade-off with risks connected with linkages and 
couplings between entity and its vicinity; and determination of way of technological 
entity safety management in time during the technological entity life cycle (docu-
mentation: preliminary safety report [13]). 
2. Process of preparation and start-up of permanent operation of technological entity 
(building, facility, network) includes: tests of functional capability of individual build-
ings, facilities and devices and elimination of revealed sources of technical and 
organizational risks; semi operation during which the risks connected with linkages 
and couplings (realised by different flows realizing at operation) inside and outside 
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the entity are traded-off; trial operation during which the risks connected with link-
ages and couplings (realised by different flows realizing at operation) inside and 
outside the entity are traded-off; realization of proposal of safety management of 
technological entity (processing the preoperational safety report and proposal of  
operational safety report [13]); and start-up of permanent operation. 
3. Process of safe operation of technological entity (building, facility, network) during 
the life cycle includes:  installation of operating procedures for normal, abnormal 
and critical conditions, safety culture, risk monitoring process; programme for up-
grade of safety in time and procedures for continuity plan realization at critical con-
ditions (operational safety report [13]); adjustment of optimal maintenance of build-
ings, facilities and devices; establishment of regular inspections of buildings, facili-
ties and devices and rules for implementation of early repair of detected defects on 
buildings, facilities and devices, especially those important from safety reasons; 
modernization of buildings, facilities and devices; regular audits of safety of tech-
nical entity and its impacts on vicinity, which including the judgement of safety cul-
ture level, and realization of measures for getting over the detected important risks 
and for removing the sources of organizational accidents; and early response to 
critical situations and ensuring the continuity of technological entity operation after 
repair  [13]. 
4. Process of close of technological entity (building, facility, network) from operation 
and recovery of territory for new use includes: determination of sources and re-
sponsibilities for measures and activities that are necessary for remove the entity 
(building, facility, and network) and decontamination works; remove of buildings, 
facilities and networks from the territory; performance of decontamination of terri-
tory. It goes on the process on which it is often   forgotten in practice as the brown-
fields show, and therefore, it needs to be followed during the whole technological 
entity life cycle.  
Because the dynamic development of world it is necessary to monitor the technical 
entity and to have prepared the procedures for correction of unfavourable situations. It 
is also necessary to consider that each technical entity has limited life cycle, and there-
fore, for preservation of conditions for human security and development it is necessary 
to forestall to depreciation of territory. From these reasons, there need to be prepared 
procedures and corrections in each technical entity for averting the unfavourable situ-
ation.  From economy reasons, it is necessary firstly to use the cheapest procedure 
that feedback 1 in Figure 28 shows; in case of its failure the feedback 2 etc.; at huge 
harms, it is immediately used the feedback 3 that means the change of safety concept. 
In each case denoted by feedback some of adjusted processes change:  
- in case denoted by feedback 1, it is pursued the change of technological entity 
safety management process (e.g. they change demands of public administration 
on operation of technological entity, rules for technological entity safety manage-
ment, priorities in technological entity safety management – Figure 27 shows that 
often it is necessary to solve conflicts between security of public assets and the 
number of products, etc.), 
- in case denoted by feedback 2, it is pursued the change of process of preparation 
and start-up of permanent operation of technological entity (e.g. they change ways 
of revealed risk management and trade-off with revealed risks and further trial 
102 
 
operation is performed, allocations of trade-off with risks among participants, prior-
ities in risk management and in trade-off with risks, allocation of means for 
measures leading to risk reduction - it does not only rely on response and more 
means is given for prevention etc.), 
- in case denoted by feedback 3, it is pursued the change of process siting, design-
ing, building and construction of technological entity (e.g. they are considered fur-
ther sources of risks, introduced further criteria for risk assessment, changed the 
value scale, considered the further contributions to integral risk from linkages and 
couplings among the assets that were revealed as sources of great losses, dam-
ages and harms on public assets etc.).  
Due to dynamic world development it is necessary regularly to evaluate in each terri-
tory the co-existence of territory and all technological entities located in it, because it 
is necessary to preserve the conditions in territory that enable the safe life of future 
human generations. At finding the significant problems it is necessary to find sources, 
forces and means for removing the important impacts on future territory conditions and 
future generations. It is necessary to determine the measures, sources for their reali-
zations and responsibilities for their implementation, in the frame of public interest it is 
necessary to use all resources for performance of remedy in acceptable time horizon.  
The interface of processes for works with risks during the time, in individual parts of 
super processes is logical and today has support in many legal rules, norms and stand-
ards. The present problem is that it is not required the logical interface of different 
sectors that is very exigent. It needs the co-operation of specialists from many fields, 
which needs the common terms, mutual understanding, common effort at finding the 
consensus etc. that are missing.  
With regard to results given above the super processes´ correct applications are good 
prevention of organization accidents. However, it is clear that the super processes ap-
plication fulfils the expected targets only if all processes on lower hierarchical levels 
will be correctly applied and will be meaningfully interconnected and co-ordinated. It is 
necessary to note that problems connected with good application of both super pro-
cesses, inhere in reality that neither present professional education nor present legis-
lation do not require the connectivity of actions and measures that are important for 
success of super processes. The next problem is that partial processes contain sub-
processes that are not interfaced in reality or their interconnections are insufficient as 
shown results of accidents investigation, failures of networks and conclusions from 
inspections of safety documentations mentioned above.  
From above mentioned reasons it is necessary to introduce in education the branch of 
knowledge on management of hierarchically interconnected processes in vertical and 
horizontal structure and to prescribe the mandatory discussion of specialists responsi-
ble for management of individual sections from the level of sub-processes, over pro-
cesses up to sub-processes, namely with participation of public administration and 
general public. The discussion needs to follow the public interest and to be performed 
by the suitable method of risk engineering on several professional levels (according to 
participants´ knowledge); the method needs to ensure the fair-mindedness and cor-
rectness; for professional discussion the more stages Delphi method [30] is suitable, 
according to experience the panel discussion [30] is unsuitable because at its use the 
special interest groups (lobby) can have chance.  
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5.5. Technical facilities open problems 
 
The human lives in modern society are made easier through technical and cyber sys-
tems. However, all these positive consequences of technical progress on the human 
system functioning are redeemed by existence of a much larger number of risks that 
lead to: the failure of the State basic functions; safety level reduction; and disruption of 
technical facilities coexistence with their surroundings [13,45]. The reason for in-
creased number of risk sources is existence of a large number of different types of 
complex systems, their elements and interconnections on which the human system 
depends.  
Each technical facility and its surroundings change over time, and therefore, they also 
change  their mutual interactions. From the human security and development view-
point, it is important so these interactions throughout the technical facility life cycle 
should be adequate. They may not cause the sources of risks that would significantly 
undermine the conditions necessary for the human lives and  cause the situations that 
human society would not have the capacity to deal with the risks to its advantage. 
As the world dynamically evolves, the progressive anthropogenic management already 
notes that due to the technical facilities´ and the world´ complexities and time changes 
in conditions that humans do not have the ability to influence, the accidents and failures 
of technical facilities are a reality with which the anthropogenic management needs to 
deal [46]. It needs to go on such technical facilities managing that performs well-estab-
lished tasks during their lifetimes for their safety. Due to the existence of dynamic trans-
formations, the management is foreseen that situations may arise where technical fa-
cility becomes dangerous to itself and its surroundings [46]. In order to ensure security 
for human society and other public assets, it is, therefore, necessary to have the tools 
to reveal risk sources and to manage emergencies so that their impacts on public as-
sets and on technical facility itself may be minimal.  
It should be remembered that in critical situations, the solution is not a " to sacrifice the 
technical facility", i.e. to carry out measures and activities that completely destroy it, 
since the technical facility supplies products or provides services, employs humans 
and is a source of economic capital for given territory. Therefore, serious risks should 
be managed with targeting the technical facilities safety in all possible conditions 
[13,15]. However,  our research shows lacks in awareness on risks, especially among 
managers and politicians. 
Research [15,20,33]  shows that at present in technical facilities, the integral risk is not 
considered and they are used the following choices of sources of risks: 
1. Sources of risks determined either by legislative, or by experiences of worker who 
solves the task.  
2. Only technical sources of risks in a given technological facility. Usually, it goes on: 
- risks connected with material (fulfilment of required parameters, supplier rela-
tions - alternative material etc.),  
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- risks connected with construction and interfaces of components and facilities 
(free procedures, presence of unstable hazardous substances….), 
- risks connected with production procedures, e.g. at welding, specific works with 
millers, lathes etc., 
- risks connected with conditions that are necessary for production of quality prod-
uct, e.g. certain pressure, certain temperature or certain humidity of surrounding 
medium etc.,  
3. Technical sources of risks and human factor. To items given in point 2, they are 
added risks connected with false operation of workers. In this case it is also required 
the prevention of false technical operations in technical work. 
4. Technical sources of risks and human factor the broadest most interpretation. To 
items given in point 3, they are added risks connected with sources of organiza-
tional accidents (i.e. bad decision-making, using the false procedures etc.). 
5. Technical sources of risks, sources of risks threatened the workers lives, health 
and safety, sources of organizational accidents and sources of risks in working en-
vironment. 
6. The sources of risks given in point 5 plus external sources of risks. 
7. The sources of risks given in point 6 plus sources of risks from interfaces of facili-
ties, components and system that disturb the technical integrity and their originators 
are in automatization, education and good skill. In this case it is also required the 
property protection, data and information protection, specific knowledge and know-
how protection. 
8. All Hazard Approach in the form described in [19]. This selection considers the risks 
from the five basic disaster sources and it is challenging on data, methods, 
knowledge, experience and time period. It requires the strategic system proactive 
approach and it has according the results of FOCUS project [13] a lot of deficits at 
use in practice.          
Research described in [14,15,33] also shows that in technical practice there are used 
following ways of work with risks: 
- risks are determined and mastered after technical facility creation. This way has 
danger that some of important risks that could be only mastered by specific tech-
nical measures in assignment of technical facility can be only reduced by organiza-
tional that are lower effective than technical measures,    
- specified risks are considered from the beginning of technological facility design up 
to its termination from operation. This way depends on requirements of legislation, 
knowledge and skill of designers, constructors and operators, i.e. it does not guar-
antee the consideration of all risk sources, 
- risks are considered from the beginning of technical facility design and it is used 
strategy verified in practice using the Defence-In-Depth approach that requires sys-
tem thinking, multi sectoral and transdisciplinary knowledge and experiences.  
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6. TOOLS FOR DETERMINATION, MANAGEMENT  AND TRADE-OFF  
     WIITH RISKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
For successful work with risks of technical facilities, they are necessary both, the cor-
rect and effective tools and the responsibilities for their correct use. 
   
6.1.Tools 
 
A number of specific tools have been developed to deal with risks in risk engineering. 
Their aim is to recognize, understand and manage the risks, thereby ensuring a safe 
technical facility and its safe operation throughout its lifetime. Because technical facil-
ities are complex systems of systems, it goes on tools in which the results of analytical 
and expert methods are interconnected in a specific way. The most important tools and 
techniques are described in [15,30]. Here, based on the experience of the authors, we 
will mention just a few of them: 
1. Benchmarking is a method of systematically comparing the processes, organiza-
tional structure, products and performance of a given technical facility department 
with other globally successful technical facilities with a view to achieving the excel-
lence. It is usually used in risk management in cases, where the objective is ideal, 
and according to good practice principles it is good to manage risks by way as the 
best industry operators do. 
2. Modelling is a technique by which we create a simplified picture of a real process, 
system or object and then we follow on it the established connections. Its aim is to 
determine the scenario of the process in time and space (e.g. the course of the 
accident, the course of the process control, the course of the response to the ac-
cident, etc.) so that we can determine appropriate measures and activities to en-
sure safe technical facilities (e.g., for preventing, mitigating and mastering the ac-
cidents with available capabilities, which we provide with the CBA (Cost Benefit 
Analysis). Based on the principle that “everything is related to everything” (regres-
sus ad infinitum), it is necessary to validate results obtained by model; evaluations 
of technical facilities accidents and failures often show that kay causes were inad-
equate modelling the accidents. In serious cases, the care should be taken for 
software applications, especially where technology transfer conditions have not 
been verified [47].  
3. A scenario is a system model that describes the evolution of a process in its various 
forms (variants, alternatives) depending on conditions or decisions made, contain-
ing a sequence of events that take place within it (including the prospective vari-
ants), and descriptions of interactions between the monitored assets of the system 
and the process 30. Disaster scenarios are the most important for safety man-
agement because they are used to propose prevention, mitigation, response and 
recovery.  
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5.  Multicriterial assessment is an assessment based on the application of multiple 
criteria, even incommensurable or conflicting, to a whole [30]. For the resulting 
solution, they need to be determined the restrictive conditions, which define objec-
tivity (e.g. in terms of system exhaustibility, human resources or value of benefits). 
The exhaustibility of the system means the maximum possible level of utility (utility 
value) that can be achieved in a given scientific and technological development. 
We always judge the restrictive conditions individually, namely based on their par-
tial evaluations. For its application in conjunction with the risks of complex systems, 
it has proved to be useful the application of: 
- What, If method in for of table, as it is given in Figure 16. 
- the Decision Support System (DSS) with appropriate value scales processed 
on the maximum utility theory [48]. 
Analyses of the risk management tools presented in [33,49] as well as the accumulated 
experience [43] show that risk management tools depend on many factors; schemati-
cally, the subject matter is also shown in Figure 13.  
Whereas in a strategic management in which security and long-term functionality are 
concerned, two factors need to be considered: 
- technical facilities are complex multi-level systems, 
- specific sources of risk associated with technical facilities are not the same at all 
levels of the technical facility. 
In practice, it is necessary to work with risks at the lowest level (simple technical equip-
ment - machines), as well as with risks at higher levels (components – e.g. pressure 
equipment; production lines, sets of production lines, whole technical facility) and at 
the highest level (technical facility and its surroundings). Safety at the highest level 
ensures the coexistence of the technical facility with the surroundings throughout the 
life cycle of the technical facility. 
In order to ensure the safety and development of people and other public assets, the 
objectives of dealing with risks at all levels are the same, a reliable or secure or safe 
entity. Because of the current goals of human society, which have been emphasized 
several times, we continue to focus on the ultimate goal, which is safe entities. 
At selection of risk management tools for technical equipment and technical facilities 
aimed to safety, they are according to arguments in [13-15] two factors important two 
factors: 
1. The first factor is the recognition that risk is a site-specific quantity, i.e. it depends 
on both, the cause of the damage to the asset or pool of assets (i.e. the nature and 
size of the harmful phenomenon) and the characteristics of the asset or pool of 
assets (vulnerability) at the time of the disaster origin. E.g. an unmaintained relief 
valve normally does not perform its function at the pressure surge limit. Because 
over time there are variables, both the asset or pool of assets and the sizes of 
harmful phenomena or disasters, there are three categories of situations in terms 
of coping with the impacts of the realized risk, namely: 
- normal, 
- emergency, 
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- critical. 
With the growing category, the professional, financial, organizational and personnel 
requirements for managing and settling the risks associated with these situations 
are increasing. Therefore, legislation that imposes requirements on owners and 
operators of technical facilities on risk management and public administration re-
quirements for safety oversight in the public interest plays an important role here 
[12-15]. Based on analyses of legislation [13-15], current legislation is too general; 
it does not mention data requirements and data processing methods that funda-
mentally determine the quality of the result.  
2. The second factor is the choice of the type of risk to be monitored in the task to be 
performed, which depends on the determination of: 
- the number of assets and their listing, i.e., it goes on considering which public 
assets and which specific assets of a technical facility in a given task are im-
portant; e.g. whether they are performance, competitiveness, profit, etc., 
- whether links and flows between listed assets play a role in the task, i.e. a me-
chanical concept is not enough, but a system concept needs to be considered. 
In order to ensure the safety of the entity in the short term (e.g. safe condition of simple 
technical equipment), it is sufficient to monitor the condition of the asset, i.e. the partial 
risk associated with the entity. With regard to human safety, legislation in developed 
countries also requires the monitoring of occupational safety and health (OSH), i.e. the 
monitoring of two assets (life and health of persons in the workplace, quality of the 
working environment), using the integrated risk (i.e. it is neglected machine - human 
binding). 
As technical equipment, people in the workplace and the working environment are in-
terconnected, the links and flows between these subsystems, i.e. integral risk, need to 
be monitored in the medium and long-term to ensure safety. 
Therefore, when selecting the risk management tools (identification, analysis, evalua-
tion, judgement, management and settlement) aimed at the safety of the selected en-
tity, the following tasks in the technical field for technical facilities should be distin-
guished: 
- selection of tools for work with the risk associated with the condition of technical 
equipment (objective - safe technical equipment), 
- selection of tools for working with the risk associated with the condition of the tech-
nical component (objective - safe technical component), 
- selection of tools for working with the risk associated with the production line / pro-
duction process (objective - safe production process), 
- selection of tools for working with the risk associated with the condition of the busi-
ness process set (objective - safe business process set), 
- selection of tools for working with the risk associated with the whole technical facility 
(objective - safe technical facility), 
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- selection of tools for working with the risk associated with the technical facility and 
its surroundings (objective - safe technical facility and safe neighbourhood of the 
technical facility). 
Based on the work [13-15,30], focusing on technical facilities, it is not enough to ensure 
the safety of the human system in connection with technical facilities and technologies 
(i.e. coexistence of a technical facility with its surroundings during operation) and their 
equipment, because the choice of risk management tools depends on: 
- the nature of the entity of interest (i.e. selected technical equipment or higher sys-
tems of technical facility), 
- the nature of the environment in which the entity of interest (i.e. selected technical 
equipment or higher systems of technical facility) operates, 
- the mode in which the entity of interest (i.e. selected technical equipment or higher 
system of technical facility) operates, 
- requirements for the operation of the entity (i.e. selected technical equipment or 
higher systems of technical facility), 
- and whether a short, medium or strategic solution is required, i.e. long-term. 
By nature, [15,16,30] are risk-based tools based on four models according to the type 
of process they follow; it's about: 
- problems that can be described by a linear model [30]; e.g.: Check list; Safety audit; 
Human Reliability Analysis - HRA; there is a need to be aware of the limited accu-
racy of the results, as only one process is monitored and the links to other pro-
cesses and the environment are neglected, 
- problems that can be described by the tree models [30]; e.g.: Preliminary Hazard 
Analysis - PHA; Quantitative Risk Analysis - QRA; Hazard Operation Process - 
Hazard Analysis (HAZOP); Event Tree Analysis - ETA; Failure Mode and Effect 
Analysis - FMEA; FMECA - Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis; Fault Tree 
Analysis - FTA; Probabilistic Safety Assessment - PSA; it should be noted here that 
the development of accidents, accidents and failures comes from a single site, i.e. 
models do not describe cases where impacts on a technical facility occur from one 
cause at several locations, i.e. combinations of harmful phenomena are not con-
sidered, 
- problems that can be described by operational analysis models [30]; e.g.: critical 
path method; PERT; GERT; Petri nets, the last three of which are now elaborated 
to form “colour stochastic models”, which simulate a large number of possible sce-
narios that are created and assessed by experts on the basis of their experience 
and data presented in experience databases, the last years of the last century spe-
cifically built in developed countries, 
- non-structured problems, which can be described in several ways, such as [30]: 
What, If, Scenario, Case Study, Multi-criteria based on Decision Support System 
(DSS). In these cases, experience is based; a series of scenarios will be developed 
through collaboration with experts, and the optimum solution is sought using maxi-
mum utility theory [48]. 
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The experiences [15,30,43,49]  show that tree models have not the capability to assess 
the size of technical facility integral risk because they come out from one point in tech-
nical facility. I.e., they do not express impacts of external disasters, external terrorist 
attacks and human factor that usually in one stroke affect many points.     
For many of the above methods, software that has been derived for a particular device 
at a particular location is available. In order to ensure correct results in this case, it is 
necessary to verify, before using each software, whether the conditions of the technol-
ogy transfer are met, i.e. whether the conditions for the solution and the solution are 
the same as for the equipment and the place for which the software was derived [30]. 
Based on the data and results of the research presented in [12-16,30] and the authors' 
experience in practice, Table 4 is compiled, listing the individual tasks recommended 
tools, characterized in the work [30]. According to the complexity of the entity, there 
are three objectives of risk management, namely: 
- operation safety, 
- process safety (component operation, production line) "process safety", 
- integral safety. 
Since the higher the tool type, the higher the cost (knowledge, finance, time) for its 
use, the table shows in each case only the lowest cost tools that, based on current 
knowledge and experience, have the ability to solve the task if the basic rules of safety 
culture, operating rules corresponding to the conditions of operation are observed; that 
is, no intention to damage the entity is considered. 
 
Table 4. Tools for working with risks sorted by the objective of the task addressed*). 
 
Objective of work with risks  Tool The subject of the ob-
servation  
Functional individual technical 
equipment / fittings (e.g. ma-
chine) 
Checklist / Safety  
Audit /  What, If 
  
One asset 
  
Secure individual technical 
equipment (the machine is 
functional and the operator se-
curity is ensured) 
Checklist / Safety Audit 
/ What, If 
 
Two assets – because 
conflicts may occur, a 
rule is required for ag-
gregation 
Safe individual technical equip-
ment (the machine does not 
endanger itself even under crit-
ical conditions and does not 
have harmful impacts on the 
surroundings), i.e. its opera-
tors´ security is ensured  and 
the products are safe 
DSS Several interconnected 
assets – because con-
flicts may occur, the the-
ory of maximum utility is 
most often used [48] 
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Functional technical compo-
nent (several interconnected 
technical fittings) 
Checklist / Safety 
 Audit /, What, If / Tree 
models 
 
Several interconnected 
technical and other as-
sets – because conflicts 
may occur, a rule is re-
quired for aggregation 
or use theory of maxi-
mum utility [48]  
Secure technical component 
(several interconnected tech-
nical fittings are is functional 
and the operator security is en-
sured)  
Checklist / Safety 
 Audit /, What If / Tree 
models / operation 
analysis methods / 
DSS 
 
Several interconnected 
technical and other as-
sets – because conflicts 
may occur, a rule is re-
quired for aggregation 
or use theory of maxi-
mum utility [48]  
Safe technical component 
(several interconnected tech-
nical fittings do not endanger 
themselves even under critical 
conditions and do not have 
harmful impacts on the sur-
roundings), i.e. its operators 
´security is ensured  and the 
products are safe 
What, If / Tree models 
/ operation analysis 
methods / DSS 
 
Several interconnected 
technical and other as-
sets and surroundings - 
because conflicts may 
occur, a rule is required 
for aggregation or use 
theory of maximum util-
ity [48]   
Functionality of production pro-
cess (production line) 
Checklist / Safety 
 Audit /, What If / Tree 
models  
Several interconnected 
technical and other as-
sets – because conflicts 
may occur, a rule is re-
quired for aggregation 
Secure production process 
(production line is functional 
and the operator security is en-
sured) 
What, If / Tree models 
/ operation analysis 
methods / DSS 
 
Several interconnected 
technical and other as-
sets and surroundings – 
because conflicts may 
occur, a rule is required 
for aggregation or use 
of theory of maximum 
utility [48]  
Safe production process / pro-
duction line does not endanger 
itself even under critical condi-
tions and does not have harm-
ful impacts on the 
What, If / operation 
analysis methods / 
DSS 
 
Several interconnected 
technical and other as-
sets and surroundings - 
because conflicts may 
occur, a rule is required 
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surroundings), i.e. its opera-
tors´ security is ensured and 
products are safe 
for aggregation or use 
of theory of maximum 
utility [48]   
Functionality of a set of pro-
cesses in the enterprise 
What, If / operation 
analysis methods / 
DSS 
 
Several interconnected 
technical and other as-
sets and surroundings - 
because conflicts may 
occur, a rule is required 
for aggregation or use 
of theory of maximum 
utility [48]  
Secure set of processes in the 
enterprise (set  of processes is 
functional and operators secu-
rity is ensured) 
What, If / stochastic 
operation analysis 
methods / DSS 
 
Several interconnected 
technical and other as-
sets and surroundings - 
because conflicts may 
occur, it is required use 
of theory of maximum 
utility [48]   
Safe set of processes in the 
enterprise (set of processes 
does not endanger itself even 
under critical conditions and 
does not have harmful impacts 
on the surroundings), i.e. its 
operators’ security is ensured 
and products are safe  
DSS Several interconnected 
technical and other as-
sets and surroundings -  
because conflicts may 
occur, it is required use 
of theory of maximum 
utility [48]   
Functional technical facility DSS Several interconnected 
technical and other as-
sets and surroundings - 
because conflicts may 
occur, it is required use 
of theory of maximum 
utility [48]   
Secure technical facility (tech-
nical facility is secured and 
functional and operators  secu-
rity is ensured)  
DSS Several interconnected 
technical and other as-
sets and surroundings - 
because conflicts may 
occur, it is required use 
of theory of maximum 
utility [48]   
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Safe technical facility (tech-
nical facility does not endanger 
itself even under critical condi-
tions and does not have harm-
ful impacts on the surround-
ings), i.e. its operators´ secu-
rity is ensured and products 
are safe 
DSS Several interconnected 
technical and other as-
sets and surroundings - 
because conflicts may 
occur, it is required use 
of theory of maximum 
utility [48]   
*) In this context, it needs to be aware – functionality  means reliable performance of tasks; safe means 
secure, reliable and functional.  
 
Table 5 shows the example of DSS for judgement of safety level of technical facility 
verified in practice.  At safety audit, the answer to each question was separately for-
mulated by 5 evaluators (technical director, security expert of technical facility, security 
expert of local public administration, security expert of regional public administration, 
author) according to documentation of technical facility. The final evaluation of each 
question was made as median from partial evaluations. In case of significant doubts at 
certain real question judgement, the note was given in special column of check list; 
and final results in these cases were finally obtained by panel discussion of experts. 
The final level of safety is determined by Table 6 in the harmony with the maximum 
utility theory [48].  
 
Table 5. Check list for judgement of technical facility safety according to judgement of 
work with risks. 
 
Question Answer Note 
yes no  
Are in technical facility documentation distinguished the terms 
danger, hazard and risk? 
   
Is technical facility documentation  based on context that consid-
ers only the technical facility assets? 
   
Is technical facility documentation based on context that consid-
ers technical facility assets and selected public assets (em-
ployee, contractors, visitors, humans in work vicinity, working 
setting and environment))?  
   
Is technical facility documentation based on context that con-
sider technical facility assets and all public assets? 
   
Are only considered risk sources that are determined by expert 
experience? 
   
Are only considered only risk sources that are determined by 
legislative and expert experience? 
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Are only considered risk sources that are connected with tech-
nical facility alone? 
   
Are considered risk sources that are connected with  technical 
facility alone and human factor connected with badly performed 
working operation? 
   
Are considered risk sources that are connected with  technical 
facility alone and human factor in the broadest concept? 
   
Are considered risk sources that are connected with  technical 
facility alone, human factor in the broadest concept, workers 
health jeopardy and threatening the working environment? 
   
Are considered risk sources that are connected with  technical 
facility alone, human factor in the broadest concept,  workers 
health jeopardy, threatening the working environment and envi-
ronment outside the technical facility? 
   
Are considered risk sources that are connected with  technical 
facility alone, human factor in the broadest concept, workers 
health jeopardy and threatening the working environment in sys-
tem context, i.e. also risk sources connected with linkages and 
flows in technical facility? 
   
Are considered risk sources according to All-Hazard-Approach?     
Are only considered partial risks?     
Are considered partial risk and integrated risk?     
Are considered partial risks, integrated risk and integral risk?    
Are risks in technical facility systematically followed?    
Are risks in technical facility systematically followed only after 
technical work building? 
   
Are risks in technical facility systematically followed for its whole 
life cycle, i.e. from its design? 
   
Are risks in technical facility systematically followed for its whole 
life cycle, i.e. from its design  and in its design and operation 
used the Defence-In-Depth approach? 
   
Is at work with risks in technical facility systematically used the 
process model of work with risks? 
   
Is at work with risks in technical facility systematically used the 
process model of work with risks that possesses clearly deter-
mined criterions for risks acceptance? 
   
Is at work with risks in technical facility systematically used the 
process model of work with risks that possesses clearly deter-
mined criterions for risks acceptance, which respect public inter-
est (i.e. they have social dimension)? 
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Is at work with risks in technical facility systematically used the 
process model of work with risks that possesses clearly deter-
mined criterions for risks acceptance  and aims of risk manage-
ment? 
   
Is at work with risks in technical facility systematically used the 
process model of work with risks that possesses clearly deter-
mined criterions for risks acceptance  with regard to public inter-
est? 
   
Is at work with risks in technical facility systematically used the 
process model of work with risks that possesses clearly deter-
mined criterions for risks acceptance  with regard to public inter-
est  and corrected measures in monitoring for the case that risk 
will happen unacceptable? 
   
Is at work with risks in technical facility systematically deter-
mined and followed the set of priority risks? 
   
Does technical facility risk management technique ensure in 
each phase of work with risks the review of profits and costs 
connected with measures for risks mastering, so economical 
handling with forces, sources and means might be ensured in 
technical facility?  
   
Does technical facility risk management technique ensure in 
each phase of work with risks the review of profits and costs 
connected with measures for risks mastering, so economical 
handling with forces, sources and means might be ensured in 
technical facility and in public administration? 
   
Are in technical facility systematically performed the preventive 
measures for reduction or avert of some risks?  
   
Are in technical facility systematically performed the preventive 
measures for reduction or avert of all priority risks?  
   
Are in technical facility systematically performed the preventive 
measures for reduction or avert of all risks that have potential to 
cause important losses to technical facility?  
   
Are in technical facility systematically performed the preventive 
measures for reduction or avert of all risks that have potential to 
cause important losses to technical facility  and unacceptable im-
pacts on surrounding environment? 
   
Are in technical facility systematically performed preventive 
measures for reduction or avert of all risks and prepared the miti-
gating measures for reduction of some highest risk impacts?  
   
Are in technical facility systematically performed preventive 
measures for reduction or avert of all risks and prepared the miti-
gating measures for reduction of  all priority risks impacts? 
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Are in technical facility systematically performed preventive 
measures for reduction or avert of all risks and prepared the miti-
gating measures for reduction of  all risks impacts that can cause 
the significant losses to technical facility? 
   
Are in technical facility systematically performed preventive 
measures for reduction or avert of all risks and prepared the miti-
gating measures for reduction of  all risks impacts that can cause 
the significant losses to technical facility and unacceptable con-
sequences for surrounding environment? 
   
Is technical facility insured against risks?    
Does technical facility possess the finance, material, technical, 
personal and organisational for response to important risk?  
   
Does technical facility possess the finance, material, technical, 
personal and organisational for renovation after important risk re-
alisation? 
   
Does technical facility possess the finance, material, technical, 
personal and organisational for response and renovation after 
extreme unexpected realisation? 
   
Are at work with risks in technical facility only considered the re-
sults of preliminary risk analyses? 
   
Are at work with risks in technical facility preferred the results of 
standard, fast and low precise risk analyses before results of 
preliminary risk analyses? 
   
Are at work with risks in technical facility preferred the results of 
detailed risk analyses in synoptic concept before the results of 
preliminary risk analyses  and standard, fast and low precise risk 
analyses? 
   
Are at work with risks in technical facility preferred the results of 
individual and specific risk analyses before the results of detailed 
risk analyses in synoptic concept, preliminary risk analyses  and 
standard, fast and low precise risk analyses? 
   
Are at work with risks in technical facility determined the criteri-
ons for assessment? 
   
Are at work with risks in technical facility determined the criteri-
ons for assessment technical and economical? 
   
Are at work with risks in technical facility determined the criteri-
ons for assessment technical and economical, external and in-
ternal? 
   
Are at work with risks in technical facility determined the criteri-
ons for assessment technical and economical, external and in-
ternal and socially political? 
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Are at work with risks in technical facility determined the require-
ments for ensuring the safety? 
   
Are at work with risks in technical facility determined the require-
ments, standards and norms for ensuring the safety? 
   
Are at work with risks in technical facility determined the require-
ments, standards and norms for ensuring the safety and partial 
aims? 
   
Are at work with risks in technical facility determined the require-
ments, standards and norms for ensuring the safety, partial aims 
and methods and procedures? 
   
Are at work with risks in technical facility determined the require-
ments, standards and norms for ensuring the safety, partial 
aims, methods and procedures, and also limits and conditions? 
   
Are at work with risks in technical facility determined the require-
ments, standards and norms for ensuring the safety, partial 
aims, methods and procedures, limits and conditions and also 
the authorizations of persons or institutions? 
   
Does the technical facility administrator hold the safety manage-
ment system that is compiled on the principles of process man-
agement and systemic work with risks?   
   
Does the technical facility administrator hold the safety manage-
ment system (SMS) that  contain the organizational structure, re-
sponsibilities, practices, rules, procedures and sources for deter-
mination and enforce of disaster prevention or at least for miti-
gating the unacceptable disasters impacts in technical work and 
its surrounding? 
   
Does the technical facility administrator hold the safety manage-
ment system (SMS) that  contain management of six processes: 
concept and management; administrative procedures; technical 
matters; off-site co-operation; emergency preparedness; and 
documentation and accident investigation? 
   
Does the technical facility administrator hold the SMS that con-
tains the concept and management process with sub-processes 
for: overall concept; reaching the safety partial aims; safety gov-
ernance; alone safety management system; personnel – human 
sources management, education and training, internal communi-
cation, working environment; audit and assessment of perfor-
mance of safety aims? 
   
Does the technical facility administrator hold the SMS that con-
tains the administrative procedures process with sub-processes 
for: hazard identification from possible disasters and correspond-
ing risk assessment; documentation of procedures (including the 
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work permits); changes management; safety connecter with con-
tractors; surveillance under products safety? 
Does the technical facility administrator hold the SMS that con-
tains the technical matters process with sub-processes for: re-
search and development; design and montage; inherently safer 
processes; technical standards; storage of hazardous sub-
stances; and integrity maintenance and maintenance of equip-
ment and buildings? 
   
Does the technical facility administrator hold the SMS that con-
tains the off-site co-operation process with  sub-processes for: 
co-operation with public administration; co-operation with public 
and other involved (including the academic institutions); and co-
operation with other enterprises? 
   
Does the technical facility administrator hold the SMS that con-
tains the emergency preparedness process  with sub-processes 
for: on-site planning; facilitation of off-site planning (for which the 
public administration is responsible); and co-ordination  of activi-
ties of resort organisations at ensuring the emergency preparing 
and the response? 
   
Does the technical facility administrator hold the SMS that con-
tains the documentation and accident investigation process with 
sub-processes for: processing the reports on disasters, acci-
dents, near misses and other instructive experiences; investiga-
tion of damages, losses and harms and their causes; and re-
sponse and  consequential activities after disasters (including 
the application of lessons and information sharing)? 
   
Does the SMS technical facility administrator contain the pro-
gram for safety improvement in which there are given: roles of 
stakeholders; rules for safety culture improvement (golden 
rules); and relevant responsibilities?  
   
Does the SMS technical facility administrator contain the pro-
gram for safety improvement in which there are given:  security 
plans (on strategic, tactical, functional a technical levels); on-site 
and off-site emergency plans; continuity plans; and crisis plans? 
   
Does the SMS technical facility administrator contain the pro-
gram for safety improvement in which there is given the risk 
management plan with clearly determined countermeasures and 
responsibilities? 
   
Does the SMS technical facility administrator contain the pro-
gram for safety improvement in which there is given the risk 
management plan with clearly determined countermeasures and 
responsibilities  that only contains the technical risks? 
   
Does the SMS technical facility administrator contain the pro-
gram for safety improvement in which there is given the risk 
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management plan with clearly determined countermeasures and 
responsibilities  that only contains the technical and organisa-
tional risks? 
Does the SMS technical facility administrator contain the pro-
gram for safety improvement in which there is given the risk 
management plan with clearly determined countermeasures and 
responsibilities  that  contains the technical, organisational and 
external  risks? 
   
Does the SMS technical facility administrator contain the pro-
gram for safety improvement in which there is given the risk 
management plan with clearly determined countermeasures and 
responsibilities  that  contains the technical, organisational, ex-
ternal and cyber  risks? 
   
Does the SMS technical facility administrator contain the quality 
monitoring integral risk and all-important partial risks and correc-
tive countermeasures for occurrence of unacceptable risks? 
   
TOTAL    
 
Table 6. Value sale for safety level determination. 
 
Safety level  Values v % Number of answers “YES” in Table 2 
Extreme high – 5 More than 95 % More than 68 
Very high – 4 70 - 95 % 51 - 68 
High – 3 45 - 70 % 33 - 50 
Medium – 2 25 – 45 % 19 - 32  
Low – 1 5 – 25 % 4 - 18  
Negligible – 0 Lower than 5 %  Lower than 4 
 
Based on experience, in the operational practice of technical facilities and their parts it 
is only applicable a tool, which is fast and not very demanding on knowledge and time. 
Therefore, the usefulness of risk management tools in the operation of technical facil-
ities was monitored based on 15,43. The result of this research shows that for: 
- a not-too-complex object, it is a proven tool, a site-specific checklist with a correctly 
calibrated risk assessment scale, 
- not very interconnected objects, it is a proven tool, a set of checklists that are site 
specific and have correctly calibrated risk scales, and the results of these checklists 
are aggregated in a specified and site-specific manner, 
- complex objects, it is a proven tool DSS that consider both, the  asset connectivity, 
the changes in time and external sources of risk.  
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6.2. Responsibilities  
 
On the basis of data on risk management and trade-off with risks, there were deter-
mined by critical analysis the errors in risk management in both, the technical facility 
and the public administration interface and in the technical facility management itself.  
Their judgement shows that the risk reduction rate is also the subject to territory top 
management responsibility and political decision-making, at which they are used, the 
current scientific and technical knowledge and considered the economic, social and 
other conditions [14,50].     
According to the TQM principles [34] and the experience of practice, it is needed in the 
context of problems solution in splitting the tasks and responsibilities to consider the 
possibilities that exist at different management levels. Options are given by both, the 
authority and the availability and the amount of available resources, forces and capa-
bilities that are needed for problems solution [13,14,50]. It holds:  
- at the technical facility operational management level, safety problems being well 
structured can be solved successfully, 
- at the technical facility middle management level, they can be successfully solved 
safety problems being structured and poorly structured ones that are not associated 
with major risks, 
- on the technical facility top management level, they can be successfully solved 
complex and unstructured safety problems that have risks that can be controlled 
using the tools, which are only available to top technical facility management, 
- complex and unstructured safety problems of the with great extent and huge risks 
can be solved only by mutual deep co-operation of the public administration and 
the technical facility top management.  
For solution of safety problems of the technical facility with transnational extent, the 
international cooperation is needed.  
To derive the technical facility risk management responsibilities, it is required so the 
technical facility needs to:  
- be safe throughout the lifetime, 
- fulfil the tasks in demanded quality during the lifetime, 
- could not endanger itself or its surroundings at its critical conditions.  
It means to apply the All-Hazard-Approach developed for Europe [19], the Defence-In-
Depth described for the technical facilities [13,14], and to have a program for the con-
tinuous improvement of safety and safety culture. 
In complex world, the technical facility management represents the hierarchical inter-
connected system. According to  [51], the  responsibility principle paid in Europe means 
that for risk management are responsible both,  the technical facility management and 
the public administration that gives permit and supervise the provision of public inter-
est.  
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Therefore, from the perspective of human security and development, it is important the 
technical facility risk management in two areas:  
- A - domain of territory administration and the technical facility management, 
- B - the technical facility real safety management.  
Based on critical analysis of the accidents and failures of the technical facility, there 
are given risk management responsibilities for the territory administration and the tech-
nical facility management in the number 40 for the levels: 
- A1 - Political (Parliament, Government, public administration) - a total of 4 requests, 
- A2 - Strategic (public administration, owner, investor, operator) - a total of 8 re-
quests, 
- A3 - Tactical (public administration, owner, investor, operator) - a total of 4 requests, 
- A4 - Operational / functional (local administration, operator) – a total of 5 requests, 
- A5 - Technical (operator) – a total of 19 requests.  
Real research results are in Table 7.  
 
Table 7. Responsibilities for risk management of technical facilities; A – levels of man-
agement. 
 
A Requirement 
A1 • to create conditions for the long-term stability of public space, which the 
technical facility need for quality operation, (it goes about all on ensuring 
the stable government, mitigating the corruption, prevention of formation 
of intolerant groups, mitigation of impacts of terrorism and national and 
transnational conflicts on the technical facility),  
• to promote the public interest and to respect the fact that the technical fa-
cility risks enter into the public area, i.e. it goes on the externalities that 
cannot be solved by market mechanisms (harmful impacts; by operation 
failure it is threatened a considerable part of the public; the political deci-
sion has the potential to trigger an event, in which the risk is realized; and 
adverse events, which are caused by unacceptable risks are distributed 
by the way that they do not take respect to the political fairness),  
• to respect that the frequent changes in legislation, taxes and the require-
ments to the technical facility operators may lead to technical facility 
lower quality of service, 
• to consider the views of specialists when deciding on the technical facility 
and not to prefer momentary political interests and actions of pressure 
groups. 
A2 • to respect the value and cultural context (comfort strategy of insurance 
and compensation is not fully reliable, because at the great risk realiza-
tion, it can happen hitting the social system, and therefore, it needs to be 
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promoted the precautionary principle and responsibility from all participat-
ing),  
• to prevent the use of incorrect technologies, the technical facility techno-
logical inadequacy and insufficient preparedness of the site for the tech-
nical facility operation (surveillance, supervision of the State),  
• to ensure that the liabilities associated with the technical facility may be 
fulfilled in good quality (surveillance, supervision of the State),  
• to ensure the technical facility staff training, mainly at the level of tech-
nical and technical-organizational; the relevant research, planning and 
legislation to support the technical facility operation, 
• to promote a proactive, systematic and strategic approach at working with 
the technical facility risks,  
• to pay attention to the technical facility goodwill at work with the risks,  
• to ensure that significant risk sources for the technical facility might not 
been underestimated, which are: uncertainty in the labour force (unsuita-
ble qualifications, lack of staff, the unreliability of the workers - fluctuation, 
strike, etc.); the uncertainty of the financial resources (insolvency of busi-
ness partners,  credit uncertainty, problems with insurance, etc.); acci-
dents and large faults on operating equipment; industrial accidents in 
other bodies; natural disasters; and political or economic instability in the 
region,  
• to ensure the capability of public administration and the technical facility 
management to handle the impacts of extreme disaster and to perform 
recovery of the technical facility and its vicinity. 
A3 • to ensure that at designing, building, construction and operation of the 
technical facility, all serious disasters that are possible in the technical fa-
cility site are considered and properly dealt with, 
• to ensure so that the technical facility design documentation is correct 
and errors-free; the technical facility building and construction done ac-
cording to professional requirements, i.e. without errors, exceedance of 
construction costs and unnecessary environmental pollution at the site, 
• to ensure that the technical facility is safe under the conditions normal, 
abnormal and critical (monitoring and supervision of the State),  
• to ensure the cooperation with the local population and local security 
forces for case of accident or failure of the technical facility (to build or-
ganizational resilience.  
A4 • to ensure a proper settlement of all risks, in particular market risks, such 
as the reduction of demand for the product, changes in the exchange 
rate; inflation, deflation and changing the interest rates,  
• to ensure the technical facility high-quality operation from the perspective 
of ensuring the material inputs and qualified personnel,  
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• to create inside the technical facility, the safety culture based on mutual 
cooperation, i.e. to have the tools to control conflicts among employees,  
• to provide resources and protective equipment for employees and the lo-
cal population, including the information fittings and documents (for case 
of accident occurrence),  
• to ensure the appropriate training and education of employees, and the 
local contractors and local population. 
A5 • to improve permanently the risk understanding, risk management and 
trade-off with risks,  
• to implement the risk sources continuous monitoring,  
• to consider the risks of organizational accidents,  
• to consider the risks associated with the technical facility complexity (be-
cause the complexity not only creates new dangers, but makes them 
even worse identified; new hazards are e.g.: increasing the automation, 
the growth of production capacity, the large pace of technological 
change),  
• to count with the appearance of atypical accidents, the causes of which 
are unexpected combination of events, and for this case to have a high-
quality response plans for multiple scenarios of accidents and also for 
special accident caused by a combination of a series of unacceptable 
phenomena,  
• to admit that the safety systems and safety related systems may fail, 
• to process a response plan to extreme phenomena,  
• to train responses to situations created by extreme phenomena,  
• to have prepared place for response management in the case of great ac-
cident and technical equipment for clearing debris, 
• to ensure that the professional top management is constantly interested 
in the development of knowledge and evaluated the experiences from the 
technical facility operation, because there is no previous experience, 
which   could  be used to overcome new dangers and the relevant laws 
and standards for many of the new engineering and technology sector 
are not yet developed,  
• to ensure performance of all tasks associated with the real technical facil-
ity operation, 
• to ensure the implementation of all tasks of the State (the products in the 
required quality, services, accessibility),  
• in the technical facility managing to be based on the qualified professional 
criteria for risk assessment (established according to: the nature and kind 
of consequences that may occur during the realization of risks including 
their measurement; the  way of risks occurrences setting; the time frame 
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of the consequences and the risk probability occurrence; the way of de-
termination of risk level, i.e. the level below which the risk is acceptable or 
tolerable, and  the level of risk, from which it is necessary to ensure a tar-
geted response; and the possibility of combining multiple risks), 
• to ensure the professional performance of actions, qualified maintenance, 
skilled repairs, timely modernizations; and timely adaptation to changing 
conditions (to have a qualified professional management and a highly ef-
fective professional inspection, including motivational resources to target 
employees on the safe implementation of the activities and cooperation), 
• to ensure the protection and the necessary training the critical employ-
ees, i.e. also the protective equipment and utilities and other necessary 
formalities, including the appropriate resources and protected space for 
hide of employees,  
• to ensure the technical facility high-quality operating rules for normal, ab-
normal and critical conditions,  
• to ensure high-quality monitoring and timely response to operational devi-
ations, failures, near accidents and accidents (to ensure that in due time 
there are accepted necessary measures, especially in sites where it is ac-
cumulation of a large amount of failures and near accidents),  
• to provide the making up the basic plans: technical facility safety manage-
ment plan, which  will provide safety during the life cycle; the risk man-
agement plan, in which the clear responsibility for the individual measures 
and individual activities are given; in-site emergency plan (in which the 
clear responsibilities for the individual measures and individual activities 
are given); business continuity plan (to overcome the highly critical to the 
extreme conditions in which they will be clear responsibilities for each of 
the measures and activities for the conservation and survival of the tech-
nical facility; the external emergency plan and crisis plan (in which the 
clearly defined cooperation and accountability of the technical facility 
components and their security forces, the public security forces, and pub-
lic administration), 
• to ensure permanent consideration of new knowledge and lessons 
learned from the near accidents and their implementation into practice in 
a form suitable for the technical facility. 
 
Based on critical analysis of the accidents and failures of the technical facility, therein-
after, there are given risk management responsibilities for real technical facility man-
agement in the number 66 for the domains:  
- B1 - concept and way of real technical facility management - 21 requests, 
- B2 - requirements for data, methods, and techniques that ensure the quality of de-
cision-making and management of technical facility - 9 requests, 
- B3 - procedures for the correct sitting, the quality of: technical facility design, build-
ing, construction and operation - 13 requests, 
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- B4 - provisions for technical facility business continuity and for support the basic 
functions of the State, i.e. public interest – 23 requests.  
In this case, it goes on the requirements for data, methods, and ways of solving prob-
lems in the areas of technical, methodological, organizational, staffing and financial; 
the complete results are at work [14] . These responsibilities strongly depend on the 
technical facility nature, size and used technologies and on the conditions in locality in 
which the technical facility is located. 
The keystones of good risk management on all organizational levels are knowledge 
and creating the permanent safety culture of all participants. It means that each human 
has responsibility for her personal behaviour and for actions in human society man-
agement in which   he / she is found. 
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7. CONCLUSION  
 
The above findings show that risk and risk sources connected with the technical facili-
ties change with time Because the human factor at decision-making is one of important 
risks´ source, it proposes two super processes for management of human activities. 
Their adherence reduces the origin the organizational accidents and it ensures the 
quality management and trade-off with risks. 
The research reveals a lot of deficiencies at risk management that are in practice, e.g.:  
- in many entities´ concepts, on which the risks or activities connected with manage-
ment or trade-off with risk, it is not considered the system nature, interconnections 
of individual systems, existence of some internal and external disasters and 
changes in time and space (usually only direct selected disaster impacts are con-
sidered). It proves series of famous failures of technological and social entities, e.g. 
recent finance crisis that affected the majority of world, 
- continually, the managers, technicians and scientists have great confidence in 
power of software that were really processed on theoretically well-founded models, 
but are not based on sufficient amount of real data describing the behaviour of 
followed entity during  the sufficient time interval length; i.e., the appurtenant soft-
ware can just contain the measures for adaptation of entity behaviour to changes 
in time and space, and therefore, the have not capability to avert or mitigate great 
disasters impacts  that are beyond their designs.  From the risk engineering 
knowledge, such entities need to have emergency plans, continuity plans and op-
erational crisis plans for protection of assets being in the entities´ vicinities,  
- for risk assessment there are often used indistinctly determined criteria and classi-
ficatory procedures from which the real size of losses and damages on public and 
private assets is not recognizable (on risks they often adjudicate administrative and 
politicians who have low knowledge on risks and their impacts, or they have not 
real responsibility), 
- at risk determination, it is often neglected the accent on use of relevant data and 
relevant methods; i.e. only exceptionally it is performed the judgement of represent-
ativeness and validity of data sets and sensibility of methods used for data pro-
cessing, which in practise is manifested by errors in both, the risk determination 
and the measures for risks suppress,  
- at ensuring the entity security and development, it is often considered to partial risks 
and exceptionally the integrated risks are considered. The integral (systemic) risks 
are considered only singularly.   
For improvement, it is necessary: 
- reconnaissance of important assets in real entity and its vicinity, the safety of which 
is the target, 
- determination of disasters that can have unacceptable impacts on the studied en-
tity, their possible scenarios at different conditions in and out of entity; it means to 
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consider the possible occurrence of several disasters mutually interconnected (am-
plification of impacts by bad maintenance, cascade effects), 
- determination of processes that have capability to cause to happen the worse sce-
narios; determination of their criticalities and occurrence probabilities, 
- evaluation of risks connected with processes with different scenarios, and mainly 
those that have capability to cause to happen the worse scenarios, 
- judgement of human capability at copping with risks, namely critical ones, accord-
ing to human possibilities and tools that are to disposal; the CBA is important tool, 
- to perform correct decision on measures for coping with risks that were selected as 
important, 
- to select the correct procedures suitable for given site  for measures application in 
this site at prevention, mitigation and response (none of measures is suitable for all 
sites 13,14),  
- to determine correct procedure of realisation of measures of all kinds – technical, 
organizational, finance, legal and human sources, 
- to ensure the prompt performance of measures, 
- to introduce the monitoring that will follow the effectiveness of accepted measures 
and ensure the prompt correction measures. 
From above concept it follows that the high-quality work with risks represents the pro-
cess which is challenging on knowledge, real data and time, and therefore, it requires 
the relevant interface of: 
- deep findings and experiences, 
- independent decision-making and management for public interest benefit,  
- quality implementation of measures, 
- support from all participants. 
In case of lack of time, detail data or professionals the method based on comparison 
of entity safety level with another paradigmatic entity is possible to use. Benchmark-
ing is the method of systematic comparison of processes, organizational structure, 
products and power of a given entity with other globally successful entities with aim to 
reach the excellency. It usually uses at risk management at cases if the goal is ideal 
and according to the good practice principles, it is suitable to manage the risks as the 
best operators in the given sector   carry out it.  
It is important continuously to consider that for whole human society welfare, the risks 
need to be managed in benefit of public interest, i.e. human security and development. 
From epoch of F. Taylor, the founder of scientific management and his successor H. 
Fayol 23,24, the basic functions of management are not changed; the management 
goes on to lead (executors of management are people) the controlled organization or 
organizational part to prosperity and efficiency, and some change in this direction has 
not been predicted.  
During the time, they have been changing the methods, the techniques and tools, how 
manage and lead, i.e. coordinate the human working activities so they may be 
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performed effectively and efficiently. The social, technical, economic and globalization 
changes are reflected into changes of management of businesses and regions.  This 
trend is permanent and it will also continue in the future. It induces the need of new 
development strategies based on smart technologies, new ways of work with risks, use 
of mutual active interactions among the research and business communities at crea-
tion and dissemination of knowledge. The successful development is more and more 
complex and depends on level of trade-off with risks in all entities.  
In all entities, it goes on achievement of conditions at which the entity has the capability 
to dampen famous and foreseeable internal and external disasters that can damage 
some entity elements (or whole entity). It mainly goes on preservation of entity struc-
ture, entity stability, entity reliability and entity behaviour that is in harmony with entity 
mission, i.e. strategic targeted direction. It goes on level of entity stability and on its 
primary and secondary adaptation. In harmony with this mission, it is possible the entity 
safety management to structure and to define as:    
- domain of management of relatively self-reliant (independent) activities with aim 
preventively to precede the risks or to minimize the risks consequences if risks re-
alize,  
- institutional set of subjects – actors ensuring the safety in regions, businesses that 
are from public administration and private entities,  
- use of methods, procedures, directions, standards, norms and tools of manage-
ment including the special methods and technologies for institutional (team) co-
operation of individual actors ensuring the entity safety,  
- systematic, functionally arranged, recurrent cycle of interconnected activities with 
the accent on permanent improvement of trade-off with risks which leads to entity 
safety upgrade.  
The human security and entity development depend on level on which we trade-off 
with risks in processes that are round us; if we are capable existing and foreseeable 
risks to identify, to analyse, to assess and to control, i.e. effectively manage.  The 
appurtenant sources – human, finance, information and time would be also the motive 
power of positive human society development. But they can be limited factor or even 
by destructive factor if they are missing. 
Generally, it is necessary to improve the safety culture and human learnedness on 
risks of citizens, administrators and politicians on all levels as the organizational acci-
dents problem 13-15 shows.   
From the viewpoint of responsibility for technical facility risk management and trade-
off with risks towards safety, two domains need to be followed.  The first domain covers 
the responsibilities in which the public administration responsibility scope is greater 
than technical facility management responsibility. Its research reveals 40 items. The 
other domain covers the responsibilities in which technical facility management deals 
with technical, economic, personal etc. items and public administration performs the  
surveillance from the public interest view. Its research reveals 66 items.   
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ANNEX 1 - DETERMINATION OF SIZE OF MAXIMUM EXPECTED DISASTERS 
FOR ENSURING THE TECHNICAL FACILITY SAFETY 
 
The task dealing with determination of maximum possible or maximum expected dis-
aster for solution of problems in real practice, in detail described in works 1-5 is of 
principal importance for both, the safety management and the insurance domain. 
Therefore, the attention has been paid to this domain for a long time.  
The methodology development in time progressed conformable with the knowledge 
development, roughly by the following way: 
- maximum expected disaster size = size of maximum observed disaster in historical 
period,  
- maximum expected disaster size = size of maximum observed disaster in historical 
time + certain correction on the indeterminateness (random and knowledge uncer-
tainties) or on the reality that extreme disaster has not had to occur yet. The cor-
rection always depended on experience and knowledge of assessor, 
- maximum expected disaster size = disaster size that corresponds to intersection of 
graph showing the disaster frequency occurrence with the disaster size axe.  Chal-
lenges to this method mainly consisted in reality that results of such assessments 
might be distinctly physically impossible in some cases, 
- maximum expected disaster size = result of methods for extreme value determina-
tion 1-5.  
Extreme value determination is widely used in many disciplines, such as earth sci-
ences, structural engineering, finance, traffic prediction, geological engineering and 
biological sciences. Applications of method for extreme value determination usually go 
from the Gumbel distribution 6 that is a particular case of generalized extreme value 
distribution.  
The applications for earthquakes and other disasters for needs of terms of references 
for nuclear power plant site locations authors started in 80s of last century and step by 
step they were spread for building the other complex technological complexes; the real 
values are in the safety documentation of these complexes. In practice connected with 
complex technological facilities 1,2, it was successfully tested the following relations: 
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in which: Rt =(I0  I0i)  is the probability that the size of disaster I0  does not exceed the 
size I0i in the time interval t; Pt (I0  I0i) is the probability that the size of disaster  I0  
exceeds  the value I0i ; P is defined by the equation (2); T is the disaster observation 
time interval; n is the observed disaster number; I0min is the minimum disaster size 
(from which the catalogue is homogeneous; it represents the data set homogeneity 
limit); and I0max is the maximum disaster size in the given region.  
It means that the relations hold for intensities from interval   I0min   I0    I0max. Parameter 
β is determined using the numerical parameter bc from the cumulative frequency equa-
tion    
 
log Nc = ac – bc Io ,                                                                                                       (3) 
 
in which Nc is the cumulative frequency of disasters,   I0 is the disaster size,  ac and bc 
are numerical parameters calculated for intensity interval I0min   I0i    I0max. It holds β = 
bc ln 10. The mean value of return period η for the disaster with the intensity of I0   is 
equal to time t for which it holds the relation Rη = 0.633(expressing the probable mean 
value of normal distribution). 
The impacts of disaster on the territory and on the complex technological facility depend on 
the type of disaster and on the vulnerability of given assets; real data are shown e.g. in 
quoted works of authors. 
From the safety reasons we in practice use the conservative deterministic approach 
for all disasters because the theory of extreme values is based on the following as-
sumptions:  
- the conditions that prevailed in the past, need also to apply in the future, 
- the largest observed phenomena in a given time interval are independent,  
- the largest phenomena size in a given interval will be the same in the future as in 
the past. 
It is necessary to note that these assumptions are not in reality fully veridical 1,2,7-9, 
which influences the results of predictions of large (extreme) disasters.   
In practice, according to the theory of extreme values   there are determined two quan-
tities the return period and the annual probability of non-exceedance by which the dis-
aster hazard is determined.  
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ANNEX 2 - METHODS USED IN SAFETY ENGINEERING 
 
1. Introduction 
High-powered tool represented by engineering of the safety called “safety engineering” 
does not only deal with technical problems but it respects public assets in the system 
vicinity, is a branch applying the methods, tools and techniques and it is based on 
engineering and managing approaches by way in order that the system might be safe 
for all public assets during the whole its life cycle [1]. The ensuring of such compre-
hended safety management is particularly marked from the risk management viewpoint 
by these characters: sitting – designing – construction – project with risk reduction; 
operation with integration of early warning systems and of procedures for management 
of acceptable level of risks; and defeating the abnormal, emergency and critical condi-
tions at operation and at putting out of operation [1,2]. However, the safety engineering 
conception was just expressed by technical terms, it holds at other domains that are 
important for safe human system with sustainable development; only there is neces-
sary to use suitable transformation of terms in order that it might be comprehensible 
for specialists of partial disciplines that are only adapted to actual terminology  [3,4]. 
The safety engineering is systematic use of engineering knowledge and experiences 
for optimising the protection of human lives, environment, property and economic af-
fairs. From the professional view it goes on process seeking all potential conditions 
that could threaten favourable operation of a given system in all stages of its life cycle, 
and identifying the capabilities for their defeating by prevention, preparedness, re-
sponse and renovation. It uses tools, methods and techniques that indicate how we 
could:  
- texturing the problem, 
- determine what we ought to solve, 
- collect and create data sets so they might have a clear evidence to a given problem, 
- select method for data processing so outputs might be relevant to a given problem, 
- interpret the outputs in given conditions.   
Therefore, it uses a family of exact methods, tools and techniques and present work 
contains the survey of their fine members. 
From above given facts it follows that safety engineering is the branch that solves 
problems, i.e. it uses the methods, tools and techniques that indicate how to: texturing 
the problem; determine what might be solved; collect and create data set in order that 
it might give evidence to a given problem; select method for data processing in order 
that outputs might be relevant to a given problem solution aim; and how to interpret 
outputs of data processing from the view of human system safety that includes func-
tionality and reliability of a given system. 
From the given facts it follows that at selection of the methods, tools and techniques 
we need  to respect that safety engineering is multi-branch and cross-section discipline 
that uses both, the general and specific methods, tools and techniques. The specific 
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ones are either simple or complex [5-7]. The complex ones represent use of several 
general or simple methods, tools and techniques. Individual methods, tools and tech-
niques respect reality that aimed complex safety management of each system cannot 
be only reached by technical or knowledge items but by combination of possible and 
accessible branch tools of human activity, i.e. they must be used the methods, tools 
and techniques logic, technical, finance, managerial and arbitrary because integral part 
of safety engineering is decision-making on technical problems, human factor, costs 
and on time schedule etc. It means that for solution of present tasks of safety engi-
neering that requires non-trivial problem solving to use the multi criteria methods, tools 
and techniques [6] in which we must respect that assets and risk source have different 
natures that are roots of criteria incommensurability and at their selection we must 
respect data quality, structure of solved problem and requirements on output quality; 
and specially verify both, the data quality (correctness, completeness, testified capa-
bility to problem) and also the expert competences (IAEA, OECD, USA, WB etc. have  
strict criteria for expert qualification verification). 
According to way of data acquisition we separate the safety engineering methods, tools 
and techniques: 
1. Empirical (based on experience). The survey of facts is made by inquiries and 
questionnaires. These are used at data collection on human behaviour and human 
society behaviour in sociology but also at acquisition of impact distribution in the 
case of earthquake, wind storm or other disasters in territory. In exact sciences 
there are used for their rapidity and modesty. Accuracy of such data is lower than 
those obtained by instrumental measurement but qualified statistical processing 
gives good and reliable information for decision-making and management. 
2. Theoretical.  They create findings, hypotheses, theoretical constructions on the 
basis of general science procedures, i.e. they are based on use of algorithms that 
lead to solving all tasks of a given type.  
3. Expert.  They use professional (professionals) for activity that requires special 
knowledge. They are used in many situations the common feature of which is ne-
cessity of professional (expert) judgement of problem and of its further development 
in future. They are also used if there is necessary to eliminate local view on a given 
problem and to judge it independently in new, broader or more specialised frame. 
According to ways of knowledge acquisition we separate the safety engineering meth-
ods to:  
- procedures for acquisition of fundamental (usually individual) knowledge – 
as discovery of properties and behaviour of a given substance, behaviour of nano-
materials under different physical and chemical conditions etc., 
- procedures for solution of simple practical tasks – as allocation and application 
of fundamental knowledge in practice, e.g. typical earthquake impact scenario for 
earthquakes from one focal region in a given region; way of response to chlorine 
release from a given building etc. In this case we need also to solve at data acqui-
sition whether we are dependent or independent on phenomena recurrence (e.g. 
measurement of natural events is non-reproducible) and how inaccuracies in fact 
acquisition may influence uncertainties and vagueness in data and by that also in 
knowledge, 
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- and procedures for solution of tasks of strategic nature – as discovery of basic 
knowledge for support of capability to solve effectively present and future problems 
of a given object, e.g. connected with security and sustainable development of hu-
man system, with human society development in a given region. In this case we 
must solve how at data acquisition we are dependent on fact whether followed pro-
cesses are or are not stable in space and time (e.g. processes of occurrence of 
floods, earthquakes etc.  are not stable in time – extreme phenomena occur rarely 
and irregularly in time and space) and how inaccuracies in data acquisitions might 
influence uncertainties and vagueness in data and by that also in knowledge, and 
what follows from it for prediction and consecutively for management; i.e. it goes 
on qualified selection of optimum variant from a set of variants offering different 
combinations of followed parameters for problem solving. 
 
2. Results of research of methods of risk engineering 
Outputs of research of selected methods from the viewpoint of their application in do-
main of safety and security [8] is in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Way of use of engineering methods, tools and techniques and their shortages. 
  
Method, 
tool, tech-
nique 
Way of use, principals for use, shortages at use Evi-
dence / 
proof 
Case study Solution of non-structure problems - critical items are 
knowledge of experts on problem and its context. 
In management and engineering the safety and security 
the case study was verified by real data for use in fol-
lowing tasks: problem structure and problem context 
identification; forecast of scenarios / variants / alterna-
tives; and selection of acceptable variant from the ex-
perience viewpoint. 
[9-11] 
SWOT analy-
sis 
Solution of non-structure problems -  critical items are 
knowledge of experts on problem and its context. 
In management and engineering the safety and security 
the SWOT analysis  was verified by real data for use in 
following tasks: understanding the problem; under-
standing the problem context; understanding the prob-
lem structure; as the source material for formation of 
variants of future development and for selection of opti-
mum variant for problem solution. 
[9-11] 
DELPHI 
method 
Solution of non-structure problems - critical items are 
knowledge of experts on problem and its context. 
[9-111] 
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In management and engineering the safety and security 
the DELPHI method was verified by real data for use in 
following tasks: understanding the problem; determin-
ing the problem context; determining the problem struc-
ture; determining the basis parameters of problem – 
e.g. occurrence probability of some phenomena; deter-
mining the process variants connected with the process 
manifestation; determining the occurrence probability of 
process variants; and determining the most probable 
process variant etc. 
Theory of ex-
treme values 
Solution of structure problems.   
In management and engineering the safety and security 
the theory of extreme values was verified by real data 
for use in following tasks: determination of size of criti-
cal disasters that can be expected in disaster focal re-
gion; determination of return period for the given disas-
ter size; and determining the disaster scenario either by 
processing the empirical scenarios corresponding to 
disaster with a given size or by simulation based on 
physical disaster characteristics. 
[10-12] 
Multi-attrib-
ute utility the-
ory (MUT) – 
version TIEQ  
Solutions of non-structure complex problems - critical 
items are knowledge of experts on problem and its con-
text. 
In management and engineering the safety and security 
the multi-attribute utility theory (MUT) – version TIEQ 
was verified by real data for use in following tasks: 
identification of tasks important for problems´ solving; 
determination of problem structure according to criteria 
from domain of safety, economy, environment and so-
cial (fundament for decision support systems); and se-
lection of optimum variant of problem solved. 
Results can be used for prognosis of future behaviour 
of system under account if data on problem develop-
ment are specially prepared in time series. 
[9-11] 
Methods of 
operation re-
search 
(CPM, 
PERT, 
GERT, PE-
TRI NETS, 
BAYESION 
NETS)  
Solutions of non-structure complex problems - critical 
items are knowledge of experts on problem and its con-
text. 
The application of operation research methods has the 
following features: problem situation is closed system 
or the links to vicinity are precisely defined; problem sit-
uation is represented by mathematical model; at calcu-
lation the computation technique does not insert the hu-
man behaviour. 
[9-11] 
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The solution is in motion in the following stages: prob-
lem formulation; model construction; solution of prob-
lem on model; analysis of solution and corrections; and 
implementation. 
The methodological shortages are: high complexity of 
models; and solution that cannot be implemented.   
In management and engineering the safety and security 
the methods of operation research (CPM, PERT, 
GERT, PETRI NETS, BAYESIAN NETS) were verified 
by real data for use in following tasks: identification of 
problems; determination of problem structure according 
to criteria from domain of safety, economy, environment 
and social; determination of problem solving variants 
and  selection of optimum variant of problem solved; 
support for decision-making - i.e. retrieval of optimum 
results for given conditions. 
Analytical hi-
erarchy pro-
cess (AHP)  
1. Solution of non-structure problems - critical items 
are knowledge of experts on problem and its con-
text. 
2. Decision situations to which the AHP can be applied 
include:  
3. Choice - The selection of one alternative (variant) 
from a given set of alternatives, usually where there 
are multiple decision criteria involved. 
4. Ranking - Putting a set of alternatives in order from 
most to least desirable. 
5. Prioritization - Determining the relative merit of 
members of a set of alternatives, as opposed to se-
lecting a single one or merely ranking them. 
6. Resource allocation - Apportioning resources 
among a set of alternatives. 
7. Benchmarking - Comparing the processes in one's 
own organization with those of other best-of-breed 
organizations. 
8. Quality management - Dealing with the multidimen-
sional aspects of quality and quality improvement. 
9. Conflict resolution - Settling disputes between par-
ties with apparently incompatible goals or positions.  
10. In management and engineering the safety and se-
curity the AHP was verified by real data for use in 
following tasks: determination of problem structure; 
[9-11] 
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results for individual levels of problem in selected hi-
erarchy; and aggregate result for the whole. 
Methods 
based on 
process 
models – es-
pecially 
methods for  
risk assess-
ment, risk 
manage-
ment, risk 
engineering 
and complex 
methodology 
for negotia-
tion with dis-
aster risk 
 
Solution of both, the structure and the non-structure 
problems. In case of nom-structure problems - critical 
items are knowledge of experts on problem and its con-
text. 
Process model is used in various contexts. For exam-
ple, in process modelling, in strategic planning etc., e.g. 
the enterprise process model is often referred to as the 
business process model. Process models are core con-
cepts in the discipline of process engineering. 
The process models are processes of the same nature 
that are classified together into a model. Thus, a pro-
cess model is a description of a process at the type 
level. 
The targets of a process model are to be descriptive, 
prescriptive and explanatory. The descriptive ones are 
to: track what actually happens during a process; and 
take the point of view of an external observer who looks 
at the way a process has been performed and deter-
mines the improvements that must be made to make it 
perform more effectively or efficiently. 
The prescriptive ones are to: define the desired pro-
cesses and how they should / could / might be per-
formed; and establish rules, guidelines, and behaviour 
patterns which, if followed, would lead to the desired 
process performance. They can range from strict en-
forcement to flexible guidance. 
The explanatory ones are to: provide explanations 
about the rationale of processes; explore and evaluate 
the several possible courses of action based on rational 
arguments; establish an explicit link between processes 
and the requirements that the model needs to fulfil; and 
pre-defines points at which data can be extracted for 
reporting purposes. 
From a theoretical point of view, the meta-process 
modelling explains the key concepts needed to de-
scribe what happens in the development process, on 
what, when it happens, and why. 
There are following types of coverage where the term 
process model has been defined differently:  
1. Activity-oriented: related set of activities conducted 
for the specific purpose of product definition; a set of 
partially ordered steps intended to reach a goal.  
[9-11] 
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2. Product-oriented: series of activities that cause sen-
sitive product transformations to reach the desired 
product. 
3. Decision-oriented: set of related decisions con-
ducted for the specific purpose of product definition. 
4. Context-oriented: sequence of contexts causing 
successive product transformations under the influ-
ence of a decision taken in a context. 
5. Strategy-oriented: allow building models represent-
ing multi-approach processes and plan different 
possible ways to elaborate the product based on the 
notion of intention and strategy.  
Risk assessment, risk management and risk engineer-
ing – methods are methods that can help to solve prob-
lems and to create safety and security. 
For practice there are the most suitable for the first risk 
assessment and the fundamental monitoring the risk 
sizes, the following methods: check list; safety audit; 
what – if analysis; and relative ranking. 
Only for specific purposes as it is the risk determination 
for complex technological processes, complex objects 
etc. there are used more sophisticated methods as are: 
1. Preliminary Hazard Analysis – PHA that is the pro-
cedure for searching the dangerous conditions (i.e. 
emergency situations), their causes and impacts 
and for their categorisation according to criteria stip-
ulated in advance.  
2. Process Quantitative Risk Analysis – QRA that is 
the systematic and complex access for prediction of 
occurrence frequency estimation, and of impacts of 
accidents on establishment or system operation.  
3. Hazard Operation Process – HAZOP, that is the 
procedure based on stochastic hazard assessment 
and on assessment of risks followed from hazard. It 
is team expert complex method. The HAZOP main 
purpose is the identification of potential accident 
hazard.  
4. Event Tree Analysis – ETA that is the procedure 
that pursues the course of the process from the initi-
ating event over inventing the possible events al-
ways pursuant to two possibilities - favourable and 
unfavourable.  
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5. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis – FMEA, that is 
the procedure based on the analysis of ways of dis-
turbances and their impacts that enables to search 
the impacts and causes pursuant to systematically 
and structured organisation of determined arrange-
ment faults.  
6. Fault Tree Analysis – FTA, that is the procedure 
based on systematic retrospective event analysis 
with the use of chain of causes that can lead to se-
lected top event.  
7. Human Reliability Analysis – HRA, that is the proce-
dure for the human factor influence appreciation on 
the disaster occurrence or some their impacts oc-
currence.  
8. Fuzzy Set Method – FL – VV that is the method of 
lingual variable. It is complex multi-criterion method 
of decision analysis from the category of soft, fuzzy 
type.   
9. Causes and Consequences Analysis – CCA that is 
the mixture of fault tree analysis and event tree 
analysis.  
10. Probabilistic Safety Assessment – PSA that stipu-
lates the contributions of individual vulnerable parts 
to total system vulnerability.  
These specific methods were derived for special practi-
cal cases, and therefore, before use it is necessary to 
verify if conditions of technology transfer are fulfilled.  
There are also specialised methods, e.g.: CRAMM 
(CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Methodology – 
see standards CSN ISO/IEC 13335 and ISO/IEC 
17799), COBRA, MELISA.; methodologies - @risk 
(based on Monte Carlo Methods); RiskPAC; Risk-
WATCH.  
There is also special software as: ALOHA, SAVE I, 
ROZEX, CEI, TEREX, EFFECTS that are broadly used 
for them it also holds that it is necessary to verify if con-
ditions of technology transfer are fulfilled and it is nec-
essary to know if they are suitable for solution of task 
under account because individual versions only respect 
special conditions. 
Note: on the address http://www.riskworld.com [12] - 
there is possible to find more than 1000 specialised 
methods that are supported by software – they were 
developed for specific cases, and therefore before their 
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use it is necessary to verify if the conditions for technol-
ogy transfer are fulfilled. 
Risk management methods and risk engineering meth-
ods are complex and they are described e.g. in [3,11]. 
Engineering working methods include the methods, 
tools and techniques used for: disaster assessment (i.e. 
site, maximum expected size, occurrence probability or 
occurrence frequency, distribution and size of impacts); 
hazard assessment (determination of normative disas-
ter size – the most frequently design disaster = centen-
nial disaster); risk assessment (in a given site accord-
ing to hazard size and according to amount and vulner-
ability of assets).  
Complex methodology for negotiation with disaster risk 
is created by set of fasten (tied) methods for assess-
ment of disasters and for risk management that is cre-
ated by:  
- method for determination of relevant disasters in a 
territory;  
- method for determination of maximum expected dis-
aster size (it has to modifications: root of hazard is 
only one source of disaster; and root of hazard is 
several sources of disaster);  
- method for determination of attenuation of disaster 
impact size with distance from source of disaster;  
- methods for determination anomalies in territorial 
distribution of disaster impacts;  
- method of determination of unacceptable disaster 
impacts;  
- method for assessment of potential damages on 
property caused by unacceptable disaster impacts;  
- method for determination of optimum corrective 
measures for expected disasters in a given territory;  
- method for implementation of corrective measures 
for ensuring the property renovation in a given terri-
tory;  
- method for determination of database of corrective 
measures to individual disasters;  
- method for determination of parametric relation be-
tween cost for renovation vs. disaster size;  
- method for determination of financial reserve for 
renovation.   
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Methods, tools and techniques for  risk assessment, 
risk management, risk engineering and complex meth-
odology for negotiation with disaster risk  are used for 
determination of: hazard assessment; vulnerability as-
sessment; disaster scenarios in variant mode; risk as-
sessment; risk mitigation and safety management; prin-
ciples of prevention, preparedness, response and re-
newal in dependence on accessible forces, sources 
and means; planning and management documents in 
advance; personal, financial, technical reserves in ad-
vance etc.  
According to way of data acquisition we separate the 
engineering methods to: 
1. Empirical (based on experience). The survey of 
facts is made by inquiries and questionnaires. 
These are used at data collection on human behav-
iour and human society behaviour in sociology but 
also at acquisition of impact distribution in the case 
of earthquake, wind storm or other disasters in terri-
tory. In exact sciences there are used for their rapid-
ity and modesty. Accuracy of such data is lower 
than those obtained by instrumental measurement 
but qualified statistical processing gives good and 
reliable information for decision-making and man-
agement. 
2. Theoretical.  They create findings, hypotheses, the-
oretical constructions on the basis of general sci-
ence procedures, i.e. they are based on use of algo-
rithms that lead to solving all tasks of a given type.  
3. Expert.  They use professional (professionals) for 
activity that requires special knowledge. They are 
used in many situations the common feature of 
which is necessity of professional (expert) judge-
ment of problem and of its further development in 
future. They are also used if there is necessary to 
eliminate local view on a given problem and to judge 
it independently in new, broader or more specialised 
frame. 
According to ways of knowledge acquisition we sepa-
rate the engineering methods to:  
- procedures for acquisition of fundamental (usually 
individual) knowledge – as discovery of properties 
and behaviour of a given substance, behaviour of 
nanomaterials under different physical and chemical 
conditions etc., 
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- procedures for solution of simple practical tasks – 
as allocation and application of fundamental 
knowledge in practice, e.g. typical earthquake im-
pact scenario for earthquakes from one focal region 
in a given region; way of response to chlorine re-
lease from a given building etc. In this case we must 
also solve at data acquisition whether we are de-
pendent or independent on phenomena recurrence 
(e.g. measurement of natural events is non-repro-
ducible) and how inaccuracies in fact acquisition 
may influence uncertainties and vagueness in data 
and by that also in knowledge, 
- procedures for solution of tasks of strategic nature – 
as discovery of basic knowledge for support of ca-
pability to solve effectively present and future prob-
lems of a given object, e.g. connected with security 
and sustainable development of human system, 
with human society development in a given region. 
In this case we must solve how at data acquisition 
we are dependent on fact whether followed pro-
cesses are or are not stable in space and time (e.g. 
processes of occurrence of floods, earthquakes etc.  
are not stable in time – extreme phenomena occur 
rarely and irregularly in time and space) and how in-
accuracies in data acquisitions might influence un-
certainties and vagueness in data and by that also 
in knowledge, and what follows from it for prediction 
and consecutively for management; i.e. it goes on 
qualified selection of optimum variant from a set of 
variants offering different combinations of followed 
parameters for problem solving. 
In management and engineering the safety and security 
the  methods based on process models – especially 
methods for  risk assessment, risk management, risk 
engineering and complex methodology for negotiation 
with disaster risk were verified by real data for use in 
following tasks: problem understanding; problem con-
text understanding; problem structure understanding; 
determination of aims of management and of engineer-
ing disciplines; determination of variants of problem 
solving and corresponding tasks for management and 
engineering disciplines; methodologies of risk manage-
ment under different conditions; interpret results in a 
given conditions and formulate data for lesson learned; 
and plans for upgrade. 
146 
 
Methods for 
system of 
systems 
(SoS) / 
systems 
system 
behaviour 
description 
and 
management 
Solution of non-structure problems - critical items are 
knowledge of experts on problem and its context 
The methods for system of systems investigation, 
namely all, i.e. computational, technical and managerial 
must correspond to the object character. Because they 
have mostly several assets that are incommensurable, 
the more criteria must be used and all problem solution 
is multi-dimensional; i.e. all analysis, assessments and 
other procedures are multi-criteria. It means higher de-
mand on methods, tools and techniques applied; if 
some problem might be decided, the managerial and 
computational methods, tools and techniques or mana-
gerial and technical methods, tools and techniques 
must be combined, i.e. heuristic approach based on 
good engineering practice is suitable for practice. Be-
cause we need good solution there must be applied 
strict rules at heuristic approach. Only in cases when 
the problem solved can be reduced to simple one the 
simple procedures can be used. 
For the investigation of system of systems, their behav-
iour and failure there are apart from analytical methods, 
classical methods of risk analysis, scenarios determina-
tion, deterministic and probabilistic safety analysis, se-
curity network analysis, reliability analysis, expert 
judgement, risk matrix, criticality matrix, Monte Carlo 
method etc. there are used for the SoS model construc-
tion used specific methods as: Bayesian Method; 
Bayesian Network; Mixed Bayesian Network; Fuzzy 
Bayesian Network Model; Bayesian Reliability Model; 
Fuzzy Rule-based Bayesian Reasoning (FuRBaR); Pe-
tri Nets (PN); Coloured Petri Nets (CPN); Stochastic 
Petri Nets (SPN); Coloured Stochastic Petri Nets 
(CSPN); Case Study (CS); Multi-Attribute Utility Theory 
(MAUT);  Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA);  Weighted Sum 
Approach (WSA); Concordance, Discordance Analysis 
(CDA); Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to 
Ideal Solution (TOPSIS);  Ideal Point Analysis (IPA);  
Aggregation Preferences (AGREPREF); Preference 
Ranking Organisation Method for Enrichment Evalua-
tions (PROMETHEE); Markov Chain (MC); Multi-Objec-
tive Genetic Algorithm (MOGA); a Multiplicative Intui-
tionist Linear Logic (MILL).  
The published results on methods for system of 
systems (SoS) / systems system behaviour description 
and management are mostly in the theoretical level. We 
have a lot of images that were not verified on real data. 
[9-11] 
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The CVUT experimental investigation of electro-energy 
system shoved that easy application of given theoreti-
cal methods get at barriers that are formed by reality 
that technological, cyber, logical or territorial connec-
tions are to site specific. The results showed that the 
main problem consists in reality that the SoS structure 
is too site specific. 
If we applied these model construction methods in the 
form step by step (e.g. in some hierarchy of technologi-
cal, cyber, logical or territorial connections) we can ob-
tain by these methods: groundwork for decision-mak-
ing; retrieval of critical points and items of SoS that 
might be sources of interdependences in which failure 
cascades can occur; determination of risks connected 
with critical points; and identification of priorities and 
aims that ensure the safe SoS and the whole commu-
nity safety.  
Combination 
of methods 
for complex 
territory 
safety man-
agement and 
safety engi-
neering 
Note: territory safety management determines the aims 
fundamental and important for territory safety and terri-
tory safety engineering realised these aims in real con-
ditions of individual sites and regions. 
The combination of methods for complex territory safety 
management and safety engineering is combination of 
such methods that are suitable for solution of FOCUS 
project tasks. It is tailored to these tasks because hu-
man cognition and experiences show that such ap-
proach gives the best results. Its assessment is con-
centrated to facts that are important for solution of tasks 
that are in the FOCUS project, i.e. the topic is not as-
sessment of all features and variants occurring in the 
practice. To obtain qualified outputs from the project we 
only give information that was verified on real data. 
Therefore, we also collected information on real solu-
tions from domains that occur in FOCUS targets. 
Solution of both, the structure and the non-structure 
problems -  critical items are knowledge of experts on 
problem and its context 
The complex territory safety management method con-
sists of four main parts that are: 
1. Qualification of territory, identification of disasters 
that can affect the territory and determination terri-
tory asset vulnerabilities (TERRITORY SCREEN-
ING). 
2. Qualification of risks, identification of possible criti-
cal situations (RISK ASSESSMENT). 
[10,11] 
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3. Qualifications of available measures and activities 
used for trade-off (negotiation) with risks and identi-
fication of gaps in trade-off with risks (SCREENING 
THE MEASURES AND ACTIVITIES FOR RISK 
MANAGEMENT AND FOR TERRITORY SAFETY 
UPGRADE, AND ASSESSMENT OF LEVEL OF 
TRADE-OFF WITH RISKS). 
4. Identification of critical interfaces that must be 
treated in a specific way to ensure human survival 
and possibility for further development start (IDEN-
TIFICATION OF CRITICAL ITEMS AND PRO-
POSAL OF SOLUTION OF GAPS). 
The details are given in publication [13]. From it follows 
that the real problem is too complex and that it is nec-
essary to help experts who work with tool. If we use 
classical approach and we compile the representative 
data sets for all parts the output is relevant. Because 
the compilation of representative data sets is time con-
suming or even impossible (new problem, problem that 
was underestimated in past etc.), it is necessary in 
practice to use suitable heuristics, e.g. for territory 
screening the SWOT analysis; for risk assessment ex-
act methods as extreme theory, PSA, FMEA etc., case 
study methodology or DELPHI method; for screening 
the tools for risk management and for territory safety 
upgrade, and assessment of level of trade-off with risks 
the specially directed methods as DELPHI, TIEQ,  
AHP, responsible matrix, risk matrix and other expert 
methods; and for identification of critical items and pro-
posal of solution of gaps only expert methods.  For 
practical purposes there were, therefore, prepared for 
each part of tool questions that help experts to use en-
gineering good practice rules and not to forgot on fun-
damental data [13]. 
The results of first ca 84 practical tests showed that 
proposed combination of methods for complex territory 
safety management and safety engineering can be 
used in practice and confirmed the theoretical judge-
ment that results are strongly dependent on knowledge 
and practical experiences of experts who are used for 
application. 
In management and engineering the safety and security 
the  combination of methods for complex territory safety 
management and safety engineering was verified by 
real data for use in following tasks: problem identifica-
tion; problem structure and context identification;  
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quantitative outputs for important disasters; identifica-
tion of ways for trade-off with risks; identification of re-
sponsibilities for trade-off with risks; identification of 
gaps in trade-off with risks and in determination of re-
sponsibilities; determination of  optimum variant with re-
gard to a given criteria set for trade-off with risks; deter-
mination of critical items that can lead to social crisis 
and that would be objects of research, management 
and engineering.   
The combination of methods has potential from the 
viewpoint of prognosis. By help of this procedure we 
can obtain variants of future development of followed 
process but the output variants and their occurrence 
frequency assessment strongly depend on data quality 
and on human processor qualification. 
 
Table 1 shows that none of above described method is all-powerful, i.e. it cannot give 
us solution of all tasks that might be solved in the FOCUS project. Each of described 
method has certain principles and demands in order that its application may give qual-
ified outputs. Each of described method is suitable for solution of one or several types 
of tasks. The selection of method depends on target of problem solution, on amount 
and quality data set, on time and techniques that we have for solution. 
Even though it is possible to say that all investigated tools serve for management op-
timisation, so it is necessary to concentrate to reality that each method solves the prob-
lem from different view, i.e. it serves to another target. E.g.: 
1. Methods for stimulation of creativity at creation of n variants (alternatives, scenar-
ios) of solution of problems that may be decided. Among them there are belonged 
brainstorming, panel discussion, DELPHI method and aimed simulation techniques 
(NST). The DELPHI method is based on group of experts who being mutually iso-
lated give proposals that are compared, again judged (reverse response is written) 
and by this way in several steps there are  converged the proposed variants. 
2. Methods for multi-criteria decision, e.g. process models, models based on MUT, 
AHP etc. The AHP is the method of multi-criteria decision for solution of non-struc-
tured problems (situations) at which the problem is separated into several levels on 
more simple problems and by this the hierarchical system is created. The process 
models in the form of arbitrary trees are mostly probabilistic arbitrary trees that 
serve to display and determination of optimum strategy of management of arbitrary 
processes with several degrees in which we can trade-off with risks. 
3. Methods that serve for optimising the process courses, search of critical paths from 
the time viewpoint, but also sources if activities (nodes or edges) are evaluated in 
such way. The CPM and PERT are in principle the same. Its fundament is edge 
oriented graph – the edge is activity (contrary to MPM – Metra Potential Method) in 
which it is node-oriented graph – node is activity), The CPM works with determin-
istic data (values), the PERT works with stochastic values (that are obtained from 
pessimistic, optimistic and modal judgement, it works with the β distribution).  The 
150 
 
Petri nets are also oriented graphs that express the structure of distribute system 
(two types of node – places and transitions). They are used for modelling so called 
parallel behaviour of distribute systems. A Bayesian network (BN) is an abstract 
formal model allowing one to describe cause-and-effect relations between objects 
and systems being investigated. Causes and effects are quantities, the nature of 
which is generally random, their number is considerable, and interrelations between 
them are multi-various. It is established that the time complexity of algorithms of 
analysis of such models is exponential. This determines the necessity of comput-
erization of computational processes in many respects and also the expediency of 
development of new types of models and efficient algorithmic means for analysing 
them. 
For the method selection there is important the procedure: 
1. To establish the aim of problem solution and to determine what partial tasks must 
be solved for aim achievements (to investigate problem and to find gaps in 
knowledge, technical measures, legal and financial measures for problem solution). 
2. To assemble accessible data on problem – recent cognition and accessible data. 
On the base of it to determine „roads“ (processes, plans) for aim achievement,  
namely including all sources and conditions (measures, actions) for ensuring their 
course. 
3. To appreciate and complete existing data sets. 
4. According to partial task and data quality to select suitable method. For generation 
of set of possible variants, the case study methodology or the DELPHI method may 
be used. For selection of sufficient good variant respecting the given criteria it is 
possible to use e.g. the AHP. For optimising the course of a given path it is possible 
to use CPM, PERT, Petri nets, Bayesian nets and for decision-making during the 
given path again e.g. AHP. 
The experience from practice shows that the best outputs are from method that is tai-
lored to problem solving goal. 
 
3. Prognostic methods 
Prognosis is in its wide sense the information about future. It can be seen as a forecast 
of future events and future development conditions. The characteristic feature of a 
prognosis is its variability arising from the possibility of setting the variant objectives 
and methods leading to their achievement, including the probabilistic character of a 
prognosis. The prognosis is always evaluated by its rate of reliability, which demands 
the specification of information requirements and requirements for data. Utilization in 
practice is always presumed at a prognosis setting it apart from prediction that is the 
part of a scientific work and from foresight that is the general ability of a human mind 
for thinking about future.  
Predictive method for a certain problem is chosen depending on the amount (content) 
and uncertainty of input information [6]. The accessibility of the input information forms 
a key factor for the selection of a method. As standard method for prediction are re-
spected: expert opinions, both implicit and explicit with the help of expert model 
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systems; comparison; field experiment; mathematic simulation; visual simulation (lay-
out, photography, film, 3D model); and physical simulation (noise, air-pollution, soil 
column etc.). 
Predictive methods are expanded to formal and informal. Formal methods recognised 
as proved are:  exact methods; statistic methods; experimental methods; and mathe-
matic simulation. Informal approach represents an engineer assessment and applica-
tion of analogy. 
Individual formal work procedures form the wide category of technically-methodical 
ways of prediction. In practice, exact methods are enabled by the formulation of a real 
technical idea in several variants, by the measurement of relevant values on a map 
basis, calculation etc. Statistic methods come out of the assembled data (gathered 
pieces of information) significant for a certain problem and area (surroundings). There 
are used scientific basics of prognosticating, the theory of rising curves and the as-
sessment of probable evolution trends. By the term “prognosis” we understand a prob-
able statement about events that arise in some spatial or time interval. Scientific ap-
proach distinguishes 3 fundamental alternatives of a methodical approach: extrapola-
tion or a normative method; synthesis or a morphological method; and intuitive or a 
theoretical method. 
However, in practise we commonly combine the extrapolation with intuition or norma-
tive method with a theoretical solution. Significant importance represents a so-called 
phenomenological projection of forecasts, where there are used both, the empiric ex-
periences acquired in the field of a researched phenomenon and the information from 
the theory of growing models are used. If there is the evolution (i.e. rising or falling) of 
a certain quantity according to time without external interference, it can be supposed 
that the rate of evolution is a definite function of a variable. By solving of a relevant 
differential equation, the law of growth can be obtained. 
Experimental methods and mathematical models differ in a feature that at mathemati-
cal models there is a need for a strict formulation of cause and consequence, while by 
experimental methods these terms don’t have to be determined. But in both cases, it 
is necessary to schematize (simplify) the system leading to definition of relationship 
cause ---> consequence. Accomplishment of experiments is deemed indispensable 
in all cases where there aren’t basic data at a disposition. Basics in this field considered 
as satisfying are predicted data acquired by a mathematical simulation, laboratory ex-
periments or experiments in situ. Favourite are comparative case studies and terrain 
pilot projects in similar natural and socio-ecological conditions. In the future, the gath-
ered information of realized projects and practical testing of hypothesis (database) will 
be a significant help. Experimental methods are divided in: illustrative or physical mod-
els symbolizing an affected environment; terrain (field) experiments; and laboratory 
experiments.  
Illustrative models provide, in a certain measure, only the visual forecast of a future 
situation, whereas physical models provide this forecast in the measure of a physical 
process. Laboratory experiments simulate biological and biochemical process, but 
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often in isolation from the overall ecosystem. The aim of the field experiments and tests 
is a research of the real changes in the area considered. 
In mathematical models, the relations between cause and consequence are repre-
sented by one or several mathematical equations. Mathematical models can be: em-
pirical, processional or mixed. Empiric models are based on experiments or a repeated 
measurement; they employ the knowledge of statistical analysis and show the relation 
between cause and consequence without explicitly formulated interrelations (a model 
of a black box). Beside the general models, special models applicable in a real area or 
the certain type of surround are used. 
Process models (internally descriptive) lie in an explicit definition of process either with-
out a reference to time (stable, constant condition) or with one (dynamic evolution). 
Complexity (algorithm) of models alters from simple ones that can be solved manually, 
to complex dynamic and stochastic models requiring a computing technology. In this 
context different types of models are used:  
- distributional models determining a dimensional layout (e.g. source objects, protec-
tive zones, primary point field allowing the digital model of a terrain etc.), 
- models of a dimensional statistic arising from the supposition that all the elements 
of the selective files are placed in the coordinate system; models of dimensional 
modifications, which are primarily represented by models of variant diffusion pro-
cesses of a different type (e.g. projection of the gradient orientation and rapidity of 
a diffusion process by a vector field calculation from the primary point field ), 
- distance-decay models allowing an exact determination of so-called divided dis-
tances, safe distances, zones of an increased hazard etc., by which they simplify 
the resolving about the localization of other investment projects demanding a spe-
cial treatment (e.g. nurseries, playgrounds etc.). 
It should be noted that the behaviour of entities based on forecast models based on as-
sumptions: 
- the conditions that prevailed in the past, needs also to apply in the future, 
- the largest observed phenomena in a given time interval are independent, 
- the behaviour of the biggest phenomena in a given interval will be the same in the 
future as in the past. 
Theoretical models based on the defined theories and their solution is a set of possible 
scenarios, with each scenario describes the behaviour of entities under certain conditions. 
For success in practice, it needs to know the full set of conditions in which the tracked entity 
can occur, the complete set of possible scenarios of the behaviour of the entity, and also 
the occurrence frequency of each scenario. Due to lack the knowledge, there are the pos-
sible sudden changes in conditions, which also mean sudden changes in the behaviour of 
the entity. This fact means that neither the probabilistic approaches applied methodically in 
practice since the mid-70's the years do not provide the correct prediction for the behaviour 
of the entities. 
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From observation of the real world we know that extreme changes and extreme phenomena 
occur irregularly and sparse in time. Therefore, modelling the extreme phenomena does not 
use already from the 70's years the methods of mathematical statistics, but it goes from the 
law of large numbers, a distribution describing the fluctuation of random maxim (it is suitable 
for modelling the extreme phenomena using the distribution of Gumbel, Fréchet and 
Weibull, which represent the limit distribution of the maximum values of random variables). 
The theory of extreme values needs to have a time series of phenomena and commonly is 
used since the mid of 80s. years for natural disasters, and in the last decade and in econ-
omy. In the area of technologies, it is based on more of the Weibull distribution. 
In the area of technology, in which there are simulated situations that are partly random and 
partly under control of the operator, from 50th years of 20th century for support of decision 
targeted to the management of the possible behaviour of the entities there are used Markov´ 
processes based on Markov´ chains. It goes on the choice from several possible options, 
with each option consists of a Markov´ chain.  
Bayesian network is a probabilistic model, which uses a graphical representation for dis-
playing the probabilistic relationships among individual phenomena. It is used for the deter-
mination of the likelihood of certain phenomena which arises from the base of the theory of 
probability. In general, the Bayesian Networks are used for modelling across different areas, 
support for decision-making and for probability calculation. Bayesian statistics is a branch 
of modern statistics, which works with the conditional probabilities and it allows to refine the 
probability of initial hypothesis, how to appear more relevant realities. The core of its math-
ematical apparatus is the Bayes'  theorem. While the classic statistics provides the proba-
bility of an event based on the known fact from the past, Bayesian statistics is used where 
it is not possible. Therefore, it has a very extensive use, where it works with uncertain 
knowledge: in finance, in management, in medicine, in criminology, and also in detecting 
the spam. "Bayesian approach" also has great importance in mathematical logic and the 
theory. 
 
4. Scenario application 
The scenario as a tool of pro-active management is a history-systemic model that de-
scribes the development of process in its different shapes (variants) dependent on 
conditions or performed decisions. It imitates mechanisms and processes that are un-
der way in system. Its target is above all to determine critical phenomena or critical 
items in which it comes up to affection of further development, i.e. there are given 
alternative options among different terminative stages. Each scenario contains: se-
quence of events that are under way in its frame (including the possible variants); and 
description of interaction (communication) between user (originator) and system. For 
needs of planning and management of safety of followed system the following scenario 
types are processed in practice: scenario of disaster impacts; scenario of response to 
disaster; management scenario. For safety management needs the most important are 
scenarios of disasters because on the basis of which the proposals of response and 
renovation are performed.  
Nowadays, it is possible to find terms such as scenarios, disaster scenarios, scenario 
management and other in literature and in various strategic documents. The scenario 
tool is frequently used technique in safety management decisions. Scenarios are com-
piled on the basis of empirical data or using various simulation techniques, both 
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analytical and heuristic [6]. Because of variability of the world represented by the hu-
man system [14] it is necessary to assemble them in variants, as the runs of relevant 
processes are variable. 
Generally, the scenario is a set of isolated and interconnected processes or phenom-
ena in time and space, which takes place at different spatial and temporal scales. Sce-
narios are used for different purposes. It is de facto succession, a chain of events in 
time, area, space or space-time. This chain can be deterministically given or stochas-
tically random and the degree of randomness can in some cases be evaluated by sta-
tistical methods, by methods based on fuzzy sets and by experts 15. In terms of 
present knowledge, we know that there are sets of events that seemingly have no 
visible internal connection, but the result of which is some specific condition of the sys-
tem. In these cases, we talk about so-called deterministic chaos. In systems engineer-
ing, there exist methods to describe and understand it [6]. 
Scenario-as a tool of pro-active management is historical-system model which de-
scribes the development of process in its different forms (variants) depending on the 
conditions or decisions taken. It imitates the mechanisms and processes that take 
place in the system. Its aim is primarily to identify critical phenomena or points, which 
affect further development, i.e. which provide alternative choices between different fi-
nal conditions. For the purposes of emergency planning and crisis management in prac-
tice, we put together the following types of scenarios: disaster impact scenario; re-
sponse scenario; management scenario. 
Hazard scenario / threat scenario is not a mathematical variable. This name is used to 
describe facts, on which the risk assessment is based. Above all, the source of hazard 
must be known, and then how it can manifest itself; in military terminology term is re-
placed with the term threat scenario. In the civil administration [16] the threat is under-
stood as a probability rate of an attack (terrorist or military) in a given location; it is the 
probability that an event or a set of events occur, that are completely different from the 
required condition or development of the protected assets in terms of their integrity and 
functionality; it is determined by attacker capabilities, by vulnerabilities of assets pro-
tected and by intent of the attacker. Hazard scenario  varies in dependence on time. 
Disaster scenarios are an essential matter for safety management purposes, because 
designs of response and recovery (i.e. response scenarios (plans) and recovery sce-
narios) are performed on their basis. The term scenario is now widely overused. 
However, it is necessary to further consider following views on the scenario: purpose, 
content, format, and life cycle. At first glance, "intention" is the answer to the question 
"why scenario has to be used, what are its benefits? “ The scenario can be used to 
project the future (this applies in particular to sustainable development); scenario can 
serve as decision support (description of activities for emergency response) in a hypo-
thetical situation. The scenario for sustainable development can have three forms: 
- predictive (what happens), which is associated with the "What, If" method,  
- projective - exploratory (what can happen), 
- normative (how to achieve specific development objectives, i.e. to specify the driv-
ing force of development). 
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The task of predictive scenario is to describe future development in its various forms, 
depending on decisions taken or on expected changes in conditions. This is mainly the 
identification of critical phenomena and critical points of development in which it is nec-
essary to make major decisions or where a fundamental change can take place, af-
fecting further development. The implications of these decisions are described in sce-
nario as an alternative choice between the final conditions of the future. 
In case of response we speak about planning and implementation scenarios using the 
techniques of process management. Planning scenario for a given disaster consists of 
a description of the emergency situation (location, possibility of occurrence, etc.) and 
from description of consequences of emergency situations, i.e., from estimation of 
damages and losses, and recommendations for prevention and mitigation of disasters 
impacts. Response scenario describes procedures for overcoming emergency situa-
tions aimed to mitigation of the expected impacts of the disaster, to stabilization of the 
situation and to start of the recovery. There is an essential difference between disaster 
scenario and response scenario. Disaster scenario includes distribution of disaster im-
pacts in the territory, i.e. damages and losses to be eliminated by response. The re-
sponse scenario is a set of measures and actions to be accomplished in order to over-
come the disaster impacts. In Czech practice it is known under term emergency plan 
or flood plan. Both types of plans: 
- are based on historical data and assumptions, i.e. the scenarios are only narratives 
(views on the problem), 
- identify differences in capacities and define an action plan for response, 
- identify and formalize the response teams, 
- identify sources of domino effects. 
Security plans include procedures for prevention, preparedness, response and recov-
ery, have a general part which relates to the object or area and site-specific parts which 
depend on what disasters are important for the followed object or territory, what are 
territory assets and how those assets are vulnerable in case of  expected disasters 
[14]. 
In the second view “content” it is necessary to answer the question: "what knowledge 
the scenario contains? “, which is related to the type of scenario. It is necessary to 
distinguish whether the scenario is a description or an analytic-synthetic approach to 
the facts. For the purpose of deciding the second approach is more reliable because it 
is based on documented facts. 
In the third and most important (“format”) perspective, it is necessary to answer ques-
tion "how and what the scenario expresses? “ It is necessary to distinguish whether 
the scenario is: narrative; descriptive table; logical sequence of events; and time se-
quence etc. 
The chosen scenario format determines the methods, by which is processed in a par-
ticular case. It is difficult to find a scenario in a reasonable format, as e.g. it is shown 
in a set of scenarios in [16] - the given scenarios are just a list of facts, mostly lacking 
a description of the algorithm on the basis of which they were compiled. Summary of 
different formats is for example in [17], where the scenario is seen as a management 
tool. Other examples of format are in [18], in which scenarios are the basis of different 
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training procedures in response management (but rarely used for training planners). 
The work also highlights the importance of structure of scenarios, including holistic 
organization of knowledge. Scenarios are used today in many areas, as documented 
by summary performed in work [19]. 
In the "life cycle" it is necessary to the answer the question of "how to handle the sce-
nario? “, i.e. how to understand, interpret, and evaluate it. E. g. at decisions based on 
disaster scenarios, it is necessary to know whether isolines represent the mean ob-
served values, or some of its limit value, see, e.g. scenarios for earthquakes which are 
in the works [3] and are used to ensure seismic safety of buildings and infrastructures. 
From all of the above it follows that the scenario is generally a set of isolated and 
interconnected  of processes or phenomena in time and space, which takes place at 
different spatial and temporal scales, and that the scenarios are used for different pur-
poses. Development of scenarios from the perspective of strategic management [14] 
requires: 
1. Ensuring permanent monitoring of the situation in the human system from the point 
of view of occurrence of disasters and critical situations resulting from them. 
2. Creating tools for disaster management and detection of critical situations ap-
proaching  
3. Creating tools that lead to the removal of critical situations. 
4. Creating tools to manage critical situations and to avert protracted critical situations. 
5. Creating tools to ensure recovery after critical situations and to ensure the contin-
ued stable development. 
Complex scenarios for territory management must have 4 separate parts, namely: the 
disaster scenario, an emergency scenario, scenario for management of response to 
an emergency, scenario of security management and sustainable development of the 
territory [14]. 
Following steps are important when creating scenarios: 
- to identify the key assumptions or factors that affect the form of scenarios, 
- to focus on factors that have a high potential impact on the shape, size, scope, etc. 
- to identify factors with an uncertain nature and to try to produce alternative solution 
of the scenario. 
A prerequisite, however, is a relatively small number of factors that could be incorpo-
rated into the possible variants. 
Development of scenarios as in [6] consists of: 
- gathering  the prognostic information about the system and its surroundings, 
- identification of targets of studied system, 
- identification of internal factors, or barriers to development of the system, 
- identification of external factors, or barriers to development of the system, 
- identification of alternative management strategies for the system (it is necessary 
to consider existing management mechanism and its variants, which can be 
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realized in future periods, simultaneously  it is necessary to formulate a strategy for 
development of the system - which direction is desirable), 
- proper compilation of scenario, 
- interpretation of scenario. 
In all the steps above it is necessary to consider: 
- assessment of current condition and current decisions in terms of future develop-
ment, 
- qualitative factors and strategies of various participants, 
- the fact that the future is uncertain and multidimensional, 
- the fact that each system must be examined globally and systemically, 
- the fact that the information and strategies are not neutral, but biased, 
- more approaches that are complementary, 
- the fact that there are biases in strategies of people and prevent them. 
Management scenarios can have different forms, depending on the use intended. De-
velopment of scenarios from the perspective of strategic management [13] requires: 
1. Ensuring the permanent monitoring of the situation in the human system from the 
perspective of occurrence of disasters and critical situations resulting from them  
2. Creating the tool for disaster management and detection of critical situations ap-
proaching. 
3. Creating the tools that lead to the removal of formation of critical situations. 
4. Creating the tools to defeat critical situations and to avert protracted critical situa-
tions. 
5. Creating the tools to ensure recovery after critical situations and to ensure the con-
tinued stable development. 
Based on the scenarios in a variant version there are created decision support systems 
that help to manage the safety of monitored system [13].  
Table 2 briefly describes the differences of two categories of scenarios: gaming sce-
narios for disaster management and strategic scenarios for conception management 
[3,4]. The function of both scenarios is to face the unexpected events and test organi-
zational readiness in condition of uncertainty and vagueness. A comparison with data 
shows that the gambling scenario is suitable for the type of reactive management and 
strategic scenario is suitable for the type of proactive management. 
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Table 2. Comparison of application of gaming scenario for disaster defeat and strategic 
scenario for strategic management 
 
Characteristic Gambling scenario for 
disaster management 
Strategic scenario for concep-
tion  management 
Source Job training in preparation 
for incidental situation as a 
military incident, natural 
disaster, industrial acci-
dent. 
Long-term forecast in the frame 
of the policy / decision-making 
concepts and major investments. 
Initial targets Test of operational skills 
and systems aimed to cre-
ate a predictable behaviour 
in unpredictable situations. 
Notify senior managers of organ-
izations about changes in the en-
vironment. 
The nature of the 
scenarios and un-
certainties 
A simple description of the 
emergency event or situa-
tion with which were not 
previously experienced. 
Training for a predictable 
event. 
Multiple descriptions of future 
variants (2-4) in terms of modifi-
cation of social, economic and 
political environment. 
Training of mental flexibility in 
decision-making in an uncertain 
event. 
The main partici-
pants 
1. Entity describing the 
event, design and cope 
of risk (simulation team). 
2. Participants in the field 
testing the  crisis restrain 
(target audience). 
1. Body forming and presenting 
a description of scenarios 
(scenario team of authors). 
2. Leading managers who use 
and make strategic decisions 
according to created scenar-
ios (target audience). 
Methodological 
steps, including 
public participa-
tion 
1. Persuasion of senior 
managers about the im-
portance of used scenar-
ios (simulation team). 
2. Decisions about the pur-
pose of simulation: the 
organizational skills to 
be tested? (Mutual simu-
lation team meeting and 
the target audience). 
3. Construction and credi-
bility proof of   disaster 
or emergency situation 
scenarios (simulation 
team). 
1. Persuasion of senior manag-
ers about the importance of 
used scenarios (team of sce-
nario authors). 
2. Identification of existing as-
sumptions (thinking), espe-
cially of senior managers. 
 
3. Identification of important 
trends, uncertainties, and sug-
gestions of the outside world 
that challenges the current 
mind-set of managers (team 
of scenario authors). 
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4. Design of simulation ex-
ercise aimed to deter-
mine the response of the 
target groups to scenario 
(simulation team). 
5. "Playing games "(Simu-
lation Team + target au-
dience). 
6. Hearing the players and 
assessment of experi-
ence gained during the 
game (Simulation Team 
+ target audience). 
4. The arrangement of factors for 
a small number of scenarios 
(2-4) for the purpose of illus-
trating future variants (team of 
scenario authors). 
5. Convincing presentation of the 
facts to leading managers 
(team of scenario authors). 
6. Work with managers on con-
ceptual management and in-
vestment decisions for each 
scenario (team of scenario au-
thors + target audience). 
Presentation of 
philosophy 
Exercise and cooperation 
for the preparation of spe-
cific abnormal situations. 
Exercise and cooperation aimed 
to prepare for future large uncer-
tainty. 
Presentation of 
objectives 
Improvement of activities 
during a disaster or emer-
gency situation. 
Improved decision-making in pol-
icy and strategy. 
Common objec-
tives 
Facing the unexpected. Test of assumptions and organi-
zational readiness. 
 
The scenarios are applied in risk management, e.g. Processing Model Framework for 
logical model of risk management in the territory is according to [3] as follows: descrip-
tion of the process; defining the objectives (criteria for measuring goals, verification, 
hierarchy and priority objectives); generating the system structure (in a simple directed 
graph format, including features and links); determination of critical points of the pro-
cess; defining the parameters of critical points; determining the relative importance 
(weight) of each parameter; aggregation of survey results and allowed simplification; 
interpretation of results and acceptable risk of decision-making process; definition of 
countermeasures in the form of response scenarios to disasters in variants; and gen-
erating the response management scenarios for the superior version, which was eval-
uated (selected) for the realization as socially most advantageous. 
Most of these tasks is managed by standard methods of operational analysis and sys-
tems engineering, i.e. by: screening the potential risks in the territory; generating the 
criteria to security and sustainable development; modelling the integral risk; risk man-
agement model; catalogue of criteria; methodical processing of results of initial screen-
ing; acceptability of risk; and application of the precautionary principle. 
When screening potential risks in the territory, the rating algorithm is happening in the 
background of a conceptual scheme for sustainable development. The system concept 
determines the basic paradigm, which reflects the gradual steps for the systematic risk 
analysis of the system, see diagrams from theoretical modelling the integral risk [3]. 
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Development of scenarios suitable for practice requires the databases available for the 
respective problem and a multidisciplinary team of experts, application of suitable team 
expert method such as brainstorming, Delphi, panel discussion etc. From the perspec-
tive of protection of it is necessary to handle both optimistic and pessimistic scenarios, 
as, e.g., the conclusions drawn from work [6]. 
 
5. Process models 
Management is a type of human activity that establishes and ensures the system func-
tions. For management support there are at present used the process models and 
project models. Main meaning the process model is to depict the possible development 
tendencies as a consequence of certain phenomenon, pertinently to demark functions 
and role of functions, i.e. according to purpose they are separated into several types. 
The process models enable to compile procedures and scenarios for certain situations 
that have certain similar features. They are suitable for planning, response and reno-
vation. We present the risk management model that has been used at present in pro-
fessional practice, two simple models from daily practice and evaluation of process 
models for crisis management.  
 
5.1. Selected tools supporting the management 
The management is a type of human activity that establishes and ensures the given 
system functions. It is conscious way of application of theoretical and practical 
knowledge of top manager directed to identification and diagnose of problems and tar-
gets in a given system, matters of defeating the problems, determination of procedures 
for required targets reaching and on implementation of procedures connected with su-
pervisory mechanisms directed to the aim in order that required targets might be opti-
mally reached. The tasks are reliable to diagnose each problem, to decide rationally, 
to realise decision-making in given real conditions. 
It is evident that the management is only successful if it is based on professional 
knowledge and on experiences. To obtain required knowledge and experiences we 
must in permanent way collect, process and verify data, perform qualified assessment 
that can only be done by qualified and experienced specialists. The fulfilment of these 
demands is possible to ensure on the top level, i.e. on the government level. Therefore, 
in developed countries there are different organisational structures, dependent on the 
government 
 administration organisation that monitor safety, disasters etc. and prepared grounds 
for decision making and strategic development of land. 
The management consists of individual decision makings. Deciding process is logically 
connected useful sequence of steps of decision maker starting from problem identifi-
cation up to decision making formulation. It consists of the following steps: 
- assembling and processing the information with respect to fact that processing 
must be adequate to problem that is followed (e.g. it means that data processing 
methods for needs of safety management must respect that big disasters with dev-
astative impacts occur rarely, and therefore, the procedures respecting the great 
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numbers law, i.e. algorithms based on extreme or marginal estimations must be 
used, 
- recognition of solution variants, 
- searching for optimal problem solution, 
- own decision making. 
In order that the decision making might be objective and qualified it is necessary: 
- to have a sufficient number of information, its objective processing and cognition of 
suitable reactions, 
- permanent reaction to an access of new findings, 
- to understand solved problems in connection to their vicinity and in their internal 
structure, 
- to combine the suitable knowledge, experiences and new information in order that 
practical way of problem solution might be obtained, 
- credible data assessment. 
At decision making it is necessary to consider: 
- judgement of present conditions and present decision makings from the viewpoint 
of a future development, 
- qualitative factors and strategies of different participants, 
- fact that the future is multidimensional and indefinite, 
- fact that each system must be investigated by both, the globally one  and the sys-
temic one, 
- fact that information and strategies are not neutral but tendentious, 
- more approaches that complete each other, 
- fact that there are prejudices against strategies and humans and to prohibit them. 
Decision making in benefit of matter decided must be objective and qualified. From the 
viewpoint of knowledge on problem that might be decided in systemic concept we di-
vide the decision makings on: 
- standard at which all is known and there are also known standard procedures of 
solution, 
- well-structured at which there is a clear and quantitatively described structure of 
problem in systemic concept and at which the  optimizing methods may be used, 
- weekly structured, i.e. at several elements of structure of judged system there are 
not only uncertainties but also unclearness. For their putting under control there 
must be used methods of system analysis that join exact mathematical methods 
with normalised quantitative considerations (i.e. heuristic methods). Decision mak-
ing heuristic methods are methods of decision-making analysis that are  usually 
divided in: 
• decision making  tree (process model), 
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• decision making matrix. 
It means that for decision making support there are processed either the process 
models or the decision-making matrixes. Assessment of process models are often 
performed by the Delphi method [20] and the assessment of decision-making ma-
trixes is performed by way described in appropriate handbooks , e.g. [6], 
- non-structured, i.e. at many elements, links and flows of judged system there are   
unclearness. Possibility for their solution only gives the expert methods. Expert 
methods simulate intellectual procedures of specialists. They lean on scenario of 
process in which decision maker is directed to gradually solution of partial problems 
of decision making in certain logic procedure of considerations and activities con-
nected with generation and assessment of different variants of solution of a given 
problem. Expert systems are diagnosed and generative (designing) [6]. For deci-
sion making support there are processed case studies [6] that use qualitative data 
by way that enables to obtain idea on frequent solution of problem in certain context 
determined by given conditions in evaluated system and in its vicinity.  
At selection of methods of decision making it is necessary to respect the nature of 
solved problem, determined aims of solution, criteria for solution and possibilities of 
collecting the necessary input information. I.e. in a domain of land safety management, 
it is necessary to respect that the majority of problems is connected with uncertainties 
and unclearness, that are induced by fact that the human system has been continu-
ously developing in permanently changing outer medium, and that for fulfilment of 
safety management targets there is necessary the choice of good strategy for ensuring 
the human system security and sustainable development. 
A strategy is a set of rules for decision making under conditions of uncertainties and 
unclearness. The development of strategic management accompanied by formation of 
effective tools started in the second half of 20 century, when there were processed 
methods of operating analysis based on the creation and assessment of variants of 
possible evolutionary tendencies of system. In 70s there was worked out the process 
approach on which in 80s there was linked the systemic approach that represented net 
interface and complex view on a given reality. 
For creation of variants / alternatives of processes there are today used methods based 
either on the estimation or on the mathematic modelling. At selection of methods for 
decision making there are necessary to respect the nature of solved problem, deter-
mined aims of solution, solution criteria and possibilities of collection of necessary input 
information. To the first group of methods there are belonged the method of analogy, 
brainstorming, brain writing, panel discussion, Delphi method, Gordon methods (tech-
nique of creative thinking), application of fuzzy sets, application of fractals [6]. Methods 
based on mathematical modelling go out from the time series processing. Excessive 
exactitude at construction of exact models often leads to overestimation of theoretical 
viewpoints and to non-respecting the real needs and possibilities of future users. Prag-
matic approach, leaning on analysis of real situation and on creation of a model suita-
ble just for it, is dependent on methodology of model compilation – objectivity, non- 
prejudice and comprehensiveness of data, capabilities and competence of profession-
als. 
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In solved case there is always effort to separate problem into a whole hierarchy of sub 
problems of different orders, i.e. structuring the problem. Problem structuring has two 
dimensions, namely the problem decomposition and the level of abstraction of problem 
representation. According to specialised literature (e.g. [4]) there are only solved the 
problems that are under control of decision maker. 
For management support there are at present processed the process models and the 
project models [4]. Main meaning the process model is to depict possible development 
tendencies as a consequence of certain phenomenon, pertinently to demark functions 
and role of functions, i.e. according to purpose they are separated into several types. 
The application of process model is suitable for repeated activities that can be sepa-
rated and consecutively described. The typical case is the production enterprise with 
a serial production. The application of project approach is conversely suitable for 
unique projects, e.g. big buildings, software development etc. Individual projects allo-
cate in life cycle own and external sources according to momentary need. The project 
approach has always higher uncertainty and is worse described by tree model [4]. 
 
5.2. Process models and their relation to management 
The fundament for process management there is the creation of process models. Mod-
elling is a specific sort of cognition of reality that is around us. It is creation of analogy 
of original of reality attending to its cognition or verification. It is efficiency activity that 
we have been using in the case of complex process / activity / object etc., when we 
want to investigate only certain matters, i.e. the existing reality is simplified or some-
times only reduced or magnified. During the modelling we create the model of identified 
reality (mathematical, thought, oral, graphical, physical (imitation)) for defined purpose, 
that at keeping the basic principles for model creation (following from condition of iso-
morphic or homomorphism representation) may give great  evidence capability that is 
only valid in the extent of reality for each the model was created. Mathematical and 
physical models come from analogies among physical quantities. The model compiled 
according to principles for physical model has with object the same physical nature. 
The model compiled according to principles for mathematical model has the different 
nature but its function is perceived by set of equation that is identical with set of equa-
tions describing the followed items of original. 
Mathematical models we can classify according to the different viewpoints. According 
to the character of parameters and deciding variables [3] the models are classified into: 
1. Deterministic models, i.e. models in which all parameters are fixed deterministic 
values and in which there are only deterministic quantities and relations. I.e. they 
are not allowed nor uncertainties and nor unclearness.  
2. Stochastic models, i.e. such models in which there is occurred at least one param-
eter that is a random quantity and at which there are not unclearness (i.e. deviations 
from reality connected with blunder error at collection or at interpretation of data, 
measurement or with lack of data or with non-linearity of process or with intentional 
or non-intentional neglecting sure actions or events). It means than at least one 
deciding variable in model is a random quantity. Uncertainties connected with this 
random quantity (or with these random quantities) may be assessed by methods of 
mathematic statistics. I.e. probability distribution of random variables in model is 
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known (in practice this distribution is deduced either from logic – theoretical con-
siderations or by methods by mathematical statistics or by expert methods). 
3. Models with unclearness we sometimes call strategic, i.e. such models at which 
there is at least one quantity that is random quantity but its distribution (on contrary 
to stochastic models) is not known and cannot be determined by  logic – theoretical 
considerations or by methods by mathematical statistics (usually owing to low num-
ber of events) or by expert methods. We usually say that at these models we only 
know bottom and top limits of these quantities. 
The modelling is one of the methods by which we solve tasks of practice if there are 
known inputs and outputs. Terminologically, clean-out models are e.g. the models: 
fuzzy multi-criteria; conceptual or qualitative; quantitative; dynamic and simulative; and 
ecological effectiveness. 
Chosen typology of continuous discrete decision models leads to separation into two 
basic groups, namely multi criteria discrete models and multipurpose continuous opti-
mising models. The other possible differentiation is according to so called degree or 
“softness” or “hardness”, i.e. according to completeness and accuracy of input infor-
mation. In this direction there are distinguished models of certain softness type (SOFT) 
and certain hardness type (HARD). 
Process models belong to category of qualitative models on background of process 
analysis and graphical representation. During the 90s of last century there have been 
developed many different technologies. The most popular methods there were the 
OMT (Rumbaugh), the OOAD (Booch) and the OOSE (Jacobson).  Each of these 
methods had own value and accent. The OMT emphasizes analysis, the OOAD pro-
posal and the OOSE behaviour analysis. During the time the methodologies have been 
converged, however, they have been own symbols. Using the different symbols 
caused the problems on a market because one symbol meant different things for dif-
ferent people. This war of methods was terminated by origination the UML (Unified 
Modelling Language) that represents the unification of notations of Booche, Rumbaugh 
and object symbols of many others. At unification of symbols used by this object-ori-
ented method, the UML, is a fundament / standard in domain of object-oriented anal-
yses and of proposals based on experiences of professionals [21].  
Process model supported by qualitative tool enables to describe actual conditions, to 
propose new processes or to optimise existing processes, to reveal unnecessary or 
inefficient processes, to simulate and to evaluate possible impacts of changes before 
their implementation. Process models are from the viewpoint of formalised process 
analysis the high sophisticated tools in which pure graphic representation may be mis-
guided and it may mean unacceptable simplification of judged system. 
Each process is a sequence of phenomena or activities in space and time in which we 
can distinguish inputs and outputs. Inside of each process there are usually parallel 
but distinct sub processes. Each of sub processes is bounded up to certain element in 
space or with certain group of elements in process under account. The process model 
is a representation of certain process directed to a certain target. Because targets are 
not same in practice there are several process models to one process. 
The process models enable to compile procedures and scenarios for certain situations 
that have certain similar features. There are suitable for planning, response and 
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renovation. They are constructed according to real needs. Demand of each application 
of certain process model is the fulfilment of assumptions for a model construction. In 
other case no correct result is guaranteed. Results of process model application are 
the norms, standards, security, emergency, accident, crisis, continuity and other plans, 
disaster scenarios, response scenarios, renovation scenarios etc. 
In management domain, namely in the planning there is possible for certain, strictly 
limited type activities to use the process models reflecting the reality type. With regard 
to above given theory each process model must be tested whether a given reality cor-
responds to model assumptions. If yes, it is possible to use this model   and vice versa. 
With regard to the multiplicity and variety of reality it is not sufficed to use only deter-
ministic and stochastic models but in the case of higher demands on accuracy there is 
necessary to apply models with unclearness in which unclearness are eliminated by 
expert methods or by case study methodology [6]. 
Just the domain of security, emergency, accident and crisis planning are the domains 
in which there is necessary to consider the origination of unforeseeable phenomena 
(human error at decision making, lack of necessary sources of all kinds, occurrence of 
low expected meteorological conditions, unusual combination of phenomena etc.), it is 
the domain in which there is necessary to use the process models based on models 
with unclearness because the use of: 
- deterministic models that are conservative, i.e. that are for the most unfavourable 
conditions, is very expensive, 
- stochastic models do not perceive possible situations because it is too simplified. 
Also, there is come the experience from practice that a complex process model is low 
suitable then the set of partial process models applied in series, when after each ap-
plication of partial model there is performed comparison with reality using the data from 
the safety monitoring and prospective correction of activities or application of corrective 
measures if disagreement with management purposes is found. 
Process models based on deterministic approach have been used at sitting, designing, 
building and processing the technologies and objects because they ensure the highest 
level of safety with regard to present knowledge and experiences. 
Process models based on stochastic approach have been most often used at inspec-
tion activities and at routine management of safety of certain processes or objects. 
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ANNEX 3 – DESCRIPTION OF TYPES OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND RISK  
                      ENGINEERING 
 
Type Concepts of work with risks - characteristics, targets and proce-
dures 
Classical risk   
management 
/ engineering 
Object is a closed system. Risk sources are internal technological 
phenomena in system. The target is to reduce the technological 
risks of a system to a certain level, given by standards and norms. It 
originated in 30s of last century. 
The risk is determined after the design of the system, and therefore, 
there is no possibility to reduce risks connected with an inappropri-
ate solution for a given site and system. The reduction of risks con-
nected with an inappropriate solution for a given site and system 
may be removed only by organisational measures, the effectiveness 
of which is lower than effectiveness of technical ones. 
Classical risk   
management  
/ engineering 
considering 
the human 
factor 
Object is a closed system. Risk sources are internal technological 
phenomena and human factor in system. The target is to reduce: 
the technological risks of a system to a certain level given by stand-
ards and norms; and risks connected with a human factor by safety 
instructions for danger works. It originated at the end of 70s of last 
century. 
The risk is determined after the design of the system, and therefore, 
for reduction of risks connected with an inappropriate solution for a 
given site and system may be removed only by organisational 
measures, the effectiveness of which is lower than effectiveness of 
technical ones.  
 System  
security  
 manage-
ment / engi-
neering 
Object is an open system. Risk sources are external and internal 
phenomena including the human factor. The target is to reduce risks 
for a system: from external and internal phenomena, a human fac-
tor, and also failures of decision-makings at risk management / engi-
neering were to a certain level given by standards and norms; i.e. to 
ensure the security of a system and its assets. No interest on sys-
tem vicinity. IT originated at the first half of 80s of last century. The 
protection of system vicinity is not solved. Unacceptable impacts on 
vicinity can be only mitigated by special off-site emergency plans, 
i.e. by organisational measures and activities if government en-
forces such legislation. 
 System 
safety  
management 
/ engineering 
Object is an open system. Risk sources are given by all hazards ap-
proach. The target is to ensure the security of a system and its as-
sets and the security of system vicinity. The advanced safety engi-
neering uses at risk determination the following principles: risk is 
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determined during the given system whole life cycle, i.e. at sitting, 
designing, building, operation and putting out of operation, and 
eventually at territory bringing in original condition; the risk determi-
nation is directed to user’s demands and to the level of provided 
services; risk is determined according to the criticality of impacts on  
processes, provided services and on assets that are determined by 
public interest; and unacceptable risks are mitigated by tool for risk 
management, i.e. according to technical and organisational pro-
posals, by standardisation of operating procedures or by automata-
ble check-up.  It originated at the second half of 80s of last century. 
The target is the safety, i.e. it is also necessary to trade-off with 
risks having low occurrence frequency if their impacts are unac-
ceptable, and i.e. precaution principle is applied. The set of stand-
ards and norms exist especially for nuclear and chemical domain. 
To prepare groundwork, it is necessary to combine analytical meth-
ods with expert judgement by which we remove vagueness (epis-
temic uncertainties) in data. 
Except of technical measures respecting the precaution principle, 
special technical problems solution there are continuity plans con-
taining the procedures for overcoming the critical conditions in sys-
tem and system vicinity, emergency plans and crisis plans. The risk 
management viewpoint by these characters: sitting – designing – 
construction – project with risk reduction; operation with the integra-
tion of early warning systems and of procedures for the manage-
ment of the acceptable level of risks; and defeating the abnormal, 
emergency and critical conditions at the operation and at putting out 
of the operation. 
 System of 
systems 
safety  
management 
/ engineering 
Object is an open system of systems. The target is to ensure: the 
security of both, the system of systems including its assets and the 
system of systems vicinity; and the co-existence of individual sys-
tems creating the system of systems. 
Risk sources are given by all hazards approach and by interdepend-
ences among the partial systems and by those with vicinity. For-
mation at the beginning of third millennium. The set of standards 
and norms are under discussion and preparation. 
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ANNEX 4 – DESCRIPTION OF TECHNICAL FACILITY SAFETY BUILDING 
 
On the basis of present knowledge, the technical (correctly socio-cyber-technical) fa-
cilities are open systems of systems, i.e. the sets of mutually interconnected open sys-
tems [1-3]. Each of these systems is made up from elements and interconnections 
among elements; the interconnections are set up by linkages among elements and by 
flows of different nature (material, energy, information, finance etc.) among elements.  
The human, as a system developer, ensures that socio-cyber-technical system fulfils 
given tasks (it produces commodities or it furnishes a service) by using the logical 
linkages and the couplings set up by flows. Apart from the required interconnections, 
there can occur under certain circumstances the unacceptable interconnections, which 
lead to a lesser or higher damage of system. Such system damages cause that the 
system does not fulfil tasks and furthermore it endangers itself and its vicinity. There-
fore, at present the technical facilities are made up as secured or safe systems.  
On the basis of works [1-3], the safe system is constructed as the system that is en-
sured against all internal and external disasters including the human factor, i.e. to all 
harmful events and so that at its critical conditions it may not endanger itself and its 
vicinity (i.e. the place in which people live). It means that the safety is the system prop-
erty, which is put above the system dependability. Therefore, the parameters which 
determine the system quality are arranged into the following order: 
- safety, i.e. the system capability to precede the critical system conditions (active 
safety uses the elements of control; passive safety uses the elements of protection) 
and even at its critical conditions does not endanger its vicinity, 
- dependability, i.e. the system capability to provide the required functions under 
the given conditions in the given quality and in the given time interval, 
- availability, i.e. the system capability to provide the required functions at the oc-
currence of process that uses the given function, 
- integrity, i.e. the system capability to provide the time correct and valid report on 
system faults, 
- continuity, i.e. the system capability to provide the required functions without dis-
ruption at the process initiation,  
- accuracy, i.e. the system capability to ensure the required system behaviour in the 
required range. 
At the complex socio-cyber-technical systems that have the form “systems of systems” 
the other parameter of quality is supplemented, namely the interoperability as the in-
terconnected systems capability to carry out the required tasks in required quality cor-
rectly and in-time in a given place and time.  
As was said above, the safety is a set of measures, which are performed by human 
with goal to ensure the safe system, i.e. also the system security and human security 
in dynamically variable conditions of present world [1-3]. Origination and operation of 
the safe system is substantially more exigent on knowledge, sources, forces and 
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means, and therefore, in current practice the secured systems are mostly used. If 
needed, these secured systems are replenished by the organizational measures, 
which ensure the protection of public assets, when these systems endanger them-
selves and their vicinity [1-3].  
The secured system is understood as the system that is secured against all internal 
and external disasters including the human factor, i.e. to all harmful phenomena. In 
comparison with the safe system, the secured system can endanger itself and its vi-
cinity under its critical conditions. With regard to human security, it can only be oper-
ated under certain conditions – so called limits and conditions [1-3]. 
As it is mentioned above, the secured systems involve commonly used technical sys-
tems, which can damage themselves and their vicinities under certain conditions. From 
this reason we follow their special property, i.e. the criticality. This quantity is consist-
ently related to size of impacts of function losses of system or system of systems tar-
geted to fulfilment of certain goals for society [1-3]. According to these works, the de-
termination of criticality in the territory of serviceability goes out from: the possible dis-
asters´ hazard analyses; consideration of territory and system vulnerabilities; and from 
consideration of mutual interconnections among partial systems in the territory, i.e. 
vulnerabilities of whole system of systems. At criticality determination they are consid-
ered the following assets: public; technical system; territory; and the State, and the 
following questions: 
1. How does the facility react to certain types of disasters?  
2. How is the facility robust, resilient and rubbery? 
3. How the behaviour of facility can be improved? 
4. What management mechanisms in the sense of control are suitable? 
5. What rules can be used for the self-regulatory or tolerable deflections? 
6. Which parts of facility are critical? 
For ensuring the safety, including the functionality, dependability and stability of facility, 
it is necessary to know certain threshold – the criticality, which determines the condi-
tions at which the system of systems focused on certain targets´ fulfilment, does not 
ensure expected functions in a required time, in a required site, and in a required qual-
ity. Therefore, with regard to results of analyses of: important and dangerous faults and 
failures; losses and damages caused by system malfunctions; external disasters´ im-
pacts; failures of mitigating measures; reactions of substances in a given facility; leak-
age or discharge of substances (pipelines) etc., the limits and conditions of facility or 
infrastructure are determined [1-3]. 
Limits and conditions are tools for safety management of these technical facilities. 
Their observance ensures the safe operation of technical facility. They are the set of 
positively defined conditions, for which it is proven that the technological facility oper-
ation is safe. The appropriated set includes data on permissible parameters, require-
ments on operation capability, setting the protection systems, demands on the work-
ers´ activities and on the organizational measures leading to the fulfilment of all defined 
requirements for design operation conditions [1-3]. 
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For ensuring the safety, i.e. also the reliability and the functionality, the control system 
of given technical facility needs to keep the determined physical quantities (parameters 
of appropriate subsystems) on values determined in advance. During the process of 
regulation, the control system changes the conditions of individual controlled systems 
by bearing upon the efficient quantities, with aim to reach the required condition of 
whole system. In terms of integral safety [1-3], the following properties of control sys-
tem are pursued in the order:  
- level of observance of established operation conditions and prevention of damaging 
(unacceptable) impacts on the system itself and its vicinity, 
- functionality (level of satisfaction of required tasks), 
- operability, i.e. level of fulfilment of required tasks at normal, abnormal and critical 
conditions, 
- operation stability, i.e. level of observance of established conditions during the time, 
- inherently included resilience to possible disasters. 
From above mentioned facts it follows that management and control systems deter-
mine quality and performance of systems. They have decisive influence on safety, and 
therefore, their following factors are considered: responsible autonomy; adaptability; 
integrity; and meaningfulness of tasks. Because the human behaviour is not determin-
istic, the main characteristics of considered systems are: the emerged properties; non-
determinist behaviour; and complex relations among the organizational targets. Peo-
ple, maintenance, renewal and changes decide about each followed system. From the 
engineering viewpoint the followed systems are characterized by structure, hardware, 
procedures, surround, information flows, organization (problem of organizational acci-
dents) and interconnections among the mentioned items [1-3]. 
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